Skoblin's History Blog

This blog is composed of articles and translations written by Skoblin pertaining to the Soviet Security forces, White Russian underground movements and Russian counter-revolutionary forces during the 1920s and 1930s. Skoblin can be reached at

Tuesday, March 31, 2009

The Yezhov File (IV)

Results of the search of former People's Commissar N. I. Yezhov's apartment, 11 April 1939.

Chief, 3rd Special Section NKVD
Colonel, comrade Panyushkin


I am reporting about several items, which were discovered during the search conducted at the Kremlin apartment of Yezhov Nikolai Ivanovich, arrested according to Order 2950 on 10 Arpil 1939.

1. During the search of the desk in Yezhov's office, I discovered in one of the drawers an open package with the letterhead Secretariat NKVD, addressed to TsK VKP(b), comrade Yezhov. In the package was found four bullets (three from the cartridges for a Nagan pistol, and one, apparently, for a Colt revolver).
The bullets were split from being fired. Each bullet was wrapped in paper with the words Zinoviev, Kamenev and Smirnov written on each in pencil, with the paper saying Smirnov wrapped around two bullets. Apparently, these bullets were sent to Yezhov after the executions of Zinoviev, Kamenev and the other. I have taken possession of this package.

2. During the search, I took possession of a Walther pistol, No. 623573, caliber 6.35, and a Browning, caliber 6.35 No. 104799, which were hidden in different places behind books in the book cabinet. In the office desk, I discovered a Walther pistol, caliber 7.65, No. 777615, loaded, with a broken firing pin.

3. While searching the book shelf, behind books in various places were discovered 3 half-bottles (full) of wheat vodka, one half-bottle of vodka, half-emptied, and two empty half-bottles of vodka. They were apparently placed in various locations on purpose.

4. While searching through the books in the library, I discovered 115 books and brochures by counter-revolutionary authors, as well as books by White emigres, in both russian and foreign languages. The books were apparently sent to Yezhov through the NKVD. As the entire apartment has been sealed up by me, the indicated books remain in the office and have been collected in one location.

5. While conducting a search of Yezhov's dacha (sovkhoz Meshcherino) among other books by counter-revolutionary authors, being subject to seizure, were seized two hardbound books titled Concerning the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist-Zinovievite group. The books have a title page and typed text comprising 10-15 pages, with completely blank stitched paper comprising the rest of the volumes.
While conducting the search, various materials, papers, writings, letters and notes of a personal and party character, were discovered and seized according to the search order.

Assistant of the Chief,
3rd Special Section, NKVD
Captain, State Security
11 April 1939.

The Yezhov File (III)

Kedrov report concerning suspicious contacts maintained by former People's Commissar, N. I Yezhov

Top Secret
To the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Union of the SSR
To Commissar of State Security, First Rank, comrade Beria


I consider it necessary to inform You about facts known to me, requiring verification, which point to the the non-accidental nature of the relations between N. I. Yezhov and individuals, subsequently exposed as enemies of the people.

1. Yezhov maintained relations with Pyatakov. Rodos informed me of this in 1936. In October 1936, I was ordered to interrogate Radek. At that time he had still not confessed to his criminal activity. He spoke rather openly about his connections with Pyatakov and other participants of an anti-soviet bloc. According to him, Pyatakov's apartment served as a meeting place and drinking spot for Pyatakov's friends. Radek named several persons, who frequented Pyatakov's apartment, including N. I. Yezhov. Kursky and Berman (the former Head of the SPO [Secret Political Section] NKVD and his deputy), to whom I reported Radek's statement, suggested that I not interest myself in this matter, because this was already known to the Politburo. Several day later I was dismissed from interrogating Radek. Radek was still refusing to admit guilt, but was on the verge of confessing. This matter could be clarified by Radek and Berman, and by L. Kogan and A. Al'tman (the former interrogated Pyatakov, the latter - Radek).

2. For reasons not understood, Nikolia Ivanovich Yezhov maintained unusual relations with a certain A. A. Mnatsakanov, a former official in the INO [Foreign Section] NKVD. In the summer of 1938, Mnatsakanov was expelled from the party as a clearly foreign element. Somewhat later it became known that he was a German spy. Meanwhile, suspicions about Mnatsakanov had emerged and were well-known among party circles in the INO NKVD long before this. Sufficient grounds for mistrusting Mnatskanov were apparent and it was impossible not to notice them. This individual was in no way connected with the Soviet Union. He had already gone abroad during the Imperialist war. His entire family lived outside the Soviet Union. He himself continually lived abroad, in Persia, Germany and Austria, until 1936. Until 1936, he would either be travelling in the Soviet Union or be here only to arrange his personal affairs and would then immediately depart once more. While not being accepted for Soviet citizenship, he would refer to himself as a Soviet citizen and carried a Soviet passport , while reserving the right to Persian citizenship. In Vienna he even carried a diplomatic passport as vice-consul. He was accepted as a candidate for the VKP(b) through the decision of a secret commission of the OGPU party committee. The members of the commission consisted of Slutsky and Ostrovsky from the party committee and Speransky from the personnel section. He had contacts with his brother, a Trotskyist and provocateur residing in Persia. When the Persians arrested this provocateur as a diversion, Slutsky obtained his release through the rezident INO OPGU in Persia. Mnatsakanov's wife, Boshkovich Erna, kept and maintained contact with her first husband - a Polish spy. Both Mnatsakanov and his wife did their utmost to become acquainted with and ingratiate themselves with Agranov, Yagoda's relatives, and so on, whom they met abroad. An agent of the INO OPGU from 1922 or 1923, Mnatsakanov become an official at the Berlin rezidentura in 1932, thank to his close personal relations with Slutsky. In 1935, he became the assistant of the rezident in Vienna and in the following year was assigned to work in the INO OGPU to the post of assistant to the section chief. His work with agents was notable for suspicious activities. In 1934, he persistently attempted to rehabilitate a provocateur with the codename "Paren'" and another time he divulged our plans to a double-agent with the codename "Lekart." Although he did not confess to this, Slutsky certainly new about it After Yezhov's appointment to the post of People's Commissar in 1936, Mnatsakanov told me the he was a personal acquaintance of Yezhov's. Another time, Mnatsakanov told me, that Yezhov would not consent to meet with any NKVD officials in Vienna except himself. Mnatsakanov and his wife served as Yezhov's guides. When my personal relations with Mnatsakanov failed to improve, he started dropping by my office for the purpose of calling Yezhov on my phone. He phoned Yezhov before the party committee session which discussed his party status. At the party committee session, Mnatsakanov behaved insolently, as if he counted on some sort of assistance. After Mnatsakanov's arrest, I appealed to Volynsky (former Deputy Head, 3rd Section GUGB) twice to permit me to interrogate Mnatsakanov regarding his criminal activities while in office. Volynsky did not grant me his consent. The third time I brought up this matter, I was talking with Dulov (also a former Deputy Head, 3rd Section GUGB), when the conversation turned to the Mnatsakanov case. Dulov told me that Mnatsakanov had confessed that he was a German spy and was beginning to write testimony about his criminal activities. During one of Mnatsakanov's interrogations, however, Yezhov dropped in during his rounds through the prison. Yezhov asked Mnatsakanov, "So, what are we doing, writing?," to which Mnatsakanov responded affirmatively. Yezhov, in monosyllables, said, "Well, write, write." After this, Mnatsakanov recanted his testimony and soon after was shot. This entire matter could be clarified by Dulov and Boshkovich, V. P. Roshchin and A. L. Shanina (former officials of the Vienna rezidentura INO NKVD) and by Slutsky's wife.

NKVD official
Senior Lieutenant, state security
28 January 1939.

