Skoblin's History Blog

Day 13 - Operation Barbarossa

2011-10-08T07:10:00.000-07:00

4 July (Friday) 1941
Day 13

The leading units of Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group reached the Dnieper at Rogachev and Bykov and was engaged in bitter fighting for the river crossings. General von Knobelsdorf's 19th Panzer Division of Hoth's 4th Panzer Group crossed the Western Dvina near Disny and established a bridgehead on the eastern bank with Luftwaffe support.

The Germans immediately sent out engineering units to establish a crossing. Subsequent efforts to continue the advance were unsuccessful. Heroic resistance on the part of Colonel A. I. Zygin's 174th Rifle Division forced the Germans to halt.

Through stubborn resistance on all sectors of the front, counter-attacks and extensive redeployment, the Red Army was able to slow the enemy advance, exhausting the German forces in continual fighting, which earned valuable time for the creation of a new defensive position along the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers. General Heinz Guderian reported to Field Marshal von Bock on 4 July 1941, that “the enemy is offering stubborn resistance. Almost all the bridges between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers have been destroyed – especially along the main roads.” Echoing Guderian's observations, the Commander of Army Group Center reported to Hitler's headquarters that “resistance in front of our advancing panzer formations is increasing in intensity.... The enemy...is offering organized and determined resistance with artillery support.”

In the area of operations of Army Group Center on this day:
On the morning of 4.7.41 at 0610 hours the Chief of Intelligence and Counterintelligence of the 9th Army prepared a morning briefing for the Chief of Staff of the 2nd Army.
1. Having crossed the Shchara river, there have been no reports of enemy resistance on the eastern bank. There is almost no contact with the enemy. In our estimation, the main incentive for enemy surrender has been our leaflets. Prisoners have been taken east of Byten, presumably belonging to the 36th Rifle Division.
2. Captured prisoners and equipment: 1916 prisoners, 31 tanks, 9 guns, 45 armoured cars, and 5 fuel tankers.
3. The army staff will be transferred to Slonim this afternoon.
4. There is no contact with the enemy.

Intelligence and Counterintelligence Section reporting to the staff of the 4th Army 04.07.41. 1545 hours:
At the present moment there is no contact with either the 2nd or 3rd Panzer Groups. Officers have been dispatched by aircraft and motor vehicles in order to establish contact. Therefore, reports concerning enemy operations will be relayed only late in the evening. The impression is forming that the encircled enemy formations are completely devoid of leadership, ammunition and food. The enemy is attempting to slip through the encirclement in groups of between 5 and 10 men, some dressed in civilian clothes. According to information supplied by a captured general staff officer, conditions within the encirclement are chaotic.

Intelligence and Counterintelligence Section reporting to the staff of the 2nd Army 04.07.41. 1630 hours:
Within the operations sector of the 2nd Army, there are only isolated enemy formations west of the Nieman river, which are offering no resistance. There is a mass of abandoned enemy equipment on the western bank of the Nieman. On the eastern side of the river, individual enemy formations have been attempting to break through to the south-east and east with weak artillery support. It was observed this morning that the enemy is attempting to break through north of Zadul'e (north-east of Stolbtsy) and west of Minsk. There is no enemy on the southern flank right up to the line Koval' – Pinsk – Slutsk. Between 0440 and 0520 hours, enemy units were observed withdrawing from Pinsk eastwards through Luninets (150 – 170 vehicles and individual groups of cavalry). A railway bridge located 18 km south of Luninets was blown up by unknown persons.

Intelligence and counterintelligence section reporting to the staff of the 2nd Panzer Group 1800 hours 04.07:
Enemy resistance has intensified within operations sector of the 2nd Panzer Group. The following formations have been recently detected on individual sectors: a) In the operations sector of the 3rd Panzer Division, near Rogachev, is the 187th Russian Rifle Division, which arrived here on 1.7 from Cherikov. b) In the operations sector of the 4th Panzer Division, south-west of Mogilev, there are weak enemy forces whose designation has still not been ascertained. Near Svisloch' is the 4th Motorised Division – this may be the 4th Tank Division which was formerly in the Bialystok area. c) In the operations sector of the XLVI Army Corps, elements belonging to formations surrounded at Bialystok have appeared: the 50th and 85th Rifle Divisions and the 7th Tank Division. d) In the operations sector of the 18th Panzer Division, the presence of the 1st Proletarian Division has been confirmed, having arrived in Orsha from Moscow. Enemy units, which have appeared east of Berizino, apparently belong to the 20th Rifle Corps. There is no continuous front and the only significant enemy resistance is being offered at the main crossings of the Dnieper and Berezina rivers. All bridges across the Dnieper and Berizina rivers have been destroyed. A bridge in the town of Borisov has been repaired.
Situation of our forces:
On 4.7 at 1800 hours, the 3rd Panzer Division intends to go on the offensive. This morning, the leading elements of the 4th Panzer Division were located at the river Drut', halfway between Bobruisk and Mogilev. The bridge across the river has been destroyed. According to the latest information, the leading elements of the 18th Panzer Division are located at Nacha (40 km east of Borisov) and are apparently advancing with success.

Intelligence and Counterintelligence Section reporting to the staff of the 2nd Panzer Group: intercepted radio messages confirm that the 13th Army is operating in the Mogilev - Smolensk area. The army is conducting combat operations alongside the Soviet 44th Rifle Corps, which includes the 1st Proletarian Division. A report was sent by the 44th Corps to the [13th ] army staff regarding the situation: On 04.07.1941 at 0900 hours, enemy tanks attacked the infantry on the flank, causing heavy losses and forcing a withdrawal to the Mazelyanka sector (3 km north-east of Krupki). The corps is withdrawing under enemy pressure to the sector along both side of Krunki. In addition – citing the text of a radio interception: The commander of the 20th Army has arrived. The forces of the 7th Tank Corps are expected to concentrate in this sector.
Assessment: The headquarters of the 44th Rifle Corps has been detected in the woods east of Sloveni )27 km east of Krupki). In all likelihood, they have confused the 20th Army with the 20th Rifle Corps. Intelligence and Counterintelligence Section reporting to the staff of the 2nd Panzer Group 04.07.41 at 2150 hours: The enemy has been withdrawing towards the north-east and east for several days now. The enemy is surrendering in a majority of cases. Attacks, generally conducted without artillery support, have been driven off. The number of prisoners continues to grow. In the operations sector of the 12th Panzer Division, some 52,000 soldiers and 21,000 civilians of military age have been captured. The security and confinement of these prisoners remains an insoluble problem at present.

With the aim of coordinating the forces engaged in the fighting between the Berezina and Dnieper rivers, the Commander of the Western Front has subordinated all units of the 13th Army to the commander of the 20th Army, the remnants of the 4th Army and the 4th Parachute Corps are subordinated to the commander of the 20th Army.

In order to provide cover for the Mogilev sector, the front commander has assigned units of the 20th Mechanized Corps and the 4th Parachute Corps to a new defensive position behind the river Drut'.

In the operations sector of the Western Front on this day:

Operational Summary No. 18 of the Staff of the Western Front regarding combat operations of the forces of the front by 0800 hours 4 July 1941

series “G”

Operational Summary No. 18 by 0800 hours 04.07.1941. Western Front Staff, Gnezdovo Stn.

Map 500 000
First. During the course of 03.07.41, the forces of the front continued to occupy the second line of defense, reinforcing it, and were engaged in fighting for the crossings of the Berezina and Drut' rivers.
Second. During the course of 03.07.41, the 13th Army continued defending the crossings of the Berezina river, with the exception of the crossings at Borisov and Chernyavka, where army units – having abandoned Borisov and Chernyavka – are attempting to contain the advance of enemy tanks and motorized infantry. A penetration made by enemy tanks near Borisov was still not eliminated by the evening of 03.07.41.
On 3.07.41, the 2nd Rifle Corps was engaged in fighting for the crossings of the Berezina river along the line Chernyavka, Berezina.
Army headquarters in Temerin.
Third. Information has not arrived regarding the operational status of units of the 3rd and 10th Armies. Measures undertaken to search for them by aircraft and through agents have not yielded results.
Fourth. Lepel' sector. On 3.07.41, enemy motorised units crossed the Berezina south-west of Lepel' and occupied Lepel' by the end of the day.
A concentration of tanks heading toward Lepel'
At 1745 hours, an enemy motorised column was heading eastward, with the head of the column at the western outskirts of Lepel'.
Fifth. During the course of 3.07.41, the 22nd Army continued fortifying its defensive position. Situation of army units unchanged. The local population along with units of the 153rd Rifle Division are preparing for the all-round defense of Vitebsk along a line extending from outside Knyazhitsa Station to Boroniki, Shapury and Vorony.
Sixth. 20th Army. Information regarding the 20th Army had still not arrived when this operational summary was being compiled. A delegate has been dispatched by aircraft.
Seventh. The 21st Army continues to regroup and is occupying a defensive position along the eastern bank of the Dnieper river on a line running from outside Mogilev to Loyev. The enemy is conducting reconnaissance with small groups of tanks in front of the army's position, in the sectors of Protochno, Vyaz'ma, Rogachev, Zhlobin and Rechitsa.
The 45th Rifle Corps is engaged in defensive efforts on the following line:
187th Rifle Division – from outside Buinichi to Gadilovich; 148th Rifle Division – information has not been received. Corps headquarters located in the woods 0.5 km south of Druzhba.
In the sector of the 45th Rifle Corps, on 3.07.42 at 1300 hours, a forward detachment of the 187th Rifle Division was engaged in fighting near Chigirinka with a reinforced enemy reconnaissance detachment consisting of some 30 tanks, 100 motorcyclist and a regiment of infantry, supported by 25 to 30 guns. Between 1300 and 1900 hours, the forward detachment was pushed back by the enemy, who captured the river crossing at Chigirinka. At 1900 hours, a counterattack by our forward detachments threw the enemy back behind the river Drut'. The position of the forward detachment of the 187th Rifle Division has been restored.
The enemy lost some 30 men killed. Our losses were 2 dead, 6 wounded.
The 63rd Rifle Corps, which is continuing to fortify its defensive position, has regrouped, concentrating its forces on right flank.
The 167th Rifle Division, 1st and 2nd Divisions of the 503rd Field Artillery Regiment, and a sapper company of the 53rd Rifle Division are occupying positions in the area of Rogachev, extending from outside of Tsuper to Maiskii.
The 117th Rifle Division is located in the sector of Tsuper and Zhlobin, and along the eastern bank of the Dnieper river up to Smychek, Kryvsk, Pirevichi and Chernaya Virnya.
The 66th Rifle Corps has finished assembling its forces in the Gomel' area and is being reinforced with men, equipment and munitions.
The 232nd Rifle Division has concentrated in a small wood west of Gomel' and is organizing an anti-tank defense along a line running from Kostyukovka to outside of Pribor, to the mouth of Uza river and the town of Gomel'.
The 154th Rifle Division has finished assembling its forces in the woods south and south-east of Novobelits and is organizing an anti-tank defense on a line running along the river Sozh from the outskirts of Gomel' to Skitok, Klimovka and Larishchevo.
Corps headquarters located in Gomel'.

Chief of Staff of the Western Front
Lieutenant-General Malandin
(signature of the chief of staff missing on the document)
Chief of the Operations Section of the Staff
of the Western Front
Major-General Semenov

In order to halt the German advance, the forces of the Western Front switched to a new defensive tactic, using a line-to-line defense. During the night, units would be removed from an occupied position and withdrawn to a new one, where they would dig in and engage enemy forces once more. The Germans would halt, regroup, summon artillery and air support, and then resume their attack against Soviet forces. The Red Army forces would then withdraw under enemy pressure to the next position and the entire operation would begin again. Such tactics strongly reduced the pace of the German advance.

Intelligence Summary No. 18 of the Staff of the Western Front regarding enemy combat operations by 2200 hours 04 July 1941

Series”G”

Reconnaissance Summary No. 18 by 2200 04.07.41. Staff of the Western Front Smolensk
Map 500 000

First. During the course of 3-4 July, the enemy continued to concentrate motorized units in the Lepel', Borisov and Bobruisk sectors. The main enemy grouping is on the Lepel' sector, where he has concentrated some two panzer and one or two motorized divisions belonging to the 39th Panzer Corps (7th and 20th Panzer Divisions). On the Borisov sector, there are between one and two panzer divisions, one being the 19th Panzer Division and one a motorized division. On the Bobruisk sector the enemy has concentrated up to one panzer and one motorized division.
Second. On the Dvinsk sector (North West Front) some three enemy infantry divisions are in operation: the 226th Infantry Division is located west of the Dvinsk – Rezekne railway line, the 28th Infantry Division is east of the railway line, in the Rezekne sector, and the 3rd Infantry Division is in the Kraslava sector.
According to information obtained from prisoners, the 226th and 3rd Infantry Divisions have been transferred from Occupied France. The 3rd Infantry Division consists of the 8th, 29th and 50th Infantry Regiments and the 3rd Artillery Regiment.
There is a concentration of tanks in the Nestanoviche area.
Third. On the Lepel' sector, the enemy is operating with a strength of some two panzer divisions and between one or two motorized divisions and by the evening of 4.07.41 its leading elements had reached the line Diena – Orekhovo – Lepel', with the main forces in the area of Lepel', Glubokoe, Dolgovino and Dokshitsy.
At 1100 hours 3.07.41 - a tank column extending from Voloki back to Begoml'.
On the morning of 4.07.41 Lepel' was captured by enemy motorized units.
At 0550 hours 4.07.41 – a tank column extending from Glubokoe back to Postavy.
06.04.07.41 – column of tanks extending from Pyshno back to Dolgovino (Presumably this is the same column mentioned on 03.07.41).
According to information received from radio intelligence, the enemy conducted active radio reconnaissance between 0500 and 0800 hours in the Polotsk and Velike Luki sectors. Reconnaissance was conducted primarily along primary and secondary roads and railways as well as airfields.
There were one and two engined aircraft at the airfield in Simtse. ME-109 aircraft patrolled over the airfield.
At 1700 hours 02.07.41 Lepel' was subjected to enemy bombing.
At 1330 hours 04.07.41Velikie Luki and Idritsa were bombed. Two enemy aircraft were shot down.
(R)(obtained by means of radio intelligence). In the sectors of Glubokoe, Lepel' and Dokshitsy, three radio transmitters have been detected, which serve divisional staffs and which maintain contact between them.
Fourth. On the Borisov sector, the enemy, operating in the strength of up to one panzer and one motorized division had by the evening of 04.07.41 fought to a line running along the river Berezina, to Loshnitsa (10 km eat of Borisov), Chernyavak and further along the western bank of the Berezina.
During the course of 03.07.41, the 4th Panzer Regiment and one motorized regiment with air support attacked the 1st Motorized Rifle Division in the Borisov – Loshnitsa sector on a line running from Pupeliche to Negnovichi.
By 1800 hours the attack was beaten off.
The 4th Motorized Division is operating in the Borisov sector. According to information supplied by a prisoner, it is operating under the command of the IV Army Corps.
Between Chernyavka and Brodet, our forces on 03.07.41 destroyed 17 enemy tanks and two companies of motorized infantry.
(A) Between 0200 and 1800 hours 03.07.41the following columns were observed moving from the west and south-west.
1. A motorised column extending from Glubokoe back to Dunilovichi
2. A tank column extending from Glubokoe back to Kurilovichi.
3. A motorised column extending from Glubokoe back to Porplische.
4. A motorised column moving in the direction of stn. Kurlevshchizna.
5. A tank column under cover of ME-109 aircraft moving from Plissa to stn. Zyabki.
6. An enemy motorized column extending from Koshary back to Bortniki.
7. A large concentration of vehicles – in the area of Logoisk.
8. A column of some 100 tanks near Bortniki.
9. [A column - JP]heading from Logoisk to Pleshchenitsy in the direction of Rogachev.
A column of tanks heading towards Rogachev from Bortniki, Barsuki
At 0500 hours 04.07.41 a group of bombers bombed the aerodrome at Mogilev.
(R) In the Osipovichi, Cherven', Smilovichi sectors, three radio transmitters have been detected, serving divisional staffs.
At 1100 hours. 04.07.41 A radio transmitter was discovered in the Pleshchenitsy sector, providing corps – division communications.
At 1114 hours, a radio transmitter was detected in the Borisov sector.
There is a large concentration of tanks in the Borisov sector.
Fifth. On the Bobruisk sector, the enemy is drawing its forces up to the river Drut'. There are some 300 enemy tanks located in the center of Slutsk which have no fuel.
Conclusion: The information presented in Intelligence Summary No. 16 regarding the rapid concentration of enemy forces in the Lepel', Borisov and Bobruisk sectors is being confirmed.
In order to establish the composition of those forces operating before the front, air reconnaissance will be sent out from the morning of 05.07.41.
1. The identification of the enemy grouping operating on the Lepel', Borisov and Bobruisk sectors.
2. The approach of reserves to the areas of Minsk, Glubokoe, Logoisk and Bobruisk.

Chief of Staff of the Western Front
Lieutenant-General Malandin

Chief of the Intelligence Section of Staff
Western Front
Colonel Blokhin

The main forces of the German 4th Panzer Group began amassing on the banks of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper rivers. The command of Army Group Center was then faced with a question – continue the offensive with motorized forces or await the arrival of the main infantry forces, which had now been freed from combat operations around Minsk. Soviet defenses along this position were very weak, which spoke in favour of a quick German offensive.

The German Command made the decision to attack, without awaiting for the arrival of the infantry, and began drawing up its forces as quickly as possible.
Lieutenant-General F. A. Yershakov's 22nd Army had already succeeded in deploying its forces on the Western Dvina – Dnieper line, while the forces of Lieutenant-General Konev's 19th Army were concentrating in the Vitebsk - Smolensk area, and the forces Lieutenant-General P. A. Kurochkin in the Vitebsk – Orsha sector. Lieutenant-General M. F. Lukin's 16th Army was concentrated in the Smolensk area as army reserve.

Directive No. 16 of the Military Council of the Western Front from 4 July 1941 for the defense of forces of the front on the line Polotsk, rivers Western Dvina and Dnieper and preparations for a counterattack by the 7th and 5th Mechanized Corps in the sector/direction Ostrovno, Senno

Series “G”

Directive No. 14. Western Front Staff. Gnezdovo. 04.07.1941 23:15 hours
Map 500 000

First. On the Lepel' sector, the enemy is amassing some two panzer and one or two motorized divisions for a further advance in the general direction of Vitebsk or Porkhov.
Second. The Western Front must firmly defend the position of the Polotsk fortified area, the Western Dvina line, the towns of Senno and Orsha, and the further along the Dnieper river, and not allow the enemy to break through to the north and east.
Third. The 22nd Army – minus the 128th and 153rd Division – is to firmly defend the Polotsk fortified area and the Western Dvina line up to and including Beshenkovich and not allow the enemy to reach the right bank of the Dvina. The bridge at Beshenkovich is to be burned.
Boundary from the left: Velizh, (excl.) Vitebsk, Beshenkovich, Lepel'.
Fourth. The 20th Army, consisting of the 61st Rifle Corps (110th, 172nd Rifle Divisions), 69th Rifle Corps (73rd, 229th and 233rd Rifle Divisions), 18th, 53rd, 128th and 153rd Rifle Divisions, and 7th and 5th Mechanized Corps, is to create a strong anti-tank defense along the line running from Beshenkovichi to Senno, Mon'kovo, Orsho and Shklov, with the Senno area having been reinforced with a tank battalion, including five KV tanks. The 229th Rifle Division to take up position on a line running from outside Senno to Mon'kovo.
To prepare for a counterattack by the 7th and 5th Mechanized Corps in the Ostrovno and Senno sectors with air support, for which the 7th Mechanized Corps is to concentrate in the Liozno area and the 5th Mechanized Corps in the area of Devino, Staiki stn., and Orekhovsk. 7th Mechanized Corps to pursue a line in the direction of Kamen' and Kublichi, and the 5th Mechanized Corps in the direction of Lepel'.
The 1st Motorized Rifle Division, reinforced by a tank regiment, is to launch an attack against Borisov, with the goal of capturing the crossing on the Berezina river. Upon success on the part of the mechanized corps, an attack is to be pursued in the direction of Dokshchitsy.
Command headquarters of the 20th Army in Kluykovka.
Boundary from the left: Pochinok, Shklov, Cherven'.
Fifth. The 21st Army in its present complement is to firmly defend the position along the river Dnieper. During the night of 4-5.07.41, detachments are to conduct bold operations in Bobruisk sector, destroying isolated groups of enemy tanks and motorized infantry east of Bobruisk, blow up all bridges and burn the woods in the area of enemy tank operations.
Sixth. Air forces. The 23rd Combined Air Division is to be transferred to the authority of the commander of the 20th Army for direct air support of the forces in the field:
1. The enemy is to be prevented from crossing forces over to the right bank of the Western Dvina and breaking through to Orsha;
2. During the night of 4-5.07.41 the woods in the area of Lepel', Glubokoe and Dokshchitsy are to be burned.

Commander of the Forces of the Western Front Marshal of the Soviet Union Timoshenko
Member of the Military Council of the Western Front L. Mekhlis
Chief of Staff of the Western Front Lieutenant-General Malandin

After having escaped from encirclement, the command staff of the 4th Army provided a written report to the Political Propaganda Department [UPP – JP] of the Western Front regarding the situation of staff documents. We will cite one of these rare documents concerned with such an accounting.
To the Chief of the UPP Western Front, Divisional Commissar com[rade] Lestev.

Political Brief.
On 4 July 1941, units of the 4th Army reached a new deployment area for receiving reinforcements of men and material. The administrative staff of the 28th Rifle Corps is located at an area 10 km west of the settlement of Krasnaya Gora. The 55th Rifle Division is located in an area 2 – 3 km from the village of Kamenka, the 42nd RD is located in the area of Gorki, and the 6th RD in the area of Krasnopol'e. The process of bringing the units up to strength in both men and equipment is proceeding at an extremely slow pace. For example, the 6th RD has 910 men at present, comprising 815 soldiers, 129 NCOs and 272 junior and senior officers. The division is understrength by a total of 13781 men, comprising 10096 soldiers, 1954 NCOs and 731 junior and senior officers. The 55th RD has at present 378 officers, 475 NCOs, 6841 soldiers, 1602 NCOs and 682 junior and senior officers [there is an error here - either in the original document or in the book version - JP]. Total understrength comprises 11068 men.
Units of the 6th RD currently possess 764 rifles, 10 PPD submachine guns, 52 TT pistols, 2 heavy machine guns, and 3 light machine guns.
The 55th RD has 1204 rifles, 467 revolvers, 23 light machine guns, 30 heavy machine guns, 1 gun and 1 T-38 tank.
The situation is especially bad in regards the organization of the artillery regiments. Not only are weapons and equipment lacking, but also personnel. Among corps units, the 455th Corps Artillery Regiment has not started reforming due to a lack of personnel. The selection and drawing up of smaller units is being conducted by the political staff.

Kursk and Moscow AKT
4 July 1941. Novozybkov. In view of the military situation, the Chief of the UPP 4th Army, Brigade Commissar com. Rozhkov authorized a committee, comprising the Secretary of the Military Council of the 4th Army, com. Intendent 1st Class A. V. Litvinko, representative of the 3rd Section, 4th Army Staff – comrade Vinogradskii, and chief of the General Unit of the UPP 4th Army, com. Intendent 2nd Class A. I. Nikitin, to undertake the burning of secret and top secret documents according to the enclosed list.

Enclosed list on five pages
Concerning which the present document has been drawn up in single copy
C [omrade] /Intendant 1st Class Litvinko
c [omrade]/Intendant 2nd Class Nikitin

How many such documents were burned, buried in iron boxes or sunk in reservoirs, in order to prevent them falling into enemy hands, and how many fell to the enemy is impossible to calculate. In 1990, search parties, which the present author, dug up an iron box. As it turned out, this box belonged to one of the units which had become encircled in the area of Krasniy Kholm, near Vyaz'ma. In the box were found monetary transfers from and to the front, several stamps and some personal letters. From these transfers, it was possible to find several persons, who had sent them.

In all forward sectors of the front, security battalions – strybki [JP] – were formed in order to assist the authorities in maintaining order in populated centers, secure railway bridges and junctions, detain suspicious persons arriving from enemy occupied territory, and uncover deserters, signalmen, and parachutists, and for the training scout and saboteur groups for operations in the enemy rear.

On 2 July 1941, report number 48/3 was prepared by the UNKVD BSSR Vitebsk Province and the NKGB BSSR regarding the state of the security battalions. Twenty six battalions had been formed across the administrative region, consisting of 3528 persons, of which 3029 persons were armed with rifles, 15 with machine guns and 137 with revolvers. By 3 July 1941 inclusive, some 143 persons had been detained by the security battalions. These included 4 German pilots, 4 deserters from Red Army units, 42 escaped convicts, 82 persons fleeing from enemy-held territory and 11 other suspicious persons. In order to detain saboteurs and suspicious persons, 7 pickets of 2 – 3 armed soldiers were drafted from the security battalions and posted at the ways in and out of Vitebsk on a daily basis, while 25 teams of two armed men each patrolled the streets of Vitebsk. On 2 July 1941, troops from the Liozny security battalion, under the command of battalion commander comrade Gutnikov, along with troops from military unit 413 brought down an enemy aircraft with rifle and machine gun fire. The airplane landed on the territory of the Lenin Collective Farm of the Vydreya Village Soviet. All four pilots were killed; pistols and maps were recovered. In order to increase the effectiveness of the security battalions in the Vitebsk region, instructional seminars are being conducted in four groups between 2 – 4 July for all security battalion commanders, according to a plan being carried out by the Operations Section NKVD-NKGB BSSR and the head security battalion of the UNKVD.
Chief UNKVD BSSR Vitebsk Province, 2nd Lieutenant of State Security Motavkin
Chief Officer Operations Section NKVD – NKGB, 1st Lieutenant of State Security Ovchinnikov

Handwritten testimony of Field Marshal E. von Kleist regarding the German campaign in southern Russia: Parts IV-V

2010-07-03T13:13:00.001-07:00

IV. Battle for the Dnieper
1. Brauchitsch in command
At roughly the end of August, the western bank of the Dnieper had been reached along its entire length - from Nikolayev-Kherson to a point north of Kiev. Bridgeheads had been established or were being established near Kherson (11th Army), Dnepropetrovsk (3rd Panzer Corps of the panzergruppe), Kremenchug (17th Army) and north of Kiev (6th Army). Information had been received concerning large enemy forces in the Nogai Steppe and in front of the Dnepropetrovsk bridgehead, as well as a very strong concentration of enemy forces near Kiev and to the east of the city. Field Marshal von Brauchitsch decided to attack by surrounding the large concentration of enemy forces near Kiev by means of an enveloping maneuver on the part of Army Groups Center and South.
For this, Army Group South was to 1) pin down enemy forces along the front, and 2) take the enemy from the rear by advancing from the east to the west, with the main attacks as follows: by an attack from the bridgehead north of Kiev and directed towards the south-east; by units of the 17th Army striking out from the Kremenchug bridgehead toward the north-west and; by panzer forces also moving out from the Kremenchug bridgehead. These panzer forces (one panzer corps*) were to be brought up from the Nikolayev area. Alongside these panzer forces, striking from Kremenchug, and the units of the 6th Army, attacking from the bridgehead north of Kiev, the operation was to also include units belonging to Army Group Center and the 2nd Panzergruppe.
A preliminary condition for success of this encirclement operation lay in surprise, as if carried out suddenly in a span of a day, so that the enemy was unable divine our intentions prematurely.
In order to coordinate all necessary movements, Colonel-General Halder flew out to the army group headquarters to discuss details of the operation.

2. Forward!
This battle had still not concluded, when the panzer corps, belonging to Army Group South and which was advancing in the sector of Rovno from east to west, was transferred to the 2nd Panzergruppe.** The headquarters of the 1st Panzergruppe and the XIV Panzer Corps, which were operating in an easterly direction, were placed at the disposal of Army Group South for further assignments.
Meanwhile, the 11th Army had invaded the Nogai steppe, in order to push back the Russian army located there and to seize the approaches to the Crimea. The 11th Army became engaged in heavy fighting between the Sea of Azov and the Dnieper bend.
The army group command radioed the 1st Panzergruppe: “Turn back! Free the III Panzer Corps from its encirclement at the Dnieper bridgehead. Attack the enemy line along the river. Strike the forces fighting the 11th Army from the rear. The 11th Army awaits. Forward!”
At that moment, the XIV Panzer Corps struck southwards. I consider this to be a remarkable example of allowing for the freedom of operations. After this battle on the shores of the Sea of Azov at the beginning of October, the entire left bank [eastern bank – skoblin] of the Dnieper was now in the hands of the army group. The 11th Army captured the Tartar Wall along the Perekop, while Rumanian forces seized Odessa.

3. End of the 1st Panzergruppe
It was around this time that the 1st Panzer Army was formed on the basis of the 1st Panzergruppe, with the headquarters staff of the panzergruppe transformed into an army staff. A large strategic-operational armoured formation, consisting of panzer and motorised divisions, ceased to exist in its pure form. In its place arose a typical army which still possessed panzer formations. Later, there would occur cases when panzer armies would in general not have panzer units yet still be referred to as panzer armies, as occurred with the 2nd Panzer Army.
In the final analysis, the panzer army was in no wise distinguishable from any other army, yet it existed at the expense of the tradition of the old panzergruppe. Armies, with their vast operational and supply apparatus were connected to an operational area, to a specific territory. The panzergruppe, however, as a resource under the operational command of the army group, could be compared to a hunting falcon, which hovers over the entire operational theater of the army group, observes the fighting taking place in the army sectors, and is quickly thrown to that spot where its appearance alone will decide the outcome of the battle.
Thus, for example, in France: one day, at the mouth of the Somme river near Abbeville, Calais and Boulogne, then with the 18th Army outside Dunkirk. Immediately afterwards, with the 6th Army through the Weygand Line southwards, with the XVIII Army Corps across the Marne, near Lyons in the vicinity of the Italian Alps, and then alongside Biatritz on the coast of the Bay of Biscay and the Italian border.
And then here, in the summer of 1941: near Kiev with the 6th Army, then in the sector of the 17th Army***, near Nikolayev with the 11th Army, near Kiev with the 2nd Panzergruppe, and immediately afterwards on the shore of the Sea of Azov as the saviour of the 11th Army. For me, tank warfare ended with this battle on the shore of the Azov – whether it was still conducted on other fronts by the Germans, I do not know.
I assume the Red Army employed a large tank force in the capture of Berlin, during the advance from the north-east through Renluch and upon forcing through the line at Nauen-Deberitz.