The Yezhov File (II)

Investigative material collected on N. I. Yezhov's family members and relatives

Relations between the writer M. Sholokhov and the wife of N. I. Yezhov

To People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR
Commissar of State Security, First Rank
Comrade Beria


Regarding your orders to monitor the activities of the writer Sholokhov in reference to travel warrant "N," I report: monitoring of Sholokhov, who arrived in Moscow with his family and is staying in room 215 of the "National" hotel, commenced during the last days of May. Monitoring of the indicated subject continued from 3.06 to 11.06.38. Copies of the summary reports are available.
In approximately the middle of August, Sholokhov arrived in Moscow again and stayed at the same hotel. Standing orders provided for the tapping into rooms during spare hours on an individual basis, and the taking of necessary measures upon detection of a conversation of interest. The stenographer Koroleva tapped into Sholokhov's room, and having recognized his voice, reported to me whether it was necessary to monitor him.I immediately reported this to Alekhin, who also ordered the monitoring to continue. Praising Koroleva's initiative, Alekhin ordered her to be awarded with a bonus, a draft order for wihich was drawn up. On the second day of monitoring, Yur'evich assumed the duties of stenographer and recorded comrade Yezhov's wife visiting Sholokhov in his room.

Sholokhov's room was monitored for more than ten days, right up to his departure, and while under observation intimate relations between Sholokhov and Yezhov's wife were recorded.

Deputy Chief of the First Department of the 2nd Special Section NKVD
Lieutenant, State Security
12 December 1938.


Reported criminal activity on the part of N. I. Yezhov's brother, I. I. Yezhov, and nephew, V. Babulin.

Special Communique from L. P. Beria to I. V. Stalin concerning I. I. Yezhov, 30 January 1939.

30 January 1939. No. 471/6
TsK VKP(b) - to comrade STALIN

The NKVD USSR received a statement from comrade SHABULIN Mikhail Ivanovich, member of the VKP(b) and official of the Moscow regional UNKVD, regarding terrorists threats known by him to have been uttered by YEZHOV Ivan Ivanovich, brother of the former People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.
An investigation has been conducted regarding this statement and we have questioned the declarant SHABULIN, the witness SOKOLOVA (LOGINOVA) Aleksandra Ivanovna (non-party, soldering worker) and the witness YEZHOVA Zinaida Vasil'evna (wife of I. I. Yezhov, non-party, housing committe clerk for building No. 14, Narodnaya street).
During questioning on 14 January 1939, the witness SHABULIN M. I. testified:
- Several years ago his acquaintance, Ivanovna, Zinaida Vasil'evna married YEZHOV Ivan Ivanovich, the borther of comrade N. I. YEZHOV.
In the summer of 1937, in the SHABULIN's absence, another acquaintance of his, LOGINOVA Aleksandra, a worker and wife of a party member serving as office manager for the Porletarski district soviet, came to his apartment and reported that her friend, IVANOVNA (YEZHOVA) Zinaida had told her about the terrorist inclinations of her husband, YEZHOV Ivan Ivanovich. The latter had spoken to his wife about how "he would now be working in the NKVD and that it would be easy for him to sneak past and murder comrade STALIN."
SHABULIN testified further that the very next day he handed in a report addressed to the Head of the DTO [Rail Transport Section] GUGB [Main Administration State Security] NKVD of the Dzerzhinski railway, KAMENSKY (now arrested), who in turn gave the report to the former Head of the Transport Section GUGB NKVD VOLKOV (also arrested).
During questioning on 15 January 1939, the witness SOKOLOVA (LOGINOVA) A. I. testified:
- Once, around the middle of 1937, IVANOVA-YEZHOVA Zinaida told LOGINOVA thet her husband, YEZHOV Ivan, expressed his hostility towards the party in the presence of company, stating that he would commit a terrorist act against comrade STALIN at the first opportunity.
On 15 January 1939, the witness YEZHOVA Z. V. testified:
- Her husband, YEZHOV Ivan, was a constant drunk and philanderer and had been detained more than once by the police. In one such drunken incident, he fractured the skull of a policeman, yet each time he was released, after explaining his close relationship to the former People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, comrade N. I. YEZHOV.
At various times, YEZHOV Ivan received some four furnished rooms from the NKVD, which he immediately let out to women with whom he co-habitated.
On 26 January 1936, YEZHOVA Zinaida made a verbal statement concerning her husband to the former NKVD officials, VOLOVICH and SAVICH, and later, at the end of May 1937, she directed a statement to N. I. YEZHOV. In this statement, YEZHOVA Zinaida reported that her husband had established contact with a Polish family, the SHPAKOVSKY'S, who were residing in Moscow, and was drinking with them in suspicious company. SHPAKOVSKY himself once declared - "How good it would be to find myself selected for the Supreme Soviet. At the first opportunity I would kill STALIN, and more if possible." However, Zinaida YEZHOVA received no response to her statement from N. I. YEZHOV.
At the same time, YEZHOVA Zinaida testified, that KRASNOLUTSKAYA Ksenia, who resided in the same apartment with the nephew of comrade N. I. YEZHOV, Viktor BABULIN, told her that the latter was constantly getting drunk, hanging out with foreigners, frequenting retaurants and was once driven home in a drunken stupor by a vehicle belonging to some embassy.
The same KRASNOLUTSKAYA told YEZHOVA Zinaida that Viktor BABULIN was accepting bribes from persons whose relatives or family members were under arrest. Thus, Viktor BABULIN accepted 2000 rubles from SOINA Matil'da Ivanovna in order to obtain the release of her son, Nikolai, who had been arrested for preparing a terrorist act against comrade STALIN. Nikolai SOIN was freed. For a bribe, Viktor BABULIN managed to obtain the relase was of another arrestee by the name of MAKAROV Aleksei.
Viktor BABULIN also received sanitarium passes through the wife of YEZHOV N. I., Yevgenia Solomovna, and sold them.
Zinaida YEZHOVA also testified that the sister of N. I. YEZHOV, Yevdokia Ivanovna, and her husband PIMENOV Yegor, a tailor-craftsmen, who are residing in comrade N. I. YEZHOV'S former apartment, have expressed sharply anti-soviet views. Yevgenia Solomonovna YEZHOVA constantly sends a stream of present to the PIMENOV apartment.

NKVD USSR considers it necessary to arrest YEZHOV Ivan Ivanovich.
I request instructions.
SUPPLEMENT: Interrogation record of witness YEZHOVA, Z. V. from 15 January 1939.
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of SSR.
L. Beria

Monday, March 30, 2009

The Yezhov File (I)

Resignation request from People's Commissar N. I. Yezhov, 23 November 1938.

Politburo TsK VKP(b)

23 November 1938.
To comrade Stalin

Top Secret

I request that the TsK [Central Committee] VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks)] relieve me from my duties for the following reasons:

1.The statement made by the Chief of the UNKVD [Local NKVD] Ivanovsk region, comrade Zhuravelev, which was discussed in the Politburo on 19 November 1938, is wholly corroborated by the facts mentioned therein. As is apparent from the statement, comrade Zhuravlev warned me about the suspicious behaviour of Litvin, Radzivilovsky and other leading officials of the NKVD, who were attempting to impede the cases involving several enemies of the people, with whom they were connected in regards conspiratorial anti-Soviet activity. This is the central fact for which I carry responsibility. Especially serious was the note sent by comrade Zhuravlev concerning the suspicious behaviour of Litvin, who was preventing in every way possible the exposure of Postyshev, with whom he was connected in conspiratorial work.It is evident that if I had displayed the attentiveness and diligence required of a Bolshevik regarding comrade Zhuravlev's warnings, the enemy of the people, Litvin, and other swine, would have been unmasked long ago and would not have been occupying responsible positions in the NKVD.