V. To the Donets Basin
1. Further to the east
During my sojourn in England****, Feldmarschall von Rundstedt told me that he had proposed a plan that the Germans should dig in behind the Dnieper river after the fighting on the east bank had ended. From several rejoinders, the details of which I have already forgotten, I concluded that Feldmarschall von Brauchitsch also insisted that the German eastern army should cross over to positional warfare for the winter. Events, however, transpired otherwise. Following the battles on the sector of Army Group Center at the beginning of October, Hitler arrived at the conviction that the Red Army was finished. Accordingly, despite the lateness of the season, he ordered an offensive against Moscow and a last gasp pursuit of the enemy along the entire front. Thus, Army Group South began a further advance with the 1st Panzer Army on the right flank, the 17th Army in the center, and the 6th Army, which advanced to Khar'kov, on the left flank. Meanwhile, the 11th Army was to storm the Crimea.
This advance was halted along a general line running from Taganrog to Khar'kov. The lengthy marches and incessant fighting had sapped the strength of the infantry, difficulties arose with supply and the tanks were out of fuel. The railway line ended on the western bank of the Dnieper and then vast distances had to be surmounted amidst the fall rasputitsa*****. Supply of the armies by air was insufficient.
Fighting stretched out for several weeks, in the course of which the German armies closed up, as did the Russian front facing the German army group. Winter with its severe cold arrived especially early that year. Winter uniforms, which had been prepared earlier by the German High Command, could not be brought up, as the lengthy offensive operations and marches made ammunition, fuel and provisions the priority. Generalfeldmarschall von Brauchitsch was subsequently relieved of duty on account of illness and Hitler personally took command of the land armies and thus the Eastern Front.

2. Positional warfare during the winter of 1941-1942
Thus,from a “last gasp pursuit of the enemy,” positional warfare arose. Army Group South's front ran along the Mius-Donets line until a point north of Khar'kov. Both sides began feeling each other out and an initial foray was made against Rostov. The Red Army displayed significant initiative, making an amphibious landing on the Crimea, near Feodosiya, while attacking constantly at various places along the army group front. We reckoned that the Red Army forces surpassed us by a factor of 2 or 3, and they had excellent weapons and equipment.

Handwritten testimony of Field Marshal E. von Kleist regarding the German campaign in southern Russia: Parts I-III

2010-07-03T13:12:00.001-07:00

“Operations on the Southern Front [1941-1944]
23 February 1951
Moscow

I. Introduction
It is difficult to describe the operations in which I participated when these events occurred ten years in the past and I have neither maps nor additional materials at my disposal. I remember well only those for which I have given repeated evidence over the past years and which were also a topic of discussion at Nurnberg. Other events I remember only poorly - especially dates, and can no longer even recall in which month some events took place. I can only describe operations in the most general terms, otherwise I become lost in the details.

II. Between Two Campaigns
1. Field Marshal von Rundstedt makes a visit
On approximately 1 May 1941, I had arrived home from Balkans, having left my headquarters staff behind. I had only been home a few days before Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt and his wife dropped by for a visit (they were residing at the hotel Monopol' in Breslau). Our families had been friends for a long time. The main command of the army group was located at that time somewhere south of Krakow.
Feldmarschall Rundstedt took me aside a told me roughly the following: “War is unavoidable. Both armies are deployed along the border against each other. Military operations may begin any day now. We will begin our offensive when those formations earmarked for the Eastern Front are freed up from their present location in the Balkans – especially the panzer and motorised divisions. This may take an additional six weeks. If the Russians attack before this, we will be ready to go on the defensive.
As part of the army group, you will command three panzer corps comprising the 1st Panzergruppe. You will not take part in the border fighting, but you will still fall under my operational command. Accordingly, you will receive additions to your staff as well as your own quartermaster forces.
Hitler has categorically demanded that you and your staff not enter the operations zone until the very last moment. You may remain here at home at your leisure. We will move your headquarters to outside of Breslau so you may get to it quickly at any time. The motorised divisions, which will be gradually arriving into the operational zone, will be under the command of the 6th Army, but the latter will not involve them in the preparations for the offensive. Depending upon the outcome of the border fighting, I intend to make use of your panzergruppe for operational purposes. Your chief of staff may get in touch with General von Sonderstern upon arriving in Breslau.
If you have any special requests regarding the transfer of any divisions currently subordinated to other corps and whose commanders you are already acquainted with as a result of previous campaigns, feel free to bring this request to my attention. In the meantime, while on leave, you may freely grant furlough to those officers and officials of your staff who have been on continuous duty since last May.”

2. The middle of June
In roughly the middle of June, the headquarters of the 1st Panzergruppe was transferred to the army group's operational area and set up in a isolated forester's house between Zamost'e and Bil'gurai.
The chief of staff made a trip to the army group and brought back the following information: The 17th and 6th Armies had finished their offensive preparations. The 11th Army was deployed further back to be employed later. The panzer units, which were to be handed over to us later, had still not fully arrived. Some of them were still resting in Czechoslovakia or Silesia, while others were still on their way back from the Balkans. It was doubtful the latter would be at full-strength. Then he reported the army group's instructions regarding the operation, which were roughly as follows: 1) Major forces of the Red Army were situated in front of the army group and further back at the great bend of the Dnieper 2) The army group had the task of destroying these forces and preventing them from withdrawing beyond the Dnieper. 3) To this purpose, the army group would begin its offensive on a designated day and at a designated hour, deploying the 17th and 6th Armies. The 17th Army had the task of quickly seizing the city of L'vov, while the 6th Army was to cross the Bug river, establish a bridgehead, and breakthrough the enemy front. The 11th Army was to cover the deep right flank of the 17th Army and tie up enemy forces. One corps, deployed in the north, was to cover the left flank of the 6th Army against enemy attack from the Volhynian forests.
The panzergruppe, which will take command of all panzer and motorised divisions on a designated day, will be ready be ready for combat operations from that moment, in order to force the [Bug] river once the 6th Army has established bridgeheads in depth. It was very important that the panzergruppe advance eastwards quickly and move ahead of the 6th Army. Under no circumstances was it to allow itself to be pinned down or forced to fall back as a result of fighting those enemy forces which the 6th Army will engage. Moreover, the panzergruppe will have the task of searching out and engaging tank forces deep in the enemy rear. In this regard, the panzergruppe will be under the operational command of the army group.

III. Operations in the great bend of the Dnieper
1. The war begins
In the early morning of 21.6.1941, the headquarters of the 1st Panzergruppe was transferred to a command post prepared by the 6th Army and situated alongside the Zamost'e-Tomashuv road. Here, it took command of three panzer corps, which were deployed side by side east of the road and echeloned in depth. The panzergruppe already had a working line to the corps' headquarters and to the staff of the 6th Army, and through the latter to the army group.
The 17th and 6th Armies began their attack at dawn, on 21.6.1941 [should obviously be 22.6.1941 - skoblin]. The battle for the frontier had begun, and the panzer forces awaited the outcome of the fighting. One resulting circumstance: around mid-day, I was informed that the 13th Panzer Division, which I had intended to leave in its deployment area far in the rear, was on the march in the direction of Vladimir-Volhynskiy under orders of the 6th Army command. Indignant, I contacted Field Marshal von Reichenau by telephone. Before I could tell him anything, however, he declared: “Kleist, the greatest battle of all time is occurring on the frontier. We are facing the whole Russian army”. “Take it easy...,” I thought to myself. When I asked him how it came to pass that he was in command of my forces, he muttered something about the necessities of war and that the 13th Panzer Division had still been under his authority only the day before. From this I formed the opinion that the fighting was going tough. I could not simply take command of the panzer division and have it turn back, as its marching columns were spread out over 120 km. I had to attach it to the III Panzer Corps, which it remained a part of until the winter of 1942-1943. Here is an example of how a chance event may turn out decisive in the long run.

2. How the army group command assessed the situation
After two weeks of fighting, the army group command had arrived at the following opinion:
The enemy is giving battle in order to gain time with the intention of either: a) transferring new major forces across the Dnieper which would be able to attack the army group's flanks, for example, with an attack from the vicinity of Kiev and the north-west [Kleist probably means the north-east - skoblin] towards the south-west with a simultaneous blow from the vicinity of Kherson to the north-west, or b) constructing a strong defense line along the Dnieper and the creating defended areas on the western bank with a subsequent withdrawal to these bridgeheads.
The task for the army group, however, remained the same: to smash the enemy forces standing before it before those forces could either be reinforced or withdrawn behind the Dnieper. Meanwhile, what was the army group's situation in relation to this?
The 17th Army was facing the mass of the enemy's forces. It was waging a frontal attack and was advancing only slowly.
The 11th Army was covering the right flank of the 17th Army and was trying to establish direct contact with the latter with its left flank.
The panzergruppe, after battling enemy forces near Dubno, Rovno and to the east [this would be the tank battle of Brody - skoblin], had overcome the defenses on the old Russian-Polish frontier at Tsviagel' and to the south, and had reached the area west of Kiev and Belaya Tserkov. Thus, it had already penetrated deep into the flank and halfway into the rear of the main Russian forces. However, the panzergruppe was now pinned down along the front and found itself in a dangerous position. It faced the threat of enemy forces in the Kiev bridgehead as well as Russian forces deployed in the forests of Volhynia, which threatened its left flank and supply routes. The panzergruppe's right flank, meanwhile, was threatened by new Russian forces, which had crossed the Dnieper south of Kiev and were attacking westwards.
The 6th Army, following behind the panzergruppe, was advancing faster than the 17th Army. It was positioned ahead of the latter army and could now advance southwards.
It was now necessary, however, the free up the panzergruppe for operational employment in the rear of the main Russian forces and against their rearward communications as well as for defending against new enemy forces, which may cross the Dnieper near Kremenchug, Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'e.
Thus, the 6th Army could not advance any further south, since it had to pick up the task from the panzergruppe of providing flank cover in the general vicinity of Korsun' – Kiev and to the northwest. The 6th Army, thus, had to move with great haste.

3. Uman'
On 8.8.[19]41], the battle against the main Russian forces deployed west of the Dnieper concluded in the vicinity of Uman'. Hitler and Mussolini were in attendance at the end of the battle. The 17th Army, and parts of the 11th Army and 1st Panzergruppe were involved in this engagement. The 6th Army had positioned itself near Kiev and to the south, facing those those Russian forces attacking from the east, while the panzergruppe lay further to the south and units of the 11th Army moved up against those Russian forces coming from the south-east.
The army group command now considered it necessary to destroy the Russian forces which were operating in the lower bend of the Dnieper and to claim the western bank of the river in its entirety. After that, the task placed before the army group in the middle of June was accomplished. The battle for the great bend of the Dnieper was over.

Interrogation of Colonel-General E. G. Jaenecke, Commander German 17th Army

2010-07-03T13:11:00.000-07:00

Interrogation of Colonel-General E. G. Jaenecke, Commander German 17th Army
Evacuation of the Kuban

22 November 1947
Sevastopol'

Interrogation beginning at 2330 hours
Interrogation ending at 0345 hours

Question: When and what positions did Field Marshal von Kleist occupy in the German Army on the Eastern Front in the war against the Soviet Union?
Answer: As far as I know, in 1941 Field Marshal von Kleist commanded a panzer army - which one I do not recall. He and his army operated somewhere in the south, but I cannot state the specific area of operations.
In the fall of 1942, Manstein was recalled from the Crimea and sent to the Leningrad front. Von Kleist assumed command of the southern group of German armies in his place. His operational area covered the Crimea, the Kuban and some of the southern regions of the Ukraine.
Appointed commander of the 17th Army on 5 July 1943, I arrived in the Kuban and took up command of the army, coming into direct subordination to Field Marshal von Kleist. Prior to assuming command, I had had a meeting with von Kleist in Simferopol', during which von Kleist placed before me the task of bringing order into the army, which had become disorganized in connection with the combat operations of the Soviet armies against the southern group of German forces.
Question: When did the situation become threatening for the the German 17th Army in the Kuban and what orders in connection with this did you receive from von Kleist?
Answer: At the beginning of August 1943, Soviet forces broke through near Krymskaya Station, while Soviet landing operations became active near Novorossiysk – both of which created a difficult situation for the 17th Army under my command. At that time, a Soviet offensive had begun near Melitopol', which created a threat to the 17th Army, which found itself thrust far forward. As a result of the unfolding situation, I received orders from von Kleist to prepare withdrawing from the Kuban. This was in August 1943.
Question: What was envisioned by this order?
Answer: By this order, the commander of the southern group of forces, Field Marshal von Kleist, proposed withdrawing the forces of the German 17th Army and carrying out a total economic cleansing of the Kuban.
Question: What was meant by an “economic cleansing” of the Kuban?
Answer: Regarding the matter of the economic cleansing of the Kuban, von Kleist's order envisioned: the removal from the Kuban of all food stores, cattle, grain, butter, wine and all other agricultural products, industrial materials and equipment. The order also envisioned the removal of railway equipment, while everything that could not be removed was to be subject to demolition and destruction. In this same order, von Kleist proposed the forcible removal of the entire population of the Kuban capable of either working or bearing arms. This order had some sort of code name, but what it was exactly I no longer recall. I carried out von Kleist's order completely, as I reported in detail during the preceding interrogations.
Question: How did von Kleist evaluate the operation you conducted regarding the economic cleansing of the Kuban?
Answer: When I met von Kleist in the town of Simferopol on 11 October 1943, I reported to him the results of carrying out his order for the economic cleansing of the Kuban. He gave the operation high marks in execution and was left completely satisfied in the measures undertaken in regards the economic cleansing of the Kuban, in particular: the evacuation of the population and the removal of food stores, industrial equipment and railways, as well as the demolition and destruction of those installations which we could not remove. At his army group headquarters, Kleist was kept continually informed about the progress of the “economic cleansing” of the Kuban through a special transit staff he had set up and stationed in the town of Kerch, headed by General Forster. This staff managed the reception of all material assets and persons, evacuated by me from the Kuban to the Crimea. The Soviet citizens evacuated from the Kuban we made use of in the construction of defensive installations and for agricultural labour. Where this staff subsequently sent these material assets and people, I do not know.
Question: What tasks did von Kleist assign to you upon the arrival of your army in the Crimea and in connection with the military situation created there?
Answer: Upon arriving in the Crimea, I received the following orders from von Kleist: to organise the defense of the Crimea by all forces at my disposal and to eliminate the two centers of the partisan movement in the Crimea – one around the Kerch quarries and the other in the vicinity of the Yayla mountains.
I should mention, that in crossing over from the Kuban to the Crimea, I had 10 German and between 6 and 7 Rumanian divisions under my command. Of these, I was ordered by von Kleist to hand over 9 German divisions to the German 6th Army, which was operating near Melitopol and which was also under the overall direction of von Kleist. The 6th Army was retreating at that time under the pressure of Soviet forces, the latter which reached the Perekop and cut off the Crimea on 28 October 1943.
In connection with the Soviet advance to the Perekop and the unfolding threat of isolation for the German forces grouped in the Crimea, von Kleist issued an order in October 1943 for the evacuation of the Crimea through the Perekop. This order envisioned the removal of prisoners of war as well as the destruction of all installations and equipment.
Despite issuing this order, von Kleist was ordered to rescind it 24 hours later by Hitler's headquarters. Still, individual groups of soldiers from my army carried out the demolition of the coal mines at Bishu and burned down the warehouses in Kerch.
Question: Provide us with details about the orders you received from von Kleist regarding the elimination of the partisan movement centers at the Kerch quarries and in the Yayla mountains.
Answer: Kleist's order indicated that the paramount task of the 17th Army in the Crimea was the suppression the partisan movement. According to this order, I was to work out the required measures myself as commander of the army. I have already indicated during the preceding interrogations those measures which my army undertook, in particular, the creation of a “dead zone” and other operations.
Question: Did you inform von Kleist that in carrying out his order you were creating a “dead zone” in which settlements were burned down, the population driven out and their property confiscated?
Answer: I reported to von Kleist daily through the army combat reports and informed him about the progress in creating a “dead zone” as well as the other operations taking place at the Kerch quarries. In addition, orders involving the 17th Army were sent to von Kleist everyday, which shed light on the progress of operations involved in the creation of the “dead zone”. Thus, von Kleist was continually informed about the measures being conducted by the 17th Army regarding the “dead zone”. In these reports, von Kleist was informed about the number of burned settlements and other results of each operation after they were carried out.
Question: When did you report to von Kleist about the arrival in the Crimea of the special commando from the High Command of the German Armed Forces for the employment of gas at the Kerch quarries against the partisans and civilians who were hiding there?
Answer: I do not recall precisely when this was reported to von Kleist, but a special report was sent to Kleist's headquarters at Army Group South regarding the arrival of the special commando and the operations carried out by them at the Kerch quarries. The existence of such gas and the preparation for its use should have been known by von Kleist even earlier as asphyxiating gas was to be used in 1940 against the Maginot Line, where von Kleist commanded a German panzer group in the vicinity of Sedan.
Question: What do you know about von Kleist's orders during the time he commanded the 1st and 6th Panzer Armies?
Answer: I know nothings about this. I was not under his command at that time and never spoke to him about this