2. While comrade Zhuravlev's statement was being discussed at the Politburo session, additional completely intolerable deficiencies in the operational activity of the organs of the NKVD were disclosed. The main instrument of intelligence activity, agent-information work, proved to be supplied from a number of wretched sources. Foreign intelligence has to be essentially rebuilt, since the INO [Foreign Section] was littered with spies, many of which were the rezidents operating abroad, who were working with the agents they had uncovered. The investigation section also suffers from a number of significant deficiencies. The main problem here lay in the fact that the investigation of the most important arrested persons was in many cases led by conspirators within the NKVD, who had not yet been exposed. These conspirators succeeded in generally hindering the development of the cases, suppressing them from the start, and - most important - concealing their conspiratorial accomplices among the ChK [Cheka]officials. The most neglected section of the NKVD turned out to be the cadres. Failing to take into consideration, that the conspirators within the NKVD and the foreign intelligence agents they were connected with had succeeded in recruiting not only the leadership of the ChK, but also the middle section and often lower officials over a period of no less than ten years, I was content in having routed the leadership and most of the middle officials who had been compromised. As has now become clear, many of the newly promoted officials were also spies and conspirators. It is understood that I must carry responsibility for all of this.

3. The most glaring omission on my part involves the situation within the security section protecting members of the TsK and the Politburo. First, there was a significant number of unmasked conspirators and simply dirty individuals who had been associated with Pauker. Second, both Kursky, who had replaced Pauker and subsequently shot himself, and the now arrested Dagin, also turned out to be conspirators and had placed a number of their people within the security section. I had believed these two heads of the security section to be honest individuals. Having been mistaken in this regard, I must also bear responsibility. Without touching upon those objective facts which may, in the best case, explain some of my bad work, I wish only to dwell on my own personal guilt as leader of the People's Commissariat. First, it is completely obvious that I was not equal to the task of managing the work involved with such an important People's Commissariat, and failed to comprehend the full scale of the most complicated intelligence work. The fault is mine that I failed at the proper time to bring this issue before the TsK VKP(b) with the diligence of a Bolshevik. Second, the fault is mine that, having seen a number of significant deficiencies in work and, what is more, even criticizing these deficiencies within my People's Commissariat, I failed at the same time to bring these issues before the TsK VKP(b). Being content with individual successes, papering over the cracks, and floundering on my own, I attempted to rectify the problem. It was being corrected, but then I lost my nerve. Third, the fault is mine that I dealt with personnel administration in an utterly narrow-minded fashion. Many times, while not trusting an official politically, I dragged out the issue of his arrest, biding my time, while they picked up another recruit.For the same narrow-minded reasons, I was mistaken in my view of many officials, recommending them for positions of authority, only to have them exposed now as spies. Fourth, the fault is mine that I displayed a carelessness utterly intolerable for a Chekist in the matter of resolutely cleaning out the security section guarding the members of the TsK and the Politburo. This carelessness was particularly inexcusable in the matter of arresting the Kremlin conspirators (Bryukhanov and others). Fifth, the fault is mine that, while doubting the political reliability of such persons as the former head of the UNKVD DVK [Far Eastern Territory], the traitor Lyushkov, and the recent People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, chairman Uspensky, I failed to take sufficient Chekist precaution and by that allowed Lyushkov the opportunity to escape to Japan and Uspensky to disappear, for whom the search continues. All this, taken together, makes it completely impossible to continue my work in the NKVD. Once more, I ask that I be relieved of my duties in the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Despite these significant deficiencies and blunders in my work, I have to say that the daily efforts of the TsK NKVD has smashed a great number of enemies.

I offer my word and pledge as a Bolshevik before the TsK VKP(b) and before comrade Stalin that I will bear in mind all of these lessons in my further duties, that I will consider my mistakes, and will improve myself in any area that the TsK considers necessary to make use of me, and to justify the confidence given in me by the TsK.


I request that you give instructions not to touch my aged mother. She is 70 years old. She is guilty of nothing. I am the last of four children which she will have lost. She is a suffering, unhappy being.


Extract from the decision of the Politburo TsK VKP(b), 24 November 1938.

Protocol No. 65a, 24 November 1938.

P. 160. Statement of comrade Yezhov, N. I.

Having considered the statement of comrade Yezhov requesting to be relieved from his duties at the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs USSR and taking into consideration both the reasons set forth in this statement and his ill-health, which do not allow him the possibility to manage at the same time two large people's commissariats, - the TsK VKP(b) decrees:

1. To comply with the request of comrade Yezhov concerning his release from duties as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR.

2. To reserve for comrade Yezhov the duties of Secretary of the TsK VKP(b), Chairman of the Party Control Commission and People's Commissar of Water Transport.

Secretary TsK, Stalin

Sunday, March 29, 2009

Katyn Documents (IV)


To the Chairman of the Governing Body of the Historical-Educational,
Philanthropic and Human Rights Society "Memorial," Roginsky A. B.

Your letter (№ 1414-213 form 15.03.2005.) requesting information pertaining to the investigation of the so-called "Katyn" case has been received and examined by the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office.

I am informing you that on 21 September 2004, the Chief Military Prosecutor discontinued the criminal case, which had been opened on 22 March 1990 by the Prosecutor's Office of Khar'kov oblast' of the Ukrainian SSR, upon the discovery of burial sites of Polish citizens in the parkland area of Khar'kov, and which was thereupon handed over to the GVP [Chief Military Prosecutor's Office] where it was taken up on 30 September that same year.

The investigation has established that the Polish citizens, who had been held in prison camps operated by the NKVD USSR, were investigated by the organs of the NKVD according to the methods established by the UPK [Criminal Procedures Code] of the RSFSR (1923) regarding the charge of state crimes.

At the beginning of March 1940, as a result of investigation, the criminal cases were handed over for examination to an extra-judicial body - the "Troika," which examined the criminal cases involving 14542 Polish citizens (10,710 persons on the territory of the RSFSR and 3832 persons on the territory of the U[krainian]SSR), found them guilty of state crimes and took the decision to have them executed.

The investigation has reliably established the deaths of 1803 Polish prisoners of war, resulting from the implementation of the Troika's decisions, and has determined the identity of 22 of them.

A specific number of highly-placed officials of the USSR had superseded their authority according to paragraph "B", article 193-17 of the UK [Criminal Code] of the RSFSR (1926), which entailed serious consequences under aggravating circumstances. On 21.09.2004, the criminal case against them was discontinued on the basis of paragraph 4, part 1, article 24 of the UPK [Criminal Procedures Code] of the RF [Russian Federation] on account of the death of the accused.

In the course of the investigation, and as a result of Polish initiative, the case was thoroughly researched and did not corroborate a claim of genocide against the Polish people during the period investigated, that is, the spring of 194o. Taking this into account, the criminal case on the basis of genocide was discontinued for lack of criminal activity, in accordance with paragraph 1, part 1, article 24 of the UPK [Criminal Procedures Code] of the RF [Russian Federation].

The actions of NKVD USSR officials regarding the Polish citizens were based on criminal-legal motives and did not have the purpose of destroying any demographic group.

The criminal case comprises 183 volumes. In accordance with the law of the RF [Russian Federation] "On State Secrets," it is acknowledged that the 36 volumes constituting the "Katyn" criminal case contain documents, which contain information comprising state secrets and are stamped "secret" and "top secret", including the decree closing the case, from 21 September 2004. According to the Commission's conclusions, a further 80 volumes of the criminal case contain confidential and official information subject to restricted circulation and have been stamped "For official use only". Another 67 volumes bear no such stamps.

The Russian Prosecutor's Office has informed the General Prosecutor's Office of the Polish Republic that the investigation into this criminal case has been concluded and is prepared to allow access to the 67 volumes of the criminal case, which did not contain information comprising state secrets.

At the present time, the possibility of applying the RF [Russian Federation] law "On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression" to the executed Polish citizens is being ascertained.

Chief of Supervisory Department
for the Implementation of the Laws
regarding Federal Security

Major-General, Judicial
V. K. Kondratov

Saturday, March 28, 2009

Katyn Documents (III)

Note from the Chairman of the KGB, A. N. Shelepin to N. S. Khrushchev regarding matters pertaining to the NKVD operation corresponding to the Politburo resolution from 5 March 1940. (3 March 1959)

Top Secret

To Comrade Khrushchev N. S.

In the Committee for State Security, Council of Ministers USSR, are stored records and other materials concerning prisoners and interned officers, gendarmes, policemen, settlers, landowners and other persons of the former bourgeois Poland, who were executed in 1940. According to the decisions of a special troika of the NKVD USSR, some 21.857 persons were executed, including: in the Katyn forest (Smolensk region) 4.421 persons, at Starobelsk camp near Khar'kov 3.820 persons, at Ostashkov camp (Kalinin region) 6.311 persons and 7.305 persons executed in other camps and prisons in the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.

The entire operation involving the liquidation of the indicated persons was conducted on the basis of the Resolution of the TsK [Central Committee] of the KPSS [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] from 5 March 1940.
According to the files, all these persons were condemned to capital punishment by those in charge of them as war prisoners and interned persons in 1939.

No one has divulged information regarding these files from the moment the operation was carried out, that is, since 1940, and all the records pertaining to these
21.857 persons have been sealed

These files present neither an operational interest nor a historical significance for the Soviet authorities and they hardly constitute a valid interest for our Polish friends. On the other hand, any unforeseen circumstances leading to the disclosure of the operation which was conducted may bring about undesirable consequences for our government. This is especially the case in regards those who were executed in Katyn forest, for which there exists an official story, corroborated by an investigative commission set up by the Soviet authorities in 1944, named: "the Special Commission concerning the identification and investigation of the Polish military officers executed by the German-Fascist invaders in the Katyn forest."

According to the conclusions established by this commission, all the Poles who were liquidated there were destroyed by the German occupiers. Materials relating to the investigation were widely reported in the Soviet and foreign press at that time. The conclusions of the commission are firmly established in international public opinion.

Pursuant to this, it seems expedient to destroy all files of the persons who were executed in 1940, in accordance with the described operation.

In order to adress possible questions regarding the policy of the TsK [Central Committee] of the KPSS [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] or the Soviet government, there remains the records from the meetings of the troika of the NKVD USSR, which condemned the indicated persons to be executed and documents concerning the implementation of the troika's decisions. The overall size of these documents is not large and they may be kept in a special pouch.

A draft resolution for the TsK
[Central Committee] KPSS [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] is attached.

Chairman of the Committe for State Security, Council of Ministers

A. Shelepin

3 March 1959.


Draft Resolution of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Top Secret

Resolution of the Presidium of the TsK KPSS


To permit the Committee of State Security, Council of Ministers USSR, to destroy all files regarding the operation conducted in accordance with the Resolution of the TsK KPSS from 5 March 1940, except the minutes from the meetings of the troika NKVD USSR.

Katyn Documents (II)

Extract from Report No. 13 of the Proceedings of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) , March 5, 1940.

All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). CENTRAL COMMITTEE

com. [comrade]* Beria

№ P13/144.
5 March 1940.

Extract from Report No. 13 of the Proceedings of the Politburo of the TSk [Central Committee] from ___ 193_

144.- Issue, NKVD USSR.

I. To propose NKVD USSR:

1) the matter concerning the 14700 former Polish officers, officials, landowners, policemen, intelligence officials, gendarmes, settlers and prison guards
located in prisoner of war camps,

2) as well as the matter concerning the 11000 members of various K-R [counter-revolutionary], espionage and saboteur organizations, former landowners, factory owners, former Polish officers, officials and deserters, who have been arrested and placed in prisons in the western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia -

- be considered by special order for the application of the highest method of punishment - execution.

II. Consideration that this matter be carried out without appeal on the part of the arrested and without presentation of the charges, the conclusions of the investigation, and the statement of indictment in the following manner:

a) against persons located in the prisoner of war camps, - according to information, presented by the Administration of Prisoner of War Affairs NKVD USSR,

b) against arrested persons - according to information presented by the NKVD USSR [Ukrainian] and NKVD BSSR [Belorussian]

III. Consideration that judgment in this matter be decided by a troika, consisting of comrades Merkulov, Kabulov and Bashtakov (Head of the 1st Special Section of the NKVD USSR).

SECRETARY TsK [Central Committee]

*[All italics added by skoblin]

Katyn Documents (I)

NKVD note concerning Polish prisoners of war, 5 March 1940.


"..." MARCH 1940
№ 794/B

5 March 1940

In the camps for war prisoners of the NKVD USSR and in the prisons of the western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia at the present time are a large number of former officers of the Polish army, former officials of the Polish police and intelligence organs, members of Polish K-R [counter-revolutionary]* parties, members of openly K-R [counter-revolutionary] insurgent organizations, deserters and others. These are all sworn enemies of Soviet power, filled with hatred for the Soviet state.

The imprisoned military officers and police officials, situated in the prison camps, are attempting to continue their K-R [counter-revolutionary] work, and conduct anti-Soviet agitation. Each of them is only waiting for the moment of liberation, in order to engage in the possibility of active struggle against Soviet power.

A number of K-R [counter-revolutionary] insurgent organizations have been uncovered by the organs of the NKVD in the western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia. In all of these K-R [counter-revolutionary] organizations, former officers from the former Polish army and former police and gendarme officials were playing an active leadership role.

Among the detained deserters and border violators, there have also been discovered a significant number of individuals, who are members of K-R [counter-revolutionary] espionage and insurgent organizations.

In the prisoner of war camps, there are in total (not counting soldiers and non-commissioned officers) 14736 officers, officials, landowners, policemen, gendarmes, prison guards, settlers and intelligence officials, more than 97% of which are Polish by nationality.

These include:

Generals, colonels and lieutenant-colonels - 295
Majors and captains - 2080
Lieutenants, 2nd lieutenants and cornets - 6049
Officers and junior commanders from the police, border guards and gendarmes - 1030
Policemen, gendarmes, prison guards, and intelligence officials - 5138
Officials, landowners, catholic priests and settlers - 144

The prisons in the western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia contain 18632 arrested persons (of which 10685 are Polish), including:

Former officers - 1207
Former policemen, intelligence officials and gendarmes - 5141
Spies and saboteurs - 347
Former landowners, factory owners and officials - 465
Members of various K-R [counter-revolutionary] and insurgent organizations and various K-R [counter-revolutionary] elements - 5345
Deserters - 6127

Proceeding on the basis that these are all inveterate and irreparable enemies of Soviet power, the NKVD USSR considers it necessary:

I. To propose NKVD USSR

1) the matter concerning the 14700 former Polish officers, officials, landowners, policemen, intelligence officials, gendarmes, settlers and prison guards
located in prisoner of war camps,

2) as well as the matter concerning the 11000 members of various K-R [counter-revolutionary], espionage and saboteur organizations, former landowners, factory owners, former Polish officers, officials and deserters, who have been arrested and placed in prisons in the western regions of the Ukraine and Belorussia -

- be considered by special order for the application of the highest method of punishment - execution.

II. Consideration that this matter be carried out without appeal on the part of the arrested and without presentation of the charges, the conclusions of the investigation, and the statement of indictment in the following manner:

a) against persons located in the prisoner of war camps, - according to information, presented by the Administration of Prisoner of War Affairs NKVD USSR,

b) against arrested persons - according to information presented by the NKVD USSR [Ukrainian] and NKVD BSSR [Belorussian]

III. Consideration that judgment in this matter be decided by a troika, consisting of comrades Beria [crossed out in blue pencil], Merkulov [Kobulov added in blue pencil] and Bashtakov (Head of the 1st Special Section of the NKVD USSR).