Interrogator:
Chief of Operations Group MVD USSR Lieutenant- Colonel KARLIN
Assistant of Operations Group MVD USSR Major NAZAROV

Translation conducted by the translator VOITENKO

Interrogation record of General Weidling, Commandant of Berlin (III)

2010-07-03T13:09:00.000-07:00

Interrogation of General Weidling, Commandant of Berlin
Questions regarding Hitler's "commissar order"
Atrocities against the civilian population around Rzhev

25 November 1951
Moscow

Weidling, Helmut, born 1891,
native of the town of Halbertstadt (Germany),
German, German national, former
commander of the defense of Berlin, General
der Artillerie

Interrogation beginning at 1415 hours
------ “ ------ ending at 1940 hours

German translator Makeev has been advised regarding his responsibility for conducting a correct translation according to Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the USSR.
MAKEEV

Question: What criminal orders of Hitler's are you aware of in regards to captured political officers of the Soviet Army?
Answer: I know that Hitler had issued an order at the start of the war that captured political officers of the Soviet Army were to be executed. I did not, however, see this order in writing.
Question: The imprisoned former Colonel-General of the German Army, Schmidt, Rudolf, testified during interrogation on 31 October 1951, that Hitler's orders concerning the execution of political officers of the Soviet Army had been given by word of mouth several days before the start of the war with the Soviet Union.
Answer: Apparently, this was so, for otherwise a written copy of the mentioned order would have been found at my divisional headquarters.
Question: Who informed you of this barbarous order on the part of Hitler?
Answer: I first heard about the existence of such an order during my first days on the Soviet-German front. On approximately 2 January 1942, I arrived at the sector of the 86th Infantry Division, which Hitler had ordered me to command. Upon assuming divisional affairs, I was informed of the existence of Hitler's order regarding the execution of political officers of the Soviet Army by my chief of staff: Colonel of the German General Staff von der Greben.
Question: How did you carry out this order of Hitler's?
Answer: I gave out no instructions regarding Hitler's order to the units and everything remained as it was before.
Question: In other words, the soldiers of the 86th Infantry Division under your command continued to execute captured political officers of the Soviet Army?
Answer: I do not recall cases of political commissars of the Soviet Army being executed by my subordinates. I do not deny, however, that cases where political commissars were executed could have taken place, but I was neither informed of this nor did I require my subordinates to stay apprised of this matter.
Question: It was like similar unwritten rules regarding bandit gangs. Is that right?
Answer: Indeed. Hitler's order regarding the execution of captured political officers of the Soviet Army was carried out in secret, without any written record, and in the same manner as a secret cabal..
It was only in captivity that I understood the entire criminal nature of Hitler's machinations against humanity. At that time, however, I believed the Nazi propaganda regarding the superiority of the German race over other peoples. In my mind, the Russians were not fully human [lit. full-value people] and thus their life had no value.
I acknowledge myself guilty of not revoking Hitler's criminal order regarding my division and of thus facilitating the implementation of this order. It is true, that I attempted to broach the matter of rescinding this order with the higher authorities. However, fearing for my personal military career, I did practically nothing to hinder the execution of Hitler's criminal order within my own formation.
Question: You have not been fully sincere in your testimony and this is attested to by the fact you have not recognised your guilt even now. The investigation has at its disposal material indicating that your subordinates from the 86th Division executed even rank and file soldiers and wounded prisoners of the Soviet Army. Why are you silent about this?
Answer: I acknowledge the fact that men of the 86th Division under my command executed prisoners of war – soldiers of the Soviet Army. I was informed about this but did nothing to stop it. As for the execution of seriously wounded Soviet prisoners, I do not recall a single instance and doubt it occurred under my command.
Question: Was there a Colonel Schenemann under your command?
Answer: Yes. Colonel Schenemann, the commander of the 184th Regiment of the 86th Division Division, was under my command. I have already testified to this.
Question: A former prisoner, the soldier Wagner, Heinrich of the 184th Regiment, 86th Division, stated: “Individual soldiers were not taken prisoner. They would first be put to use carrying machine guns and ammunition and then shot in the evening. Wounded Russians were also not bothered with as they were generally shot on the spot. On one occasion, we arrived in a Russian village late in the evening. Our platoon captured a house with 11 wounded Red Army men inside (I was at that time in the 8th Company, 184th Regiment, 86th Infantry Division). Our platoon commander, Sergeant Fogel, gave the order to collect the wounded men in a barn and shoot them. The order was carried out.
On another occasion, our regiment captured a large Russian village (I have forgotten the name). In this village there was a brick building in which lay some 200 seriously wounded Russians... The regimental commander, Colonel Schenemann, issued an order to shoot these seriously wounded men.” You must be aware of these facts.
Answer: I do not doubt Wagner's statement that these cases of Soviet prisoners of war, including the seriously wounded, being executed took place. But I believe, that the cases described took place before my arrival at the division.
Question: If you mean by this that such cases did not occur under your command, then you are contradicting yourself. You have, indeed, acknowledged that you allowed the bestial orders of your predecessor regarding the treatment of political officers to remain in force. As a result, the men under your command could continue to commit any atrocity against Soviet prisoners of war without hindrance.
Answer: That is correct. Everything had remained as it was under my predecessor, Witthöft. I acknowledge that atrocities against Russian prisoners of war continued to take place even under my term as divisional commander. I am greatly at fault for not rescinding this cruel order of the former divisional commander, Witthöft, regarding prisoners of war.
Question: In your handwritten testimony from 10 January 1946, you state that Witthöft's order rescinding the execution of captured Soviet political officers remained in force under you. Why was the purpose behind this testimony?
Answer: My testimony from 10 January 1946 was written when I had still not recognised my criminal actions in a better light.
In actual fact, I did not leave in force such an order on the part of Witthöft regarding the revocation of the execution of political commissars, since such an order could not have existed. Witthöft would not have taken it upon himself to revoke Hitler's order. Lieutenant-Colonel von der Greben told me that Witthöft had allegedly attempted to bypass Hitler's order by sending captured commissars to the camps, but I do not believe this. Hitler's order regarding the execution of captured political commissars remained in force under my command.
Question: Colonel Schenemann apparently executed seriously wounded Soviet prisoners without your knowledge.
Answer: Colonel Schenemann did not inform me personally about such cases, but it was known within the division that he took part in the execution of Soviet prisoners of war. Thus, in the summer of 1942, during the fighting in the “Rzhev sack,” soldiers of the 184th Regiment under Schenemann's command executed Russian soldiers who had been taken prisoner.
I would like to point out that Hitler's newspapers, which printed articles about so-called “Bolshevik atrocities,” stirred up base animalistic instincts in the German soldiers and incited them to commit criminal acts.
Question: You knew about the atrocities committed by Colonel Schenemann?
Answer: I knew about cases where Russian soldiers had been executed by Schenemann's regiment, but I did nothing to halt further atrocities being committed against prisoners of war.
Question: In other words, you were an accomplice in the execution of those crimes committed by your subordinates.
Answer: I confess, that I was an accomplice in the execution of crimes against Soviet prisoners, which were committed by the division under my command.
In this sense, my actions – as divisional commander – bore a criminal aspect in regards the laws and customs of war.
Question: Your former subordinate, Wagner, reports further in his statement: “During our flight from the Red Army at the beginning of 1942, we received orders to create a 50-kilometer zone where everything was to be burned to the ground... The civilian population suffered inhuman torments as a result of our actions. The entire civilian population, including women and children, were driven out of their homes in -30 to -40 degree weather with no idea where to go. Whoever resisted the forcible measures of the Germans were punished by death.” Do you corroborate this?
Answer: I corroborate Wagner's testimony fully and entirely. I would like to introduce only one correction however: the events described by Wagner occurred in the spring of 1943, not in 1942. At the beginning of 1943, it was decided to free up a number of formations which had been hopelessly bogged down in the “Rzhev sack”. This was in connection with with the planned offensive which was to occur in the area of the “Kursk salient”. The commander of the 9th Army, Model, worked out a plan named “Buffalo Movement,” according to which the vast territory of the “Rzhev sack” was to become a “desert zone” following the withdrawal of German forces. According to this plan, my division was to withdraw westwards, destroying literally everything behind it: installations and buildings were burned down or blown up and the population driven out. Resisters were executed.
Question: Was Model's plan detailed?
Answer: Model's plan on balance consisted of general instructions and designated zones of “destruction” for each division. In accordance with this plan, each divisional commander issued orders, taking into account the details of the impending “operation”.
Question: How did you carry this out in practice?
Answer: In March 1943, I issued an order: upon withdrawing from the “Rzhev sack,” everything was to be destroyed along the path of retreat, the population driven to the west and those resisting shot. The order – with my signature – was sent out to all the units of the division for immediate execution.
Question: Your order was carried out?
Answer: Yes. My order was carried out. After the division withdrew from the “Rzhev sack” there remained only ruins: everything was burned down or blown up and the population driven westwards.
Question: Was this order called for by military necessity?
Answer: No. The order to burn everything down to the ground in an area of tens and hundreds of square kilometers was not called for by military necessity.
Question: The former soldier, Blumenkamp, from the 5th Company, 167th Regiment, 86th Infantry Division has stated the following regarding the withdrawal of Germans from the area of Rzhev and Byeliy: “Here I saw how men belonging to the field police of the 86th Infantry Division beat the civilian population without cause as they drove the civilian population to forced labour and they mercilessly grabbed everything that they were in need of”. Did such facts take place?
Answer: I think Blumenkamp has stated the truth, although I did not personally observe such occurrences.
Question: But the field police were following your instructions.
Answer: I did indeed issue orders to the field police to compel the civilian population to perform various forced labour in clearing streets, roads, and so on. In carrying out my orders, the police resorted to physical coercion on those persons who did not want to work for the Germans.
Question: Besides the testimony of your former troops, you have also been exposed in your criminal activity by the Extraordinary State Commission concerning the crimes of the German-Fascist invaders in the cities of Vyazma, Gzhatsk and Sychevka in Smolensk province and in the city of Rzhev, Kalinin province from 6 April 1943, and by the investigation regarding the crimes of the Germans in the city of Rzhev from 20 October 1943.
These documents indicate that troops belonging to the units and formations comprising Model's 9th Army and the XXVII Army Corps and, consequently, your division as well, not only beat peaceful civilians, burned and destroyed installations and drove the Soviet people into servitude, but also subjected innocent people to inhuman torments and tortures, shot and hanged Soviet prisoners of war and robbed and starved the civilian population. Do you acknowledge your participation in the crimes committed by the Germans in the territory around Rzhev?
Answer: The soldiers of the 86th Infantry Division under my command committed such crimes as indicated in the documents of the Extraordinary State Commission. My 86th Division comprised part of the XXVII Army Corps which was under the immediate command of the 9th Army.
I bear responsibility, as commander of the indicated division, for those crimes which were committed by my subordinates. I ask only to make note that neither I nor my forces were in the city of Rzhev and that I am not responsible for the crimes committed there.
Question: In the documents concerning the crimes of the German-Fascist invaders in the Rzhev area (Case No. 510, 11-13) the following is noted: “Upon withdrawing through the village of Starushevtsi (Chentsovskiy village soviet), the Germans drove into the rear the entire civilian population, two of whom were shot for refusing to go into servitude. The rest of the population which could not leave were driven into a barn which was readied to be set on fire and only the timely arrival of a Red Army detachment saved these unfortunate people from death”. Is this how your order appeared in practice: the population driven into the West and resisters shot?
Answer: Due to the passage of time, I do not recall individual cases of repression against the inhabitants and I have also forgotten the names of the settlements through which we withdrew. However, the atrocity committed by German soldiers against the inhabitants cited in the document could also have taken place within the confines of the 86th Division's withdrawal.

WEIDLING

Interrogator: Ass[istant] Sections Ch[ief] of the Investigations Department, 2nd M[ain] Adm[inistration] MGB USSR, Sen[ior] Lieutenant LISOVETS

Translator: Translator for the Investigations Department of the 2nd M[ain] Adm[inistration] MGB USSR, Lieutenant MAKEEV

Interrogation record of General Weidling, Commandant of Berlin (II)

2010-07-03T13:08:00.000-07:00

Interrogation of General Weidling, Commandant of Berlin
Questions regarding Generalfeldmarschall Schörner

20 November 1951
Moscow

Weidling, Helmut, born 1891
native of the town of Halbertstadt (Germany)
German, German national, former
commander of the defense of Berlin, General
der Artillerie.