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs

Union of SSR

L. Beria

* [all italics added by skoblin]


1. On front page, "for" followed by Stalin's signature in bold blue pencil / across text
2. On front page, Voroshilov's signature in bold blue pencil / across text
On front page, Molotov's signature in plain pencil / across text
On front page, Mikoyan's signature in bold blue pencil / across text
On front page, "t. [comrade] Kalinin - for" inscribed in pencil / side margin
On front page, "t. [ comrade] Kaganovich - for" inscribed in pencil / side margin

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

Shvernik Report on the trial against Tukhachevsky and other members of the RKKA (I)


On 11 June 1937, the following prominent members of the Red Army were condemned to death by a special judicial hearing of the Supreme Court of the USSR on the charges betrayal of the Motherland (Art. 58-1 "B" of the RSFSR Criminal Code), terror (Art. 58-8) and military conspiracy (Art. 58-11):

1. Marshal of the Soviet Union Tukhachevskii, Mikhail Nikolaevich, born 1893, member of the VKP(B) since 1918, candidate to the Central Committee VKP(B), member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Deputy People's Commissar of Defense USSR;

2. Army Commander 1st Rank Yakir, Iona Emmanuilovich, born 1896, member of the VKP(B) since 1917, member of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) and Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Commander of the Kiev Military District;

3. Army Commander 1st Rank Uberovich, Ieronim Petrovich, born 1896, member of the VKP(B) since 1917, candidate to the Central Committee of the VKP(B), member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Commander of the Belorussian Military District;

4. Army Commander 2nd Rank Kork, Avgust Ivanovich, born 1888, member of the VKP(B) since 1927, member of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Head of the M. V. Frunze Military Academy;

5. Corps Commander Eideman, Robert Petrovich, born 1895, member of the VKP(B) since 1917, Chairman of the Central Council OSOAVIAKHIM of the USSR;

6. Corps Commander Feld'man, Boris Mironovich, born 1890, member of the VKP(B) since 1919, former Head of Administration, Command Personnel, of the People's Commissariat of Defence of the USSR;

7. Corps Commander Primakov, Vitalii Markovich, born 1897, member of the VKP(B) since 1914, Deputy Commander of the Leningrad Military District;

8. Corps Commander Putna, Vitovt Kazimirovich, born 1893, member of the VKP(B) since 1917, USSR Military Attache to Great Britain.

In 1956, the Chief Military Procurator and the Committee for State Security, Council of Ministers of the USSR, examined the criminal case against Tukhachevsky and the other individuals, who had been condemned with him, and established that the charges brought against them were falsified. On 31 January 1957, the Military Collegiate of the Supreme Court of the USSR, having considered the decision made by the General Procurator of the USSR, judged, that the sentence of the Special Judicial Session of the Supreme Court of the USSR from 11 June 1937, with respect to Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Kork, Eideman, Primakov, Putna and Feld'man, should be repealed and that the case should be discontinued for the lack of evidence of any criminal activity.
In that same year of 1957, all these individuals were also rehabilitated by the Party Control Committee of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with respect to the party.
Earlier, in 1955, the Party Control Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU had completely rehabilitated Yan Borisovich Gamarnik, member of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) and Chief of the Political Administration of the Red Army, who had been falsely charged in 1937 with being one of the leaders of the military conspiracy and a member of its "center."
However, even after the judicial review of 1956-1957, there remained many unanswered questions: the causes and conditions which lay behind the case; the relationship of Stalin to the leading military figures; and the illegal mass repression of the military cadres and other consequences of the Cult of Personality on military affairs and the study of military history.
In accordance with the decision made by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU of 5 January 1961 (П. 313/ХХШ), we examined the materials involved in the investigation and the judicial trial relating to the case of the so-called military conspiracy. This included documents held in storage in the archives of the Secretariat, Presidium and Party Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU, party, soviet and military archives, operational materials from the organs of the NKVD-KGB USSR, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs USSR. In addition, we also examined individual foreign sources relating to the case, and explanations received from a number of military figures, former officials from the organs of the NKVD, court and procurator's office and from other individuals who were involved with the case.
As a result of examining the above indicated materials, the following document is presented.