Interrogation beginning at 1120 hours
------ “ ------ ending at 1650 hours

German translator Makeev has been advised regarding his responsibility for conducting a correct translation according to Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the USSR.
[MAKEEV]

Question: Do you know the former Generalfeldmarschall Schörner, Ferdinand?
Answer: Yes. I know Generalfeldmarschall Schörner of the former German Army.
Question: When and under what circumstances did you become acquainted with him?
Answer: I first met Schörner in January 1941, when he was the commander of the 6th Mountain Division, which was deployed near the Semmering pass in the Alps. The 6th Mountain Division had come under the command of the XL Panzer Corps at that time. As the artillery commander of the XL Panzer Corps, I headed off to meet Schörner in order to establish direct contact and check on the condition of division's artillery. I was then struck by the model order and harsh discipline, which Schörner had established in his division.
Question: What kind of relations did you have with Schörner?
Answer: I had normal relations with Schörner.
Question: Did you and Schörner take part in the criminal war against the Soviet Union as members of the same corps?
Answer: No. I did not serve with Schörner in the war against the Soviet Union. I only saw Schörner during the first weeks of the war in the Balkans, in April 1941. As part of my duties I had to spend time with his division. Schörner's division left the XL Panzer Corps shortly before the war with the Soviet Union and I no longer encountered Schörner.
Question: It is known, that in 1945 Schörner was in command of Army Group 'Center,” while you were the commander of the LVI Panzer Corps. Is it not true that your corps was part of Schörner's army group?
Answer: In April 1945, Hitler ordered me to take command of the LVI Panzer Corps, which was part of the 9th Army. The 9th Army, however, reported directly to Hitler and was not part of Army Group “Center”. The 9th Army most likely had dealings with the northern Army Group “Vistula”, while Schörner's group was located on the right flank of the 9th Army. Generalfeldmarschall Schörner's army group subsequently fought somewhere in Silesia and Czechoslovakia.
Question: What German crimes did Schörner and those forces under his command commit in the territory of the Soviet Union?
Answer: I do not know.
Question: What reputation did Schörner enjoy among the German generals?
Answer: I heard at various times from many acquaintances among the generals (I do not remember the names), that Schörner was a fervent national socialist according to his political convictions and was a fanatic admirer of Hitler. I heard little regarding his military skill, but he was known for his love of strict discipline and textbook order among the troops.
Question: Schörner's fascist convictions and admiration of Hitler played a large role in his advance in the service. Is this not true?
Answer: Many generals told me at the time that Schörner owed his career to Hitler, who knew about his fanatic admiration for National Socialism and thus assisted in his rapid rise in the service. Schörner also had some success as a military commander.
Question: What did Hitler have to say about Schörner?
Answer: I do not remember if Hitler spoke about Schörner in my presence. However, the fact that Hitler in his will and testament appointed Schörner to the post of War Minister in the new government speaks for itself. If Hitler did not value Schörner highly, then his name would naturally not have appeared among the members of the proposed government.
Question: Can you provide a more detailed account of this?
Answer: On the evening of 30 April 1945, I was summoned to Hitler's personal bunker where I met Goebbels, Bormann and Krebs.
The latter informed me in a somber tone that Hitler had killed himself and that he had appointed a new government in his will and testament: Grossadmiral Doenitz was appointed Reichsprasident, Goebbels as Reichschanceller, Bormann – Minister for Party Affairs, Generalfeldmarschall Schörner as Minister of Defense and Seyss-Inquardt as Minister of Foreign Affairs. I did not personally see Hitler's political testament.
Question: Was Schörner officially announced as the new German Minister of Defense on 30 April 1945?
Answer: All those who were located in the bunker near the Reich Chancellery during the final days of the battle of Berlin were completely isolated from the outside world.
Thus, Hitler's testament was not officially announced in Germany. Moreover, Goebbels, Bormann and others were afraid that news of Hitler's death would have a negative influence on the crumbling morale of the German Army. Thus, as far as I know, Schörner was not officially recognised as the German Minister of Defense.
Question: Did you encounter Generalfeldmarschall Greim of the Luftwaffe in Hitler's bunker?
Answer: Yes. I saw Generalfeldmarschall Greim of the Luftwaffe in the bunker several days before Hitler's death. Hitler had ordered that Greim be appointed as head of the Luftwaffe in place of Goering. Greim was in Berlin for only a few hours and then flew out with the pilot Hannah Greitsch to an unknown destination.
Question: During the interrogation on October 30 this year, the prisoner Schörner testified that you enjoyed a great deal of trust on the part of Hitler and worked out military plans with him. Do you corroborate this?
Answer: Yes. I certainly enjoyed Hitler's trust, otherwise he would not have appointed me as the commander of Berlin's defenses. It stands to reason, that I took part in working out the plans for the defense of Berlin alongside Hitler, as I have already related to the investigation.
Question: During the same interrogation, the prisoner Schörner stated that during the battle of Berlin you were found to be under the significant influence of the then Berlin Defense Commissioner, Goebbels. Is this true?
Answer: I do not deny that there were normal relations between me and Goebbels, which the latter did not enjoy with Reymann. As is known, my predecessor in command of the defense of Berlin, General Reymann, was unable to work with Goebbels and was removed from his post.
I was not, however, under the influence of Goebbels and could not be under his influence, as he had no understanding of military questions.

WEIDLING

Interrogator: Dep[uty] Ch[ief] of the Section, 2nd M[ain] Adm[inistration] MGB USSR, Sen[ior] Lieutenant LISOVETS

Translator: Translator for the same section, Lieutenant MAKEEV

Interrogation record of General Weidling, Commandant of Berlin (I)

2010-07-03T12:57:00.000-07:00

Interrogation record of General Weidling, Commandant of Berlin
Statement of charges for war crimes

7 September 1951. Moscow

Weidling, Helmut, born 1891
native of the town of Halbertstadt, German,
secondary school education, former Military
Commandant of Berlin, General der Artillerie

Interrogation conducted in German. Translator for the Investigations Section of the 2nd M[ain] Adm[inistration] MGB USSR, Lieutenant Makeev, had been advised of his responsibility in conducting a correct translation according to Article 95 of the Criminal Code of the USSR.

[MAKEEV]

Interrogation beginning at 1355 hours
Interrogation ending at 1645 hours

Question: You have been charged according to points 1 “a” and 1 “b” of Article II, Law No. 10, of the Control Council in Germany*. Do you understand?
Answer: I understand the charges.
Question: Do you acknowledge yourself guilty of the charges brought against you?
Answer: I acknowledge myself fully guilty of the charges brought against me.
Question: In what specifically do you acknowledge your guilt?
Answer: I acknowledge my guilt first of all in that being a career officer in the German Army and occupying a leading position in it, I carried out in practice Hitler's idea of aggressive wars of conquest conducted by Germany in Europe. Due to the intensive propaganda conducted by the National Socialist party along racist lines and against other peoples, I became a Nazi by conviction, although I was not formally a member of the party.
I acknowledge the fact that I participated in the war against the USSR and that this war, which was directed at the destruction of the Soviet people, which took place throughout the occupied territory, was an atrocity.
This especially relates to the generals of Hitler's Army, who – in prosecuting the war – carried out the delirious ideas of Hitler and his ruling circle in the destruction of some peoples and the subjugation of others.
I was a participant of the First World War and also took part in the war against Poland, France and Balkan countries. I also actively participated in the war against the USSR and thus I can state that the war against Soviet Russia was distinguished from all other wars Germany conducted. This was a war not only between Hitler's Army and the Soviet Army but also a war against the Soviet people. It was conducted with the intention of destroying the Soviet people and eliminating Bolshevism. For four years, Hitler's army – under the leadership of his generals – did everything possible in pursuit of these goals.
Question: Describe your active participation in Hitler's aggressive forces, in particular, against the Soviet Union.
Answer: In the aggressive war against Poland in 1939, I commanded an artillery regiment of the 20th Division and took part in the fighting against the Polish Army. I took part in the fighting against the French Army as an artillery commander of a panzer corps. I served in this same post during the fighting in the Balkans. I began the war against the Soviet Union as the artillery commander of XL Panzer Corps and then, from January 1942, commanded the 86th Infantry Division. From October 1943, I continued fighting against the Soviet Army as the commander of a panzer corps. On 24 April 1945, I was appointed by Hitler as the Military Commandant of the city of Berlin and under his direction carried out the defense of the Berlin, resisting Soviet forces until 2 May 1945, when I was taken prisoner.
Question: In what atrocities did you take part?
Answer: I am guilty of the fact that the 86th Infantry Division, under my command, destroyed populated centers during the withdrawal in the area of Rzhev, according to a general plan developed earlier by the German command, and drove the civilian population westwards. I took no part in other atrocities committed against the civilian population or against Soviet prisoners of war.

WEIDLING

Interrogator: Dep[uty] Ch[ief] of the 5th Section, 2nd M[ain] Adm[inistration] MGB USSR, Major GONCHAROV

Translator: Translator for the Investigations Section of the 2nd M[ain] Adm[inistration] MGB USSR, Lieutenant MAKEEV

General Andrei A. Vlasov - NKVD File: I

2009-08-28T00:00:00.000-07:00

INFORMATION SHEET concerning the situation of the 2nd Shock Army of the Volkhov Front for the period JANUARY – JULY 1942.

Army Commander – Major-General VLASOV

Member of the Military Council – Divisional Commissar ZUYEV

Army Chief of Staff – Colonel VINOGRADOV

Chief of the Special Section – Major of State Security SHASHKOV

In January 1942, the 2nd Shock Army was assigned the task of breaking through the enemy's defenses in the sector Spasskaya Polist' – Myasniy Bor, with the task of pushing the enemy back towards the north-west, seizing the station of Lyuban' through joint efforts with the 54th Army, cutting the October railway, and concluding the operation by participating in the general rout of the enemy forces around Chudovo at the hands of the Volkhov Front.

Carrying out the assigned task, the 2nd Shock Army between January 20-22 broke through the enemy defensive positions at the indicated sector along a width of 8-10 km, moved all of its forces through the breakthrough, and over the course of two months of stubborn and bloody fighting, advanced upon Lyuban', bypassing it from the south-west.

Indecisive actions on the part of the 54th Army of the Leningrad Front, which was to link up with the 2nd Shock Army from the north-east, slowed its movement significantly. By the end of February, the offensive impulse of the 2nd Shock Army had played itself out and its advance was halted in the vicinity of Krasnaya Gorka, south-west of Lyuban'.

The 2nd Shock Army, forcing the enemy back, punched a hole in its defenses to a depth of 60-70 km through marshy, forested terrain.

Despite repeated attempts to widen the initial point of the breakthrough, which took on the distinctive shape of a corridor, success was not achieved...

Between March 20-21, the enemy succeeded in cutting the communications of the 2nd Shock Army. Having closed the corridor, the enemy had the intention of encircling the army in a constrictive ring and destroying it completely.

On March 28, the corridor was re-opened through efforts of the 2nd Shock Army and units of the 52nd and 59th Armies.

On May 25, Stavka of the Supreme Main Command issued an order for units of the 2nd Shock Army to beginning withdrawing to the south-west, that is, on a reverse route through the corridor, commencing June 1.

On June 2, the enemy closed the corridor once again, effecting the complete encirclement of the army. From this moment, the army began receiving military supplies and provisions from the air.

On June 21, the enemy front was broken through once again on a narrow sector 1-2 km in width and an organized withdrawal of units of the 2nd Shock Army began.

On June 25, the enemy succeeded in closing the corridor a third time and stop the withdrawal of our units. From this moment, the enemy forced an end to air deliveries to the army due to heavy losses among our aircraft.

On May 21, Stavka of the Supreme Main Command ordered units of the 2nd Shock Army to withdraw from the north-west to the south-east, and - having firmly established a western covering line at Ol'khovka – Lake Tigoda - to attack from the west with the main forces of the army in tandem with an attack from the east by the 59th Army with the goal of smashing the enemy salient at Priyutino – Spasskaya Polnyet'.

The commander of the Leningrad Front, Lieutenant-General KHOSIN, was slow in carrying out Stavka's order, citing the impossibility of sending out equipment and vehicles due to the trackless terrain and the necessity of constructing new roads. By the beginning of June, KHOSIN and his Chief of Staff STEL'MAKH sent a report that the withdraw of army units had begun. As established later, KHOSIN and STEL'MAKH deceived the General Staff, as by this time the 2nd Shock Army had only begun pulling back its rear formations.

The 59th Army acted very indecisively, undertaking several unsuccessful attacks, and the tasks assigned by Stavka were not carried out.

Thus, by June 21, the formations of the 2nd Shock Army, numbering 8 rifle divisions, 6 rifle brigades (35-37,000 men) along with three artillery regiments of the Main Command Reserve (100 guns) as well as some 1000 vehicles, were concentrated in an area 6 km by 6 km located several kilometers south of N[ovaya] Kerest'.

According to information available in the General Staff, on July 1, 9600 men from units of the 2nd Shock Army, including 32 divisional and army staff officials, escaped with their personal weapons. According to unverified information, the Chief of the Special Section also escaped.

According to information sent to the General Staff by a general staff officer, Army Commander VLASOV and member of the Military Council ZUYEV reached the western shore of the river Polnyet' escorted by 4 submachine gunners. They ran into the enemy and scattered under enemy fire. They have allegedly not been seen since.

The Chief of Staff of the Front, STEL'MAKH, reported by radio that VLASOV and ZUYEV reached the western bank of the river Polnyet' and were directing the withdrawal of the forces from a knocked-out tank. Their further fate is not known.

According to information from the Special Section of the NKVD of the Volkhov Front, by the end of the day, June 26, 14,000 men from units of the 2nd Shock Army had escaped. The front staff have no information regarding the condition of the army's units and formations.

According to a statement by the commissar of an independent signals battalion, PESKOV, Army Commander VLASOV along with staff commanders moved towards the escape zone in the 2nd echelon. A group headed by VLASOV fell under enemy artillery and mortar fire. VLASOV ordered all radio-sets to be destroyed by setting them on fire, which led to a loss of control over the forces.

According to information from the Chief of the Special Section of the front, on June 17, the situation within the army units had already become extremely serious, with large numbers of troops exhausted, ill from hunger, and in desperate need of supplies. By this time, according to the General Staff, passenger aircraft had been making daily air deliveries of some 7-8 tons of foodstuffs out of a required 17 tons, 1900-2000 shells out of a minimum requirement of 40,000, and 300,000 cartridges, roughly 5 cartridges per man.

It should be noted, that according to recent information, received by the General Staff on 29.6, a group of military officials from units of the 2nd Shock Army made their way out through the enemy's rear in the vicinity of Mikhaleva, reaching the sector of the 59th Army without suffering any losses. They assert, that the enemy strength in this sector is scant, while the escape corridor, which is now enclosed by strong enemy forces, subjected to ranged firing from dozens of mortar and artillery batteries, and attacked by daily increasing enemy air forces is today almost inaccessible for a breakthrough by either the 2nd Shock Army from the west or by the 59th Army from the east.

It is typical, that the areas through which the 40 military officials of the 2nd Shock Army escaped were exactly those which Stavka of the Supreme Main Command instructed the units of the 2nd Shock Army to escape through. However, neither the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army nor the Military Council of the Volkhov Front ensured that the Stavka directive was carried out.

Assistant Chief of Administration OO NKVD USSR, Senior Major of State Security (MOSKALENKO)

1 July 1942.

The Teletank - The Soviet Robot Tank

2009-07-04T15:46:00.000-07:00

Teletanks – “Robots” of the USSR
http://www.mosoblpress.ru/odincovo/show.shtml?d_id=4247

Now and then, life brings us together with persons who were witnesses of surprising historical facts. An old tank soldier, Viktor Dmitrievich Scherbitsky, began relating to me his military career with the unusual statement: “I served on the teletank at the beginning of 1939”. My reaction was not surprising: “Excuse me....you served on what!?” Viktor Dmitrievich smiled and continued his story.

Your are not the only one surprised by that statement. Many people do not believe that we had such equipment as the Teletank – a tank controlled by radio – and that we had it in 1930s, when the radio was a miracles among miracles. I happened to be in this battalion, probably because I had training in electrical engineering, having worked at a power station before entering the army. Our unit was classified and military secrets were kept under tight security. This, perhaps, partly explains the reason why few know about teletanks even today. If any information remains, it would be located somewhere deep in the archives and may possibly be found in Podol'sk.
Our battalion consisted of paired combat groups of T-26 tanks. Each pair consisted of a command and control tank, which was given the designation TU, and a teletank, designated TT. The crew of TU tank included an operator who would control the operation of the TT tank by radio. The TT tank could operate 1.5 kilometers ahead of the control tank and was armed with special weapons. It could lay down a smoke screen by means of cistern installed specially for this purpose. The designers of the TT also contemplated that this tank could deliver chemical weapons at a much closer distance to the enemy without subjecting crew members to danger. The tank had a flame thrower installed which was also controlled by radio. It was also equipped with a Degtyaryov machine gun. Finally, there was a specially modified turretless version of the teletank with reinforced armour and a specially designed running gear, which was considerably more reliable than the standard T-26.
This latter tank was able to convey a special box, protected by 30mm of armour, against an enemy pillbox. Inside the box was a 500kg explosive. The mechanism for lowering the box and placing the explosive in operation was controlled by radio. The explosive included a fifteen minute fuse set from the moment the explosive reached the ground, which would allow the tank the necessary time to back up and reach a safe distance. Such an explosive charge could destroy the most powerful reinforced concrete pillbox down to depth of four levels. In our battalion, there was only one group of such tanks, which had taken part in the Finnish campaign. The main task of these teletanks was to breakthrough reinforced defensive lines – such as the Mannerheim Line. The officers who trained us also had experience in the Finnish campaign.

How did the command and control mechanism work?

Tracks [Тяги] and levers were were pneumatically controlled: a compressor would blow air into a special balloon, and from there compressed air would set in motion the pistons which ran the controls. Now we would use hydraulics, but this was not known at that time. The process was controlled through electromechanical relays, being set in motion by radio commands. The receiving equipment allowed for control along sixteen parameters. The radio operator worked from a control panel which had around 20 buttons arranged on it in rows of four. I remember them to this day: the first button “Ready” - prepared the machine for receiving one of the combat commands; the second button “Fire” - engaged the flamethrower (or subjected an area to poisonous gas); the fourth button “Smoke” - laid down a smoke screen. The second, third and fourth rows of buttons involved command and control functions governing the general operation of the teletank. The first button started the engine, the second button engaged the first running gear, while buttons three through six governed higher gears and the seventh button engaged the reverse. Buttons eight and nine would turn the turret to the left or to the right, while buttons ten and eleven would turn the tank itself left or right respectively. There was a red light on the control panel, situated above and to the right of the buttons, which verified the panel circuit. Opposite it, in the corner on the left hand side, was a switch which allowed one to alternate between radio channels. This tank could also be operated by an ordinary driver-mechanic, as all the regular operational equipment of standard T-26 were maintained inside. Externally, the teletank differed from the standard model of tank by the installation on the roof of the turret of two pieces of armoured glass which protected the antenna rods from destruction of the electrical assembly as well as isolating them from suppressive small arms fire.

What served for the relaying of the radio signals? There were no transistors, of course – only vacuum tubes – and can you imagine the jolting that would take place within the tank!

It stands to reason that the radio set involved the use vacuum tubes. Some of the tubes had metal enclosures but most were still made of glass. As strange as it may sound, failures did not occur! The entire structure was fastened onto special spring-based shock absorbers. There were some differences. For example, the turning speed of the radio-controlled vehicle depended upon the voltage, which the generator issued to the lateral electrical circuits. At times, this even depended upon the weather. Lower than normal voltage would mean that the tank would respond more slowly to commands. Higher than normal voltage and the tank would make sharp and abrupt movements. Thus, it would be necessary to make adjustments. There was one instance in which the training vehicles ceased to obey commands. We were unable to determine the problem. We changed the receiver and replaced the transmitter, but it did not help. The problem turned out to be that an electrical transmission line ran through this location, and the signal quality had been affected by the electromagnetic field.

Does this mean then, that – theoretically speaking – enemy radio interference could put TT tanks out of commission?

This cannot be denied, although the radio sets operated on two channels – HF and UHF – and could be switched back and forth. This – however – was not a very serious defense for radio communications.

How would one stop a vehicle which failed to respond to commands?

As far as I remember, such occurrences never took place, but generally there was a special box on the rear of the tank. One could catch up to the tank, open the box and muffle the engine through the normal means of employing the choke. If the TT were to depart from the range of the TU tank, a mechanism in the TT tank would automatically employ the “Stop” command after 30 seconds. The tank would halt and await the next command from the TU while the engine would remain idling. By that time, the control tank would have regained operational radio contact with the TT.

What was the nature of training on the test vehicles?

We were given an assigned task: on a certain rise there was an enemy pillbox, and before it lay a ditch, a mine field and an anti-tank obstacle. We were all trained to surmount these obstructions. A lot of time was given over to driving. To conduct even a standard tank over ground pitted with craters was no easy task, but to do so from a distance of a kilometer – well, you can imagine. As an example of the tactics involved: the crew of the TT tank, having approached the enemy positions, would “bail out” - taking the machine gun with them. The problem was not to allow enemy infantry from getting close to the teletank, which was accomplished through the use of the flame thrower and by the TU tank, which was armed with a 45mm gun and a machine gun. Radio control was conducted by one of the tank commanders, but the crews were trained so that everyone was able to control the teletank. Crew members were completely interchangeable.

It is an historical fact that the Katyushas carried special cases filled with explosives. If the risk presented itself that the equipment would fall into the hands of the enemy, the crew was obliged to blow it up, and thus destroy the rocket systems. Was there something similar involved with the teletanks?

I am not aware of such things. The training manual specified that if the enemy were to attempt to capture a teletank, the crew of the command tank were obliged to open fire against the TT with their cannon.

What was the fate of the teletanks in the Great Fatherland War? Were they employed?

As teletanks – no. The tactics of military operations had changed considerably. War had ceased being positional in nature and had become mobile. There were only two battalions of teletanks in the Soviet Union. One of them was deployed near Rovno, and the Germans bombed it during the first months of the war. Our battalion was based outside of Yaroslavl' and the war found us on maneuvers near Gor'kiy'. For some time we were spared involvement, as the equipment was considered secret. But when the situation had become tense with enemy having approached the gates of Moscow, the equipment was removed and replaced by crews and our T-26s were sent into battle. A fire happened to break out in our tank, although we managed to put it out, and I was wounded.
From 1943, I served at the scientific research institute at Kubinka, testing tanks. I do not recall other models of radio-controlled tanks in the history of tank construction in our country, although modern tanks are stuffed full of electronic and automatic systems. But...perhaps I am also mistaken...

What do you mean?

The lunar rover? It is – indeed – the most genuine example of a teletank!

Victor Dmitrievich Scherbitsky had the opportunity to serve on a teletank T-26. The first experimental trials in our country involving the control of a tank from a distance commenced at the beginning of the 1930s. On 23 March 1930, the MOST-1 three-command system of radio control was tested on the T-18 tank. However, serial production of a teletank based on the T-18 chassis did not occur. The T-18 was too light, tall and possessed an extremely narrow silhouette. This made it very difficult to control as it would change direction upon encountering any potholes or ruts in the ground. The heavier T-26 proved better. History records several instances in which teletanks were employed in combat. This occurred during the Finnish campaign. As evidence of this, we may cite information from a meeting of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) – TsK VKP(b):

MEETING of the TsK VKP(b)
From the Command Staff regarding the Experience Gained during Military Operations Against Finland
Morning of the Sixth session, 17 April 1940: Kombrig Yermakov, commander of the 100th Rifle Division:
“... Comrades, one should mention, that we made use of teletanks, but conditions did not allow for their mass employment. The teletanks provided us with assistance - especially in the destruction of pillboxes No. 39 and No. 35. These pillboxes were of the strongest construction, nevertheless they were blown up.... The tanks operated quite well, they proved themselves, but we were not always able to employ them as the terrain had a large number of depressions and potholes. Nevertheless, we made use of them. In any case, the tanks have proven themselves”.

There were similarly designed tanks also in the German army. There was the teletank V-4, there were small anti-tank “torpedoes” such as the radio-guided “Springer” and the “Goliath”, which would unwind an electrical control lead behind itself. A “Goliath” is found in the armoured vehicle museum at Kubinka. It is difficult to consider all of these designs as being successful. It was very difficult to direct a “Goliath” up to a tank even from a distance of 100 meters. The battery had a charge, which allowed for only eight minutes of movement, and the low clearance did not provide for sufficient mobility. Equipping these tankettes with a petrol engine did not save the situation. Nevertheless, they were able to carry out certain functions – including mine clearing and attacking fortifications.

The Lockhart Case (1918) - Part III

2009-06-12T23:09:00.000-07:00

Additional Testimony provided by K. D. Kalamatiano

Comrade Kingisepp – Cheka

K. D. Kalamatiano, citizen of the USNA [United States of North America], Russian-Greek by origin, has specialized in the study Russia and the Russian language since university (Chicago, 1907). Has been in Russia since 1905 (with the exception of yearly trips to the US and the years 1906 and 1907, when he was in France). While in Russia, he was in the constant employ of the Case Co., at the main office in Odessa. K. D. was in charge of operations until 1915, and was the main representative in Russia. The company specializes in tractors (for ploughing and threshing), road-building equipment and automobiles. In connection with company's operations, K. D. traveled around Russia and was especially acquainted with the work of the zemstvos and landed property. At the beginning of 1915, it seemed that a fortuitous moment had arrived for the establishment of new American enterprises in Russia. Having this in mind, K. D. left his former employ and went to the US, where he remained until the spring of 1916. In the US, he was exclusively engaged in attracting American firms to future activities in Russia, and – in connection with others – organized the International Co. of Manufacturers and Factories in America, working as the director – manager of this firm (9 Armyanskiy Alley). Due to the lack of orders, monetary difficulties, and friction with the American government, the firm did not experience success. On 1 October 1917, K. D. left this firm and accepted the post as the Russian representative for the trading company Klavdii M. Gankivel in New York, a firm which supplied automobiles and lorries to a wide number of enterprises during the war (primarily to the All-Russian Land Union).
In connection with the new complications which arose during 1917-1918, further operations became almost impossible. K. D. was engaged in the liquidation of the business, preparations for future dealings, and serious investigations in connection with the new situation in Russia.

Activities during the past 6-8 months

As a result of the political situation, it had become clear that private commercial activity was almost impossible, and the USNA, through the aegis of its commercial attache at the consulate (Gentington [Huntington]), entertained the idea of exporting goods required by Russia while importing Russian goods exclusively through state enterprises. Negotiations were conducted with cooperatives, with the commissar of foreign trade and so on, on the basis of bartered trade. K. D. was well-acquainted with the commercial attache and was also interested in this activity, both in the interests of his firm as well as for his own personal future. It became clear that the US knew very little about the internal situation in Russia and therefore K. D. took it upon himself to organize, in the name of his firm, an Information Bureau, whose purpose was to provide an accurate picture of modern Russia, both economically and politically. The political situation was extremely important for any commercial activity, since it would be impossible to operate successfully if the political situation was unstable. An issue of primary interest was the question of how much economic use Germany was making of the Brest peace treaty and so on. The issues under consideration were roughly as follows:
1. Transport – how much destroyed, freight capacity of the railways, the condition of junction points, how much of the primary communications system with Germany is operating (through the occupied areas to the Ukraine and so on).
2. Trade – how much is operating normally, what goods are required most of all, what can a certain area provide in exchange. How much have the new laws affected trade, how much influence do requisitions have on trade, and so on.
3. Banking – how will nationalization proceed, how are the banks operating in general.
4. Agrarian question – how successful has been the distribution of land, what influence has it had on agriculture, the general mood of the agricultural population.
5. Political mood – how strong is the new government, is agitation noticeable among other parties and which ones.
6. Attitude of the population: 1) to America; 2) to Germany
7. Is export-import trade occurring with Germany. How many shares is Germany purchasing, how much land and so on.
Also, there were special questions depending upon the region, local questions, such as the Mal'tsevskiye factories and other factories in Bryansk, the textile industry in Kineshma and Vladimir, flax in Rzhev and Smolensk and so on.
Recently, the question arose concerning the transfer of forces from Germany to Russia along the railways as well as the issue of sending raw materials and products of the textiles industry from Russia to Germany.
The area under investigation was initially limited to the front line region – Rostov, Minsk, Voronezh, Kursk, Bryansk, Orsha, Smolensk, Dno and Novgorod. Later, a section [of the Bureau - skoblin] was organized in the Ukraine (Rostov, Khar'kov, Poltava, Kiev, Odessa and the Crimea). Persons were sent to the Ukraine to conducted a specialized study concerning the status of the Ukrainian government, relations with Germany and Austria, progress in the export of goods from the Ukraine to Germany, the situation in the Donets Basin, factories and so on. Also of interest was the situation regarding the German forces and – in particular – their attitude towards and relations with the local inhabitants. The same was done in Belorussia and the Baltic provinces.
In Russia, individuals headed out from Moscow, with the latter comprising the center of operations. They were to live in the occupied areas and communicate by courier with Moscow, as well as with Khar'kov – which also comprised a center of operations.
In view of the possible difficulties (departure of the consular representatives and ambassadors, arrest of allies, and so on), K. D. decided on August 1 to settle in the country as a Russian with a false Russian passport (i.e. not his own). Moreover, he considered collecting information particularly in the Ukraine and Belorussia. During this period there were 8 persons in the Ukraine with 3 couriers, 1 in Minsk, 1 in Riga and 4 in Russia (not counting 2 in Moscow).
The persons drawn into this affair were all personally recommended to K. D. by his business acquaintances and were hired under the guise of the Klavd. M. Gankivel' trading company. K. D., in particular, tried to find persons not biased politically so that they could respond to given questions with absolute accuracy, to the point.
Payment was meager and there was nothing to prevent those who had been hired from finding other work.

Persons drawn into the case

5. A.V. Fride carried out several assignments. Then, having received employment in Moscow, remained here. His responsibilities included reading through accounts, making reports, rewriting the same on a typewriter and sending them to K. D.
24. Zagryazhskiy was recently invited in order to serve as Fride's deputy, in the view of the possible departure of K. D. He has not taken up these duties at present. He has provided several accounts and summaries of stories concerning Russian prisoners-of-war, who have fled from Germany through the occupied areas.
11. Potyomkin (2 brothers) had initially carried out 1 or 2 assignments. The older brother (who is in Kursk) then fell ill, and his brother was take on and worked in the countryside.
10. Volynskiy – has left.
8. Ivanov – recently went to Minsk-Orsha. At the end of August, having received employment somewhere, refused further work. Received payment.
12. Golitsyn had employment in which he carried out assignments. Has not gone anywhere as of late and was supposed to be paid.
7. Ishevskiy – one assignment, but proved to be undesirable. Was paid.
19. Solyus was recently hired on. Carried out one or two assignments.
Nos. 1, 3, 16, 17, 18, 23, 28, 20 and 21 (Ukraine)
No. 9 – Riga
Nos. 2, 4, 6, 13, 14 and 19 left according to circumstances and were dismissed.
Nos. 22, 26 and 27 – couriers
M.A. Fride was not used at all. She carried out one assignment for Mr [Smith] in connection with the army Red Cross. She recently carried a letter to an appointed destination, but it not considered as employed.
Special issues in this regard:
I. When it became conclusively clear that A.[the identitiy of “A” is not indicated - skoblin] and the Allied consular officials in general would be departing, I had conversations with Mr. Pull whether I should remain behind or not. On his advice, I decided to stay, as I took into consideration my future connections with Russia in the light of the my lengthy activity in this regard. It was reported to me that the representatives of the British and French consulates would also be staying and I was invited to meet with them if need be. This is, indeed, what occurred at the American Consulate on August 25, which is where I first met with Mr. Reilly and Mr. Vertamon. It was decided that I would provide them with a daily summary (especially in regards the Ukraine), which would be passed on to the consulate. I exchanged addresses with them and we spoke about the situation. Our organization had no other contact with them or with their organization.
II. The trip to Samara. In July 1918, K.D.'s wife set out to Belebey, in Ufa province, where her relatives lived, due to the high cost of living in Moscow. K.D. was unable to find out any information about her after that and became very worried. He decided to head out before winter, in order to find out what had become of her. He asked various acquaintances to assist him with the necessary permits and passes. In connection with this, A.V. Fride arranged an errand for K.D. in Penza (which was carried out) and provided documentation averring the non-political nature of the trip (this was a deception, in which K.D. persuaded Fride). This documentation, however, had only been signed by Fride, while K.D. provided the second signature himself. Through acquaintances, K.D. also received a commission from a cooperative, according to which he was to make all sorts of inquiries in Penza.
K.D. set out for Belebey, in Ufa province, departing from Moscow of August 30 and returning on the 18th [of September] (19 in total, including 13 on the road). In Belebey, he found his wife and took care of personal affairs. Having been arrested in Syzran', he had to go to Samara in order to obtain a document from a consular official. Being interested, naturally, in the state of affairs, K. D. had a meeting with the French consul and brought back several letters of a purely personal nature on behalf of the consul and others.
K.D. was arrested upon his return to Moscow in the courtyard of the former American consulate.
All the above-mentioned testimony may be corroborated by witnesses.
III. V.N. Zhukovskiy and I were acquaintances from childhood in Switzerland. He is a close friend and had nothing to do with my activities. I lived with him for a short time after I had sold my apartment.