The case of the so-called fascist military plot in the Red Army was raised soon after the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee of the VKP(B). This Plenum saw the discussion of issues connected with the destruction of the Trotskyites, Zinovievites and Right Opposition, with speeches given by Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Yezhov.
Voroshilov and Gamarnik addressed the Plenum regarding the issue of the army cadres. In their estimation, the moral and political status of the personnel in the army elicited no concern. According to Voroshilov, the army had been systematically cleansing its ranks of undesirable elements and for the past 12 - 13 years, following Trotsky's expulsion form the military, some 47,000 individuals had been expelled, including 5,000 oppositionists.
" the present moment, - declared Voroshilov, - the army represents an efficient fighting force, loyal to both the party and the government. ... the selection in the army is exceptional. The country provides us with the very best people."
Molotov, however, gave quite a different appraisal of the army cadres:
"...the military, - he announced, - is a very important matter. Subjecting it to examination will not be done now, but it will be done in time and will be done very firmly... If we have wreckers in all branches of the economy, can we possibly imagine that only here there are none? This would be nonsense, it would be naive. It was first suggested that we listen to a special report about the military, now we have renounced it. We understand the significance of this matter...."
Although the repression of numerous party and soviet officials was already taking place prior to the February-March Plenum, it would take on unprecedented dimensions afterward. The plenary speeches of Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Yezhov inflamed sentiments within the country, and prompted the party and administrative organs to seek out so-called enemies of the people in party organizations and soviet institutions. As a result, trumped up charges, false denunciations and slander received wide credence. Any past mistakes committed by party members, any attempts to utter critical comments directed against Stalin or some other leaders of the Central Committee were to be regarded as anti-party and anti-soviet activities with all their attendant consequences.
The repression, which unfolded across the country following the Plenum of the Central Committee, affected even the army. Stalin and Molotov's demands for "examination" of the military were taken up by the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the NKVD as if they were outright directives to purge the army and liquidate "enemies of the people," allegedly engaged in enemy activity within the ranks of the Red Army.
The events, which followed upon the Plenum of the Central Committee and which led to the rise of the so-called fascist military plot, unfolded in the following manner.
In April 1937, the Politburo of the Central Committee made the decision to cancel Tukhachevsky's trip to London to attend the coronation of the British King, George VI. This decision was based upon a special report delivered by Yezhov on 21 April 1937 to Stalin, Molotov and Voroshilov.
Here is the text of his report:
"We have received information today from foreign sources, which are highly reliable, that German intelligence agencies are planning to commit a terrorist act against comrade Tukhachevsky, while he attends the coronation festivities in London. Four individuals (3 German and 1 Polish) are conducting the preparations for the attack. The source does not rule out the possibility that the terrorist act is being planned for the purpose of provoking an international incident. Since we lack the means of ensuring comrade Tukhachevsky's full safety throughout his trip to London, I consider it expedient that we cancel comrade Tukhachevsky's visit. I ask for consideration in this matter."
No material of any sort was discovered in the KGB USSR archives which could point to such a terrorist act against Tukhachevsky. Thus, the special report in question was a falsification.
Responding to the special report, Stalin wrote:
"To the members of the Politiburo. How sad it is that we must agree with comrade Yezhov's suggestion. Comrade Voroshilov will have to offer another candidate. I. Stalin."
A copy of the NKVD "special report" has Voroshilov's inscription on it "Show to M. N. 23.IV.37 KV." The same copy is signed by M. N. Tukhachevsky, confirming that he was familiarized with the document. On 22 April 1937, the Politburo passed the following motion:
"1. Taking into consideration the NKVD report, that comrade Tukhachevsky faces serious danger from a German-Polish terrorist group during his trip to London to attend the coronation ceremonies, and that this group has the task of murdering comrade Tukhachevsky, that it be considered expedient to cancel the Central Committee's decision to send comrade Tukhachevsky to London. 2. That the suggestion made by the People's Commissar of Defense to send comrade Orlov to London to attend the coronation ceremonies as representative of the USSR military be accepted."
Having shown manifest "concern" for Tukhachevsky's safety, the organs of the NKVD, under the leadership and direct participation of Yezhov, began to actively collect at the same time a variety of provocational testimony against him and other military commanders, extracted from a number of arrested individuals. Thus, between 22-25 April 1937, false testimony was obtained from the former Chief of the Special Section of the NKVD Gai and the former Deputy People's Commissar for Internal Affairs USSR Prokofiev, both of whom had been arrested by this time, alleging criminal connections between Tukhachevsky, Uberovich, Kork, Shaposhnikov, Eideman and others with Yagoda.
Attempts to obtain evidence against the military officials from Yagoda at the same time, however, were not successful. Being questioned on 26 April 1937, Yagoda testified: "I never had any personal connections with military officials, in the strict meaning of the term. I was acquainted with them on an official level, and made no attempt to recruit any of them."
Drastic measures were also taken by NKVD officials in order to obtain evidence against Tukhachevsky from the arrested NKVD Deputy Section Chief, Volovich. Volovich's interrogation had major significance. An example of its importance can be deduced from the records Yezhov made in his pesonal notebook. Judging by the character of individual entries made by Yezhov, he was receiving instructions from Stalin. In one such notebook, the following entry was made: "Volovich. spec. interrogation."
On 27 April 1937, NKVD officials managed to obtain testimony from Volovich averring Tukhachevsky's participation in a plot, for which Tukhachevsky guaranteed the support of military forces.
It is apparent from the materials concerning the case against Gai, Prokofiev and Volovich that their testimony was of a general, vague and contradictory nature. In addition, the given testimony was obtained illegally by means of deception, provocation and physical coercion. None of the evidence would be authenticated in court, since Prokofiev, Gai and Volovich were executed "by special decree" in 1937 without a hearing.
Having discovered the illegal methods employed in obtaining information from Gai and Prokofiev, the Deputy Chief of the 2nd Section of the NKVD, Zalpeter, wrote on 10 February 1939 while under arrest: "The former Chief of the 2nd Section, Nikolaev, entrusted Zhupakhin... to interrogate Prokofiev. On Nikolaev's instructions, he essentially composed Prokofiev's testimony without interrogating him... In my presence, Zhupakhin brought this "testimony" to Nikolaev's office, saying, "take a look how it turned out." Nikolaev then amended Prokofiev's "testimony," giving it a "more" believable character...
Goaded by me and Nikolaev to offer up preliminary testimony, Gai remained defiant. Nikolaev then declared: "You must do as Prokofiev has done." Yezhov dropped in and repeated the same thing, declaring "You must provide evidence," to which Prokofiev responded, drawing himself up in military fashion, "rightly so." Then and there, Gai started to produce testimony..
"...during one of our days off from interrogating prisoners at the Lefortovo prison, Nikolaev told me: "Well, let's go smash Gai's face in." After being summoned for interrogation, Gai was questioned by Evgenev, who - not allowing him the chance to respond - struck him...."
"During Gai's interrogations relating to the Yagoda case, I questioned Gai, sometimes jointly with Nikolaev, regarding the primary facts of the case. I looked upon this as an "official task" sanctioned by Stalin himself, which Yezhov had led me to believe, when he instructed the investigators at the initial operations briefing... Gai began to provide testimony about espionage activities after Yezhov had promised him leniency, declaring: "You will be spared."
As is obvious from Zalpeter's testimony, which he gave in 1939, prior to his arrest he had expressed his own opinion regarding the reasons for the provocational activities being conducted by the organs of the NKVD:
"The mass repression of leading officials in the People's Commissariats (and the People's Commissars as well) is explained by the fact, that Stalin means to govern the country by dictatorial methods, deciding everything alone, not suffering opposition, not considering the opinions of others and placing under mass arrest those individuals who have contradicted (criticized) him. These people were not counter-revolutionaries at all. The Trotskyist document, the so-called "Testament of Lenin," aptly described Stalin in this regard, referring to his intolerance and single-mindedness.... As matters unfold, party officials, who have been arrested without cause, eventually slander themselves and others, offering up false testimony. Essentially, their fate has been predetermined prior to their arrest, while still in the Central Committee. Knowing this and considering their situation hopeless, the specter of their absolute isolation springs up before them, since - for them - the political life is the only thing that makes life worth living. In the final analysis, everything depends upon the investigator, who generally employs physically coercive methods of interrogation. Under such conditions, these people allow themselves to agree to any sort of testimony. And upon the declaration of the investigators, that they have confessed to their crimes, they inscribe their last words on these documents."
The former NKVD official, Surovitzkikh, related the circumstances of Volovich's interrogation in April-May, 1937. Explaining the case to the Party Control Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU on December 20, 1961, Surovitzkikh, member of the CPSU from 1929, stated:
"Everything that took place within the organs of the NKVD at that time, from the beginning until the end, constituted a planned and thought out provocation... Volovich's demeanour during the investigation attested to the fact that he was ready to offer the required testimony... Volovich was questioned by Yezhov, and the vast majority of the names suggested to Volovich by either Yartsev or myself, were set forth according to Yezhov's instructions... The structure of the trestimony was also determined by the investigation. And so it was with Volovich's testimony against Tukhachevsky, which attested to the participation of the latter in a plot preparing for a military seziure of power. Yartsev and I "obtained" detailed information from Volovich against Tukhachevasky as a participant in the conspiracy, preparing the army in order to ensure a military coup. In other words, we obtained corroboration for the existence of such a military force and secured for Yezhov the necessary "solidity and seriousness" of the plot."
Despite the lack of any reliable evidence regarding the existence of conspirators among the top echelons of the military, Stalin took the opportunity, while dining in Voroshilov's apartment after the May Day parade of 1937, and in the presence of many military officials, to rail against alleged enemies in the military. This declaration of Stalin's was recalled by the Chief of the Intelligence Department of the RKKA, Uritsky, in a letter he wrote to Voroshilov, on 27 September 1937:
"...after the parade on 1 May 1937," Uritsky wrote, "the leader remarked, in your apartment, that enemies will be unmasked, and that their party will be ground into dust, and then he raised a toast to those who, remaining loyal, have a deserved place at the splendid table celebrating the October Revolution."
Realizing the motives of Stalin and Molotov in their talk of unmasking enemies within the military, Yezhov placed great hopes in obtaining testimony concerning the criminal activity of Tukhachevsky, Yakir and others. This was to be accomplished through interrogation of the corps commanders, Primakov and Putna, who had been affiliated with Trotskyists in the past and had been arrested in August 1936, as well as from the former Chief of the Air-Defense Department of the RKKA, Corps Commander Medvedev, who had been expelled from the party in 1934 for squandering government funds. Pursuant to this, in one of Yezhov's notebooks, the following entry was found: "1. Seize: Primakov regarding Yakir. 2. Medvedev regarding Yakir."
Arrested on 6 May 1937, Medvedev confessed during questioning that he was a participant of a Trotskyist military organization, which intended to launch a military coup in the country. On 10 May 1937, he signed the minutes of the interrogation, in which he stated, that he had learned from the corps commanders Vasilenko and Putna, that Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Putna, Turovsk and Primakov were the leaders of the Trotskyist military organization.
Vasilenko and Smolin, however, failed to corroborate Medvedev's testimony, despite being arrested and severely beaten. Medvedev, himself, had also been subjected to methods of physical coercion and subsequently recanted his testimony when at trial.
One of the individuals who took part in the interrogation of Medvedev was the Deputy Chief of Administration of the Moscow Region NKVD, Radzivilovsky, who was later arrested. Interrogated on 16 April 1939, regarding Yezhov's activities in the creation of the RKKA military conspiracy case, he testified:
"Yezhov entrusted me with the task of immediately pursuing the interrogation of the prisoner Medvedev, the former chief of the PVO RKKA, and obtaining testimony from him implicating the widest possible circle of participants in a military conspiracy within the RKKA. To obtain this, Yezhov gave me direct instructions to employ physical coercion, without being reticent in the methods chosen. Yezhov especially emphasized the fact, that in interrogating Medvedev I was to secure from him the names of the largest possible number of military officials. Upon interrogation Medvedev, I established that three or four years prior to his arrest he had been sacked from the RKKA and was managing the construction of some sort of hospital when he was arrested. Medevedev denied participation in any anti-Soviet activity and generally no longer maintained any contacts with military circles within the RKKA since he left the army. However, in carrying out Yezhov and Frinovsky's directives, I obtained testimony from Medvedev regarding the existence of a military conspiracy and about his active participation within it. In subsequent interrogations, and especially after a severe beating he received at the hands of Frinovsky in Yezhov's presence, he began naming a siginifant number of military officials. During the course of the case, I observed and knew that the contacts Medevedev was describing were fictitious, and he continually related me, and later, to Yezhov and Frinovsky as well, that his testimony consisted of lies and did not correspond to reality. Despite this, however, Yezhov presented the interrogation records to the TsK... Medvedev was arrested on Yezhov's orders... with the intention of fanning the flames of a military conspiracy within the RKKA."
The former superintendent of the Special Section of the PVO [Petrograd Military District], Sadov, N. A. (member of the KPSS since 1931), testified in Moscow that he saw the investigator, Reiter, beat the prisoner Medvedev severely with a rubber truncheon in Lefortovo prison.

Corps Commander Primakov, arrected on 14 August 1936, was kept confined in Lefortovo prison for a period of 9 months, without making any confession. In Stalin's archive are found several statements from Primakov protesting his innocence. However, on 8 May 1937, Primakov, finally succumbing to the ordeal, addressed the following statement to Yezhov from Lefortovo prison:
"Over a period of nine months, I refused to speak to the investigation regarding the matter of the Trostskyist counter-revolutionary organization, and this denial reached such a degree of insolence that I refused to admit my guilt even before the TsK and comrade Stalin in every possible way. Comrade Stalin was right when he stated, "Primakov is a coward, refusing to speak about this matter. This is cowardice." It was, indeed, cowardice and shameful lying deception on my part. I, now, declare that, having returned from Japan in 1930, I entered into contact with Dreitser and Shmidt, and, through Dreitser and Putna, with Mrachkovsky and began engaging in Trotskyist activity. I am now providing the investigation with a complete account of this activity."
Giving way to the demands of the investigation and the wishes of Stalin, Primakov embarked upon the path of deception and self-incrimination. During interrogation on 14 May 1937, Primakov already started naming his "accomplices," stating, in reference to Yakir, that:
"The Trotskyist organization considered Yakir to be the most suited for the post of People's Commissar, in place of Voroshilov... They considered Yakir to be the strictest example of a conspiratorial Trotskyist and acknowledged that Yakir was in personal contact with Trotsky. It was also assumed that he was operating independently, carry out certain secret tasks."
That same day, Yezhov sent Primakov's record of interrogation to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich. In a cover letter, Yezhov wrote:
"I am sending Primakov's first interrogation record from May 14 of this year. I report: Garkavy, Vasilenko, Turovsky, Zyuk, Gavryushenko, Vezhelev, Savitsky, Smolin, Lapin and Ol'shansky have been arrested. I request permission to arrest: 1) Chanyshev (Commander, 1st Tatar division; 2) Koshelev (Chieff of Staff, 13th Corps); 3) Kel'bein (Commander, 75th division); 4) Kazansky (former Commander, 5th Rifle division); 5) Butyrsky (former Chief of Staff, KVO [Kiev Military District] ); 6) Klysheiko (Commander, Aviation Brigade); 7) Klochko (former Military Attache to Turkey); 8) Zenek (Head of the Lenigrad Tank School)."
Continuing to "work over" Primakov, on 21 May 1937 the NKVD was able to obtain from him "a hand-written statement" that the conspiracy was being led by Tukhachevsky, who was in contact with Trotsky. During this same round of questioning, Primakov named 40 prominent military officials as participants in the Trotskyist military conspiracy.
Corps Commander Putna was also subjected to a painful night of questioning. On 14 May 1937, he was transferred from the prison infirmary of Butyrki prison to the Lefortovo prison, where he was interrogated the entire night. As a result, Putna provided testimony against Tukhachevsky and 9 other prominent military officials as participants of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization.
On 16 May 1937, Yezhov sent Putna's record of interrogation to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich. In the accompanying cover letter, Yezhov wrote:
"I am sending the record of V. K. Putna 's interrogation from May 15 of this year. Putna has testified, that in 1935 he personally delivered a letter from Trotsky to Tukhachevsky, containing a direct proposal that Tukhachevsky take part in the Trostskyist conspiracy. After familiarizing himself with this letter, Tukhachevsky instructed Putna to convey to Trotsky that he could count on him. As participants in the anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization Putna has named Primakov, Kuz'michev, Shmidt and Lapin, who have have been arrested; Zenek - former Head of the Leningrad Military Tank School; Klochko - former USSR Military Attache to Turkey, Gordozensky - former Head of the Supply Administration, Primorski Group, Kornel' - former official in the INO [Foreign Section] OGPU and Adamovich - former Chairman of the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] BSSR [Belorussian Socialist Republic]."
On 3 June 1955, Budarev, member of the KPSS and a former official from the Special Section of the NKVD USSR, testified that Putna and Primakov were subjected to physical coercion during interrogation:
"When Primakov had still failed to provide evidence, Deputy Section Chief Karelin and Section Chief Avseevich instructed me and other officials to sit beside him. This was done in order to prevent him from sleeping and compel him to give evidence about his participation in a Trotskyist organization. At this time, he was allowed only 2-3 hours of sleep per day in the office where he was being interrogated and to where he was brought food. Thus, he was not left alone... During the time they were being interrogated, it was known that Putna and Primakov were providing testimony regarding participation in the conspiracy after having been severely beaten in Lefortovo prison."
On 10 December 1962, the former Deputy Minister of State Security USSR, member of the KPSS since 1932, Selivansky, reported to the TsK KPSS:
"In April 1937, the case concening Putna and Primakov was transferred to Avseevich. Through the use of btrutal and cruel methods of interrogation, Avseevich forced Primakov and Putna to provide testimony against Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Fel'dman. This testimony served as the basis for the arrest of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Fel'dman and other prominent military officals in May 1937. Avseevich's work served as an example for dealing with prisoners and set the standard for other investigators operating within the Special Section. Thus emerged the conspiracy within the Soviet army. After this, the mass arrest of high-ranking military officials, members of the TsK KPSS and prominent individuals within the party and the government commenced on Stalin and Yezhov's orders."
The former NKVD USSR official, Avseevich, who conducted the interrogations of Putna and Primakov, explained to the TsK KPSS:
"...many officials, including myself, happened to be working in the Special Section of the NKVD in the years 1937-1938, that is, during the period when the mass arrest of military officials occurred, and took part in the interrogation and beatings of the prisoners... During the interrogations, questions and responses were formulated by Leplevsky (Chief of the Special Section NKVD USSR), and although the names entered into the minutes were those mentioned by Primakov, the actual significance of the conversations and meetings mentioned by him were exagerrated and raised up to the level of conspiratorial activity. Thus, the testimony provided by Primakov against a large number of prominent military officials was fabricated."
"The prisoners, Primakov and Putna, were morally broken as a result of lengthy periods in solitary confinement and meager prison rations.... they were dressed in threadbare cotton uniforms instead of their regular clothes, went about in sandals instead of boots, and their hair grew long and beards went unshaven for a lengthy period... transferred to Lefortovo prison and finally summoned by Yezhov, they were broken and ready to provide evidence."
In the middle of May 1937, several prominent military officials were subjected to night time arrest. They included the Head of the Frunze Military Academy, Army Commander 2nd Rank Kork, and the Deputy Commander of the Moscow Military District, Corps Commander Fel'dman.
During his first round of interrogations, Kork, who had been arrested on the night of 15 May 1937, denied participation in anti-Soviet activities. On 16 May, however, his resistance was broken and Kork signed two statements which were addressed to Yezhov. Kork reported, that he had been drawn into a Rightist organization by Yenukidze and that the Rightist organization also included a Trotskyist military group consisting of Putna, Primakov and Turovsky. Tukhachevsky was also connected with the Rightist military organization. Kork wrote further, that the main goal of the group was to carry out a military coup in the Kremlin. and that the organization was headed by a coup committee consisting of Kork, Tukhachevsky and Putna.