Summary

I consider myself guilty for remaining in Russia under someone else's passport.
I consider the activities of my organization to be completely harmless, as the organization pursued no military, political or anti-government goals. Those persons, who had been drawn into this activity, were specially instructed not to impart or propagate their own opinions, but to report the simple facts, as this activity could have great value for future relations with the USNA [United States of North America – skoblin].
There were no contacts with any organizations, Allied or Russian, with the exception indicated on page 3/1. Otherwise, K.D. always endeavoured to find out the perspective, plans and so on, of various parties, their orientation, strength and so on.
Repeating that which has been indicated earlier, it would appear, that in connection with the current situation, i.e., the lack of an American consulate and so on, K.D. and his organization:
1) acted unofficially, but 2) since K.D. was known as an American businessman, was well-acquainted with Russia and was undoubtedly unconnected with any party and generally interested in future relations with America, he could be of further use even now during potential negotiations and so on. It should be stressed that the US lack correct information and that it must rely exclusively upon information from others.
In any case, K.D. has stressed once more that the persons, employed by his organization, were in no wise guilty of any anti-government activities, since only he himself knew its actual purposes.

Monetary aspects

Some 100,000 was allocated for the activities [of the organization] and was located as follows: 50,000 roub. with A.V. Fride, 20,000 with A.A. Zagryazhskiy, with part of the remainder being sent to the Ukraine, while the rest was with K.D. The sums mentioned above were held by the indicated persons for safekeeping.

Signed K.D. Kalamatiano
15/X – [19]18.

It turned out that Kalamatiano, in creating his organization, had already taken measures to ensure the protection of its members against the retribution of the revolutionary proletariat in case of any failure. All of them were instructed to say that they were employed in an exclusively commer[cial] organization, [collecting information] of a political nature about Russia. Typical of those who were arrested, though, was not to admit to belonging to Kalamatiano's organization until Kalamatiano himself was arrested and - once the names of all of his collaborators had been decoded – they were forced to admit their attachment to this organization under the weight of evidence. All of them knew perfectly well, that their organization bore a criminal nature in regards the revolution, and they endeavoured to conceal everything until, under the weight of evidence, they began to relate the story imparted to them by their master.
As an example, I will cite several of the aforementioned affidavits.

Affidavit from Aleksandr Andreevich Zagryazhskiy

25 September 1918.
During the first few days of July of this year, according to the new style, A. Vl. Fride, who had related to me earlier that he was working for some sort of American firm, invited me to take part in the collection of political and economic information for the Americans. The understanding was that the America intended to enter into close economic relations with Russia upon the conclusion of the world war.
I stated that I did not have any influential or authoritative acquaintances in those areas of interest, that my circle of acquaintances was extremely limited and that I had neither the time nor the inclination to subject them to questioning for the sake of information. A.V. Fride responded by saying that any rumours being circulated would be valuable and that even foolish rumours sometimes possess a small portion of truth, while complete foolishness is always disclosed through comparison with others [other rumours - skoblin]. I requested time to consider.
Being neither a politician nor an economist, my line of reasoning was roughly as follows: we were not in a state of hostility with America – at least not open hostility at that time – and after the war, Russia would require vast material resources, which only America could provide, having entered the war later than other countries and being wealthier than them. Thus, I saw nothing either criminal or even improper in such information.
I agreed and in early July, new style, possibly July 7, I was introduced to Kalamatiano at Fride's apartment. During this encounter, I repeated my arguments that I would be a poor informant considering my lack of extensive knowledge and authority regarding economic issues. The same considerations, however, were repeated to me concerning the value of any news or information making its rounds. After meeting Kalamatiano at Fride's apartment, I saw him around 20 times in total. I was at his apartment twice, once at Kudrinskaya Sadovaya and another time when he lived not far from Fride (I do not remember the name of the street). I was at his apartment for only a very short time, having dropped by in order to go to Fride's.
There was nothing conspiratorial in these meetings: I would drop by during the daytime, and took no measures to conceal my visits. On some occasions, I would arrive at Fride's and find Kalamatiano there; on other times I would leave earlier than him and sometimes we would leave together. Several times he would see me off [text is ambiguous here – may be translated “he would accompany me to Fride's apartment”, “accompany me leaving Fride's apartment” or “would see me off” - skoblin] During these meetings, the conversations would consist of relating stories concerning the news and rumours and commenting on them. In a word, the conversations did not depart from being typical mundane conversations regarding current events. On some occasions, I would relate about the horrible conditions of confinement of our prisoners [this being Russian prisoners confined by Germany - skoblin], or about exceptional or curious events, such as the miraculous recovery of one of our soldiers the day following his arrival in Moscow. I would also relate about the desire of prisoners to make their way home quickly. But I declare, that I never inquired about the political mood of the prisoners and therefore could not report anything in this regard. The mood of the prisoners was unknown to me.
I should mention that neither Fride nor Kalamatiano discussed payment with me. In early August, new style, while in Fride's study and in the presence of Kalamatiano, Fride handed me 750 roub. for work. This occurred possibly on August 7. I took the money, but in my heart I did not feel like I had earned it. Perhaps, this is how things are done in business circles, I thought to myself, but I was used to a more basic understanding of work. I decided to bide my time, while keeping the sum of money for payment. Later, Fride, and it seems Kalamatiano as well, advised me to take on collaborators [informants - skoblin], to receive their reports and to compile summaries of them, in case Fride and Kalamatiano were absent. One time, I was presented with 5-10 thous. roub. (for safekeeping). I do not remember the actual amount. I categorically refused, for I have never liked and do not like to hold other people's money. The matter was dropped and the money was not given to me.
When Kalamatiano was leaving for Penza, he and Fride spoke to me again about the possibility of compiling summaries and dispatching them, in case Fride was absent, which Fride had brought up once before. To my relief, I never saw a single collaborator [informant] nor any reports, never compiled any summaries and never delivered any packages containing documents. I stated “to my relief”, because I see now that such actions would have complicated my current situation regarding this matter, whereas at the time I had perceived nothing improper in this activity. It was at approximately this time that I was 20 thous. roub. for safekeeping and for issuing payments to collaborators. The details concerning these payments were to be relayed to me by Fride. The collaborators were signified by numbers, as were their corresponding reports, according to which I was to know them. Perhaps, Fride was also supposed to relate to me their names, but this was not done.
After Kalamatiano's departure, I saw Fride once, as far as I can recall. In connection with the 20 thous. roub. that was entrusted to me, for which – I repeat – I had a dislike, as I do not like to hold other people's money, occurred the matter of Kalamatiano changing his name to Serpovskiy. This struck me as being conspiratorial, and thought arose of declining further participation in this activity. For three days, I attempted to do this. As far as I remember, these attempts were made on August 29, 30 and 31, new style (Thursday, Friday and Saturday).
On August 29, I went to Fride's and knocked on his window (the bell was not working) and received absolutely no answer. On August 30, Fride's elderly mother opened the door and told me that A. V. was not at home. After asking her where it would be possible to get milk (she suggested through her), I left. On August 31, while on my way to the Prisoners' Board on B. Nikitskaya [Bol'shaya Nikitskaya street – skoblin], in order to hand in termination notes [tetradei okonchonnikh], I ran right into Mlle. Fride near the square at the entrance to Trubnikovskiy Alley (with my short-sightedness, I would not have recognized her if we had not bumped into each other). After exchanging greetings, I told her that I had dropped by the apartment twice but had been unable to find A.V. at home, on one occasion (Thursday) not even receiving an answer. After telling her that I planned drop by today as well, she told me that A.V. Would not be home, but that she could pass on a message if needed. I responded by saying that I would come by another time myself. I suggested Tuesday evening, but he was arrested the night before. Now I have doubts whether this occurred on August 30, 31 and September 1, but I believe that the first dates – August 29, 30 and 31 – are more accurate.
I saw Mlle. Fride perhaps 5 or 6 times in total, no more – generally when she answered the door.
Kalamatiano explained his decision to change his name as arising from his desire to remain in Russia in order to continue his work of collecting economic information. In other words, he wished to continue in his endaevours, even though he – as an American – was required to leave Russia, as all the Americans were.
I not only intended to notify Fride of my refusal to accept further work, but also to hand back the 20 thous. roub. as well as the 750 roub., since I felt I had done no work since August 7, other than hang on to the 20 thous. for around a week or so. In conclusion, I may state further, that I made no new acquaintances in connection with my participation in this activity. I made no excursions, either in regards this employment or in addition to it (I do not consider the instances in which I dropped in on old acquaintances). And I continued to serve with an institution, which has no secrets, for this institution collects information regarding the condition of our imprisoned soldiers, about which all of Russia has been apprised for a long time from newspapers of the most varied outlook. The desire of the prisoners to make their way home quickly is quite natural and understandable, but this sort of information, however, has no price.
I did not know where Fride worked, nor do I know even now. I was never there. As indirect evidence that I had no dealings with collaborators [informants], I may mention the fact that the 20 thous. remained in the same one thousand note bills as when I received them. I may also suggest, that if my apartment had been put under observation, it would have been found out that no informants had approached me. Essentially, my participation in this matter remained at the level of preliminary conversations and did not depart from these limits, with the reservation that the purpose of this information – as I understood it – did not constitute anything improper or criminal against the people or the Soviet state.

Aleksandr Andreevich Zagryazhskiy

In one of my statements I was mistaken. I once presided over a political case in the spring of 1916, in Voronezh. A peasant was tried on the charge of apparently belonging to a peasant brotherhood in Nizhnedevitsk. He was acquitted. This trial constituted a small part of a large case, examined earlier in 1907-1909 under the chairmanship of the judge, Duble.

A. Zagryazhskiy

Affidavit from Aleksei Vasilievich Potyomkin

Having recently graduated from a secondary educational institution and with the harsh life and high cost of living of the present day, I, Aleksei Vasilievich Potyomkin, considered it my responsibility to find work in order to help provide for my mother and father as much as possible. Circumstances arose thus, that an old acquaintance of my parents, Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride, living in the city of Moscow and having employment, the precise nature of which I did not know, offered me a position, saying that I would receive good pay. Naturally, while telling me stories about this work, Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride also stated that there was nothing improper involved in it. At the same time, he gave me the address of a certain Ksenefont Dmitrievich Kalamatiano, with whom I would have to meet, and did, in fact, meet with twice, albeit briefly: once, at the office of William Hinns [William Camber-Higgs - skoblin], I believe, while the second more or less took place at Aleksandr Vladimiriovich's own apartment.
Upon arriving in Moscow on September 2, and proceeding to Mr. Fride's residence to take up my duties, I was arrested by a man who subsequently told me that he was an official from the Cheka and that he was arresting everyone who was arriving at the residence of the known counter-revolutionary, Fride.
On the evening of September 2, I was taken to the Cheka, where I was questioned several times. They asked me what sort of understanding I had of the work I was involved in. I stated that it was purely commercial and was far removed from politics, which I had never engaged in. If I were to be subsequently released, I would place myself far away from it, since in the present circumstances I have neither the right nor the ability to risk my life. I know that I was to provide information concerning the condition of trade and industry in Russia for an American industrial concern. As for payment, I sometimes received an advance from Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride of approximately 600 roub. give or take.
I am always ready to provide testimony in more detail in the belief that I will not be sentenced.

A. Potyomkin
28 September 1918.

In his initial testimony, Potyomkin denied either knowing Kalamtiano or having done any work for him. He claimed that he had come to Moscow on account of illness and had gone to Fride's in order to relay greetings from his parents.
It is necessary to present one more affidavit, that from Ishevskiy.

Affidavit from Ishevskiy

In the middle of April of this year, I, the undersigned, journalist Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Ishevskiy, learned through my acquaintances, the Nikifaraks [probably Nikiforuks - skoblin], that the representative of a certain American transport firm was looking for various agents for the collection of purely commercial information. Since I found myself in straitened material circumstances at that time on one hand, and generally enjoyed traveling on the other, I was glad to offer my services to this American. I requested an introduction and received it in the form of a calling card belonging to a Mr. Angin. With this card, I headed off to the indicated address (23 Sadovaya Kudrinskaya, apt. 23) and offered my services to Mr. K. D. Kalamatiano. He greeted me very amicably and was obviously very glad of the fact that I was a journalist, to wit, that their transportation firm needed information dealing exclusively with transportation issues, since (in his words) their firm “Nankvil' and Co.” intended to import some sort of goods into Russia. He requested that I drop in on their (now deceased) consul and personally inquire about the credit worthiness of this firm and its purely commercial activity. For payment, I was offered 600 roub. a month and a daily rate of 20 roub.
Incidentally, he led me to believe that the work would be on-going (no less than 2 or 3 months). I did not go to the consul, being satisfied with the look of the official American stamp placed on the authorization pass that was issued to me.
Roughly a week later, I departed for the town of Ryazan', intending to head to Voronezh. However, I did not make it there, deciding to take advantage of these 2 or 3 weeks and rest at my father's residence in Samara province. And so I did. Three weeks later I returned to Moscow and called on Kalamatiano. He suggested that I provide a written report about my trip and promised to bring me the format for the report that same evening. He did in fact bring me this format and then urgently parted ways, requesting that I drop by his apartment with the report.
Becoming acquainted with the format, I perceived that their firm was more akin to an espionage organization and I decided to write the report in the most general terms, using newspaper information as a guide. Three days later I handed him the report and learned the disconcerting news that I was being let go. The explanation given was that the firm was temporarily shutting down. I was very disheartened by this and was determined to obtain the money that was owed me on the strength of his promises. Thus, I sent him a letter demanding money for the 2 – 3 months work that had been promised. His reply is known. I then decided to make the entire story public and offered it to the editor of the newspaper “Mir”. The editor regarded my proposal sympathetically and this matter was to have been decided in the next few days.
In conclusion, I have the honour of pointing out especially the following circumstances of this case: upon returning from my “sham assignment”, that is, up until my acquaintance with the format for the my report, I did not know about the character and purposes of the work offered me by Kalamatiano. If I have given him an altogether insignificant report, it was only out of a desperate need for money.