Corps Commander Fel'dman was arrected on 15 May 1937. In his staement, he requested to be apprised of the materials possessed by the investigation and expressed his readiness to provide testimony regarding these materials. He wrote to investigator Ushakov:
"Both you and the Head of the Special Section, comrade Leplevsky, with whom I have also spoken, presented charges involving participation in an anti-Soviet Trotskyist military organization and suggested that I embark upon the path of sincere repentence. I requested that I be apprised of the facts indiciating my participation in the above mentioned organization. After this, it will be easier for me to understand the issue at hand."
The testimony, which Fel'dman started to provide concerning a military conspiracy, was extremely contradictory. Thus, while under interrogation on 16 May 1937, he testified that he had been drawn into the Trotskyist military organization by Primakov in 1934. Three days later, Fel'dman changed his testimony, asserting that the Trotskyist military organization was headed by Tukhachevsky, who had also drawn in Primakov in the beginning of 1932.
In presenting this record of interrogation to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich on 20 May 1937, Yezhov wrote:
"I am forwarding the interrogation record of Fel'dman, B. M., former Head of the Administration of Supply for the RKKA, from 19 May of this year. Fel'dman has testified that was a participant of a Trotskyist military conspiracy and was recruited by Tukhachevsky, M. N. at the beginning of 1932. Fel'dman has named the following participants of the conspiracy: Chief of Staff of the Transcaucasus Military District Savitsky, Deputy Commander of the Pri.VO [Volga Military District] Kutyakov, former Commander of the VTsIKh [All-Russian Central Executive Commitee] School Yegorov, Commander of the Engineering Academy RKKA Smolin, former Assistant Commander of the Engineering Administration Maksimov and the former Deputy Commander of Armoured Car and Tank Administration Ol'shansky have been arrested. I request discussion regarding the issue of arresting the remaining participants of the conspiracy, who have been named by Fel'dman."
Among the "remaining participants of the conspiracy," who had still not been arrested at that time, were Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Eideman and other commanders. Their arrest would took place in the last week or so of May 1937. In Fel'dman's interrogation records from May 19, 21 and 23, more than 40 commanders and political officers of the army were named as participants in the Trotskyist military organization.
Investigator Ushakov (Ushamirsky), having shown himself to be a grand master of blackmail and provocation, succeded in establishing a trusting relationship with Fel'dman. By alleviating his terms of confinement, Ushakov won Fel'dman over and persuaded him to provide testimony.
It is in this context, that he following note written by Fel'dman is of interest:
"To the Assistant Chief of the 5th Section GUGB NKVD Union of the SSR, comrade Ushakov. Zinovy Markovich! I have written out the beginning and ending of the my statement according to my own discretion. I trust you will summon me and provide personal instructions. It will be a simple matter to do a revision... I thank you for your care and solicitude. On the 29th, I received biscuits, apples and cigarettes and today I received cigarettes as well. They do not tell me from where or from whom these have arrived, but I know who sent them... Fel'dman. 31.V.37."
In the statement, which Fel'dman referred to in his note, he reaffirmed his willingness to provide the investgators with any testimony:
"I request, comrade Ushakov, that I be summoned personally to You. I would like either You or comrade Leplevsky to convey to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Union of the SSR, comrade Yezhov, that I am prepared to stand before whomever you wish and relate everything I know about the military conspiracy, if this is required by the Red Army. I am ready to walk through Purgatory, as you have described my investigative confrontation with Tukhachevsky. I am prepared to show all of you, who have extended me a helping hand and pulled me from the filthy waters, that you have not been mistaken when you determined during my first interrogation, that Fel'dman is not an inveterate, implacable enemy, but rather a man who stands ready to work and labour at repentence and in assitance with the investigation in smashing the conspiracy. I ask that my last appeal also be conveyed to comrade Voroshilov. B. Fel'dman. 31.V.1937."
In 1938, the investigator, Ushakov, was himself arrested. Commenting on the interrogatin of Fel'dman, Ushakov hand wrote the following testimony:
"Against Fel'dman there existed only circumstantial evidence provided by a certain Medvedev... During his first day of questioning, Fel'dman provided a statement, in which he wrote about his participation in a Trotskyist military organization and into which he had been recruited by Primakov... Adhering to the principal of close, careful study of the personal affairs and connections of persons under arrest, I obtained Fel'dman's file from the main office and began studying it. As a result, I reached the conclusion, that Fel'dman was on intimately friendly terms with Tukhachevsky, Yakir and a number of other important commanders and that he had family in America, with whom he was maintaining contact. I understood, that Fel'dman was connected with Tukhachevsky in the conspiracy and I summoned early in the morning of 19.V [19 May 1937] for questioning.At this time, however, I was summoned by Leplevsky to an operational meeting, which was attended by some 30 officials, who were taking part in the investigation. I was roughly number 10 on the list of speakers, and was called upon to present the results of Fel'dman's interrogation. Having presented Fel'dman's testimony, I turned to my analyis and began familiarizing the investigators with the importance of steering the interrogations towards revealing the military conspiracy, which undoubtedly existed in the RKKA. As soon as the meeting concluded, I... summoned Fel'dman. By the evening of 19 May, Fel'dman had addressed a statement to me, which comprised his known testimony regarding the participation of Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Eideman and others in a military conspiracy, and on the basis of which the TsK VKP(b) decided on 21 or 22 May to have Tukhachevsky and a number of other officials arrested."
The arrest of Tukhachevsky and Yakir was preceded by a number of "organizational measures" on the part of the People's Commissariat of Defense.
On 9 May 1937, Voroshilov addressed the Politburo TsK VKP(b) with a letter confirming new appointments. On 10 May 1937, the Politburo TsK VKP(b) took the decsion:
"To ratify: 1. As First Deputy, People's Commissariat of Defense - Marshal of the Soviet Union, comrade Yegorov A. I., 2. As Chief of the General Staff of the RKKA - the current commander of the Leningrad Military District, Army Commander 1st Rank, comrade Shaposhnikov B. M., 3. As Commander of the Lenigrad Military District - the current Commander of the Kiev Military District, Army Commander 1st Rank, comrade Yakir I. E. ... 8. As Commander of the Volga Military District - Marshal of the Soviet Union, comrade Tukhachevsky M. N., who is released from his duties as Deputy People's Commissar of Defense."
On 13 May 1937, as established by the Kremlin registration book, Stalin personally greeted Marshal Tukhachevsky. There has been no record found in the archives concerning the nature of their conversation.
Also of interest is a report concerning an old comrade of Tukhachevsky, Kulyabko, a former member of the TsIK, upon the examination of his personal affairs in the party organization in June 1937. Kulyabko, who had recommended Tukhachevsky to the party in 1918, explained to the party organizations that when he read about Tukhachevsky's appointment as Commander of the PriVO in the newspapers, he visited him at this apartment. According to Tukhachevsky, the reason given for his transfer to Kuibyshev, as explained in the TsK, was connected with the circumstances that his acquaintance, Kuz'mina, and his former courier had been arrested as spies.
Thus began the formulation of the false charges against Tukhachevsky and other military figures immediately prior to their arrest.