D. Ishevskiy
25/IX – [19]18.

In addition to his testimony, Ishevskiy also provided the VChK information concerning the nature of Kalamatiano's organization described in the following letter.

Letter from Ishevskiy to Kalamatiano

2/VI – [19]18.

Dear Sir.
Ksenefont Kalamatiano

I believe the time has come to resolve the issues concerning our joint endeavour. And therefore, I would like to express myself in a straightforward fashion. The substance of my report, as you yourself are aware of, departed significantly from that which you initially indicated to me. This, of course, did not come as a surprise to me. From the very beginning, I concluded that the “firm” and “conditions of transport” were nothing other than a mask used to conceal political and military espionage. And it was in this vein that I began conducting observations during my assignment.
But what was my surprise when I returned to Moscow and discovered that my services were no longer required. Having obtained what you required, and paying a pittance, which a courier for one of the current ministries would have received, you now rest content... A man, who risked much in the hope of future prospects, experienced arrest, worked on composing a comprehensive detailed report on Russian life and all for 600 roubles....is then sent away. This, despite repeated assertions on your part that my work with you would continue and there there was some sort of “future”. No, other governments do not treat their secret agents in such a manner.
In full awareness of my moral right and documentary proof, I demand restitution. If my work with you has come to an end, then I wish (and this desire is fully legal, and I am prepared to support it by all means at my disposal) to obtain my recompense for three months. This amounts to 4500 roub. on the basis of 600 roub. basic pay [600 roubles per month – skoblin] and 30 roub. per day. It would certainly be excessive on my part to waste so many words on this, if I was not confident in the satisfaction – I repeat – of my modest and just demands. Without a doubt, you are aware of the fact that Russia, at the present time, is of interest not only to your own country, but also to that coalition that stands hostile to you... And this is something you should reflect upon.
And so, I will wait for you for three days between 4 and 6 in the evening or for your notice with instructions of a time and place where we can meet.
It need not be said, that upon the conclusion our financial transaction, I will immediately return all documents, drafts and other materials in my possession. With proper acknowledgment and my word of honour, it will be as if we never met.

With deepest full respect
D. Ishevskiy

PS. I hereby relay to you the following newspaper issues in which my articles are published: “Zarya Rossii” No. 33 from 30-17 May 1918 and current issue of the newspaper “Zhizn'”.

Ishevskiy

As is obvious from Ishevskiy's letter, he new perfectly well why Kalamatiano had recruited him. What is more, he knew that he caught Kalamatiano in a trap. He knew that he could threaten Kalamatiano and acquire money as a result. And like a born blackmailer, Ishevskiy indeed carried this out. He not only threatened Kalamatiano, he even offered his services to the editor of the bourgeois newspaper “Mir” which had German sympathies. Ishevskiy wrote in a letter to the editor that he had materials in his possession which related to military and political espionage in Russia.

Letter from Ishevskiy to the Editor of “Mir”

To the editor of the newspaper “Mir”
Dear Sir.

I have in my possession interesting documents, which relate to an area which is rarely touched upon in the press: foreign military and political espionage in Russia.
I have been lucky enough to come into very close contact with one such secretive operation being conducted by “Allied” diplomacy, specifically, the Anglo-Americans.
Being of a mind to offer your newspaper this sensational documentation, I humbly request that you notify me through the above mentioned address of a time and place where we could meet to discuss this matter.

In expectation of your response
With deepest respect

In his response to Ishevskiy's threats, Kalamatiano attempted to extricate himself by stating once again that his organization was not criminal and so on.

Letter from Kalamatiano to Ishevskiy

Moscow, 4 June 1918.
Mr. Ishevskiy
Here
Dear Sir

Your letter from the 2nd of this month has rather surprised me. Due to your youth, you still have an apparently romantic outlook and have envisaged some sort of secret mission in our simple desire to be apprised of the possibility of exporting goods from Russia.
Nevertheless, considering your youth, allow me to explain to you, that you were taken on for one month, have received payment, and agreed to part company and you may have no further demands.
Since you were recommended to me, I will not consider your letter as being a typical example of blackmail of a nature such that others would probably perceive and in response to which they would employ quite different measures.

Respectfully yours,
K. D. K.

During this time, Ishevskiy had already received a response from the editor of “Mir”, having approached the paper for the purpose of acquiring a healthy reward for his services to this German sympathizing newspaper. As is readily apparent, Ishevskiy demanded much and haggled for a long time.

Letter from the Editor of “Mir” to Ishevskiy

Editor
Daily newspaper “Mir”
Moscow
September 12, 1918.

Dear Dmitrii Aleksandrovich
I have been urgently summoned to a meeting with shareholders today and once again am unable to meet with you.
Iv. Mikh. has been delegated to meet and conclude terms with you. My opinion regarding your articles has not changed: they are interesting and lively, but do not contain material of either a secretive or sensational nature that would justify exceptional terms.
Moreover, as I already noted yesterday, the slant of your articles runs opposite to the nature of our paper, which supports Soviet policy in foreign relations.
Regarding the extraordinary documents about which you have spoken (Anglo-American espionage), I propose that we enter into special discussions regarding the presentation and inspection of the documents you have in your possession.
I believe, that the rate of 75 kop. per line, which you have worked out with Iv. Mikh., has fully satisfied your demands.
You will agree, that the editorial board is in no position to set forth any sort of special and extraordinary guarantees even for such valuable contributers as yourself.
It is another matter concerning documents having a political significance, the purchase of which may exceed any special rate.

Regards,
(signed)

It has not been determined how matters with the newspaper “Mir” concluded and what material Ishevskiy provided it. The fact remains, however, that Ishevskiy trod firmly along the path of blackmail, knowing that it was not a political and economic organization he had in his clutches, but an espionage one.

The Lockhart Case (1918) - Part II

2009-06-02T12:10:00.000-07:00

First Affidavit from Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride

“Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride, age 34, a former lieutenant-colonel, at the present time serving in the Administration of the Chief of Military Communications (Maliy Znemenskiy Alley, Mazinga School). I have been employed there since June 6. Prior to this, I had requested permission to take up a post since April and waited for an opening, which was offered to me the same month. I receive 600 roubles in salary. The papers, which my mother threw in the lavatory, contain information from various places in Russia. I collected this information like a journalist and for this, I had to supply this information by postal dispatch. A certain Johnston, who was departing from Moscow, entrusted me to collect all the materials, which were addressed to him and sent to my apartment. I became acquainted with this above-mentioned gentleman during a divorce case about two months ago. He left around two weeks ago for short amount of time, I do not where. Since his departure, I have received three letters, two of them written by the same hand – one apparently from the south, the other from the north. The papers, which my mother wanted to throw into the lavatory, are originals of letters sent to me and dropped in a box outside. Regarding compensation, Johnston and I had a conversation, but nothing concrete was determined and it was put off to the future. I met with him on Kuznetskiy bridge and he has been to our apartment three times. As for appearance, Johnston is older than I am and referred to himself as a commercial agent or attache. I was supposed to send a report to a prearranged address on Sheremetievskiy Alley and to another address on Myasnitskaya [Street]. I do not remember the addresses. The addresses were written on a small note and kept in my writing desk. I wanted to send [the report] today, in fact, but due to the search I was unable to to do so. I was to send it in duplicate to the addresses indicated to me. On the envelope, I was to mark down three code letters. I do not remember what letters these were. I intended to type the report and then send the letters either by courier or by myself. He, Johnston, assured me that this document would be received by someone among the Allies, specifically, the Americans.

My brother is employed by an economic association of officers and occupies a position as a bookkeeper or an accountant. My older sister went to find flour, while Maria was absent from Moscow for a short period of time. She also went to find flour and brought back bread. I think my sister Maria was gone for around two weeks and I do not where where she went. My relations with my sisters are good, but with my brother are cooler. I am married with no children but it has already been five years since my wife and I have stopped living together. (As evidence [during] questioning I was provided a copy of report No. 17). I acknowledge that it was sent off by my sister Maria. I confirm that report No. 1 … is not fictitious and that this report is authentic and that I did not send anything more than this. I know Zagryazhskiy well. He is a colleague employed in the same profession I had been engaged in earlier, in other words, he is a jurist. Zagryazhskiy Aleksandr Andreevich resides on Uspenskiy Alley. I do not remember at which address or apartment.

2/IX – [19]18.

A. Fride

Copy collated (signed)”

During further questioning, A. V. Fride was forced to confess under the weight of evidence, that he had met with a certain Kalamatiano, in addition to the American, Johnston. He further admitted that he was in the service of the Americans at the same time he was employed by the Soviet authorities, and that he was in receipt of definite recompense.

Second Affidavit from Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride

“Subsequent to my previous testimony, I can report that, in addition to Johnston, I know one other American gentleman, Kalamatiano. I know neither his first name, patronymic nor address.

We met on the street. Packets were sent to several addresses, since it was told to me that the packets could be lost and therefore it was necessary to send them through several individuals. The report concerning Petrograd, seized in this case, was obtained for me by Solyus, who went to Petrograd and provided me this information on my request. My sister does not deny having received money, most likely, as a nurse. Whether she received money as an informant providing information, I know nothing about this. My sister's trip to Vladikavkaz was arranged by Smith, the American Consul. They arranged this through Mr. Kalamatiano. After meeting Kalamatiano on the street, he visited my apartment and was introduced to my sister. I do not know Mr. Khvalynskiy. The name Malinko, apparently, Nikolai, I know. I am acquainted with him, but from where and under what circumstances we became acquainted, I do not know.

I know Mr. Potemkin. I became acquainted with him several years ago during a trip, before I entered the academy. I knew little of his family. He used to visit me in Moscow. He was at my apartment three or four times last month. It seems he did not tell me about the calamities and dire straits his family faced. I know Ostroslovskaya. She is a neighbour of ours and has absolutely never been to our apartment. I have spoken about where I am employed and earn my income, and have not concealed that I am acquainted with Americans. We know the name Otten and have sent packets to this address. In the Gimels writing desk there is a note which indicates where a packet was to be sent. I do not remember the address. Regarding the address on Milyutinskiy Alley, I affirm that I sent a packet there. I neither remember nor knew the name of the addressee. The packet was to be handed over to the director. I do not know the address Maliy Lubyanka. Financial consideration did not play any part in my case.

A. Fride

4/IX – [19]18.”

Third Affidavit from Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride

“My acquaintance and collaborative activity with Mr. Kalamatiano started from the month of May. I received 500 roubles a month the first 2 or 3 months, then 750 and on one occasion received 1 thousand roubles. My tasks included informing him about the domestic, economic and political side of life. He also requested that I pay attention to everything describing the activity of the Germans in Russia. The material to be used for this consisted of rumours and conversations taking place and circulating among all layers of the population. This material was not to be critiqued, but merely reproduced absent those elements which were clearly ridiculous.

I invited A. A. Zagryazhskiy in view of the fact that Kalamatiano wanted exceptional individuals among his associates; individuals having a known social character and whom one could trust. Since this work involved obtaining information for friendly powers, and not hostile ones, I did not perceive it as being either illegal or even improper, and therefore invited Zagryazhskiy to participate in it. The question for both myself and for him was not the material reward, but that the work was not improper in regards Soviet power.

Before departing, Kalamatiano gave me 50 thousand roubles in 50 one thousand rouble notes for safekeeping. I placed the notes in my shaving kit behind the mirror (hidden) in the cover of this kit. When my room was being search, I was not there and they would not allow me to enter it. When they apparently reached the shaving kit, they called for me and asked how to open the mirror. I stated that I did not know. They asked me to move away and said they would break open the cover by force. Immediately after this, I heard the sound of breaking glass. I do not know whether the 50 thous. has been indicated in the records and I was not questioned about during the preceding interrogations. I promised Aleksei Potyomkin that I would arrange a position for him and was supposed to discuss this with Kalamatiano. I did, in fact, discuss Potyomkin with Kalamatiano.

Kalamatiano gave me Otten's address (3 Sheremetievskiy Alley). He gave me three address at that time. The second address was on Milyutinskiy Alley, I do not remember the street number, and the word Sonbon (monastery) was written. The third address was the American Consulate.

Solyus went to Petrograd, and upon his return he handed me the report, which I was to rewrite and then forward with additional information to the addresses indicated above.

I issued Kalamatiano an identity passes numbered 15594 and 10780. The latter, moreover, was signed by me, but was not registered. The assistant's signature on it was made by me.

It was known to me that Kalamatiano had traveled to Belebey. He said, that he would possibly meet with the American Consul. The first two pages were written by Fride in his own hand.

A. Fride

19/IX – [19]18.

Examined (signed)”

After the arrest of her brother and sister, M. V. Fride changed her initial testimony, in which she denied everything. She began to confess that she had been to Otten's apartment on several occasions – not just the one time. She also confessed that she had carried letters to the French gymnasium on Milyutinskiy Alley and handed them over to the directors of this school, that she had carried letters to a certain Smit [Smith] on Vagankovskiy Alley, as well as to the American Consulate for Pull, the American Consul General in Moscow. On one occasion, she was also sent to Vladivkavkaz with a packet, for which she received 600 roub. from Smith.

Affidavit from Maria Vladimirovna Fride

“I, Maria Vladimirovna Fride, have lived in Moscow permanently from the age of eight. At the present time, I am 31 years old. On July 30, old style, I left Moscow for Vladikavkaz, intending to visit a friend of mine, but it was not possible get through. Thus, I turned back at Astrakhan and returned to Moscow. I had no acquaintances in Astrakhan, and I lived at the Armenian seminary. I stayed in Astrakhan for a week and a half. In the detachment [the Armenian Seminary - skoblin], I became acquainted with Sheveleva Evgenia Arturovna, Doctor Melkumyanets and other individuals from the detachment, the names of whom I do not remember. Upon departing, Sheveleva entrusted me with a letter to give to her sister. I used to work at the clinic Dowager House, which is closed at present. I assert that the letter, which was entrusted to me, was given to me by an unknown individual. The letter was sealed and without an address on the envelope. I memorized the address [obviously given verbally – skoblin] and delivered it to the address, where I was also arrested.

I have two brothers: Aleksandr Vladimirovich and Mikhail Vladimirovich Fride. We all live together at No. 12 Durasovskiy Alley, apartment No. 2. Our sister, who is 42 years old, lives with us. At the present time, she has left for the Aleks [Aleksandrovskiy] railway. She works at the Aleks [Aleksandrovskiy] railway station as a typist. I, myself, am employed at the 5^th Women's Gymnasium. My brother Alek Vlad [Aleksandr Vladimirovich] works for the staff in charge of the transfer of forces and entered service there around three months ago. Mikh Vl [Mikhail Vladimirovich] works for an economic society of former officers and is a member of the board. I am not and have not been a member of any political party. When the hospital [the Dowager clinic – skoblin] was eliminated, I received around 750 roub.. The remainder, I received at the Gymnasium at a rate of 150 roub. a month for three months with an additional 1000 roub. for four months [250 roubles per month - skoblin]. Upon leaving, I had 2000 roubles in my purse in order to meet expenses. [Maria Vladimirovna Fride is apparently being questioned regarding the origin and purpose of 2000 roubles found on her person upon being arrested - skoblin]

1/IX – [19]18.”

“Supplementary to the previous testimony, I declare that the name Johnston is not known to me and I do not know any foreigners at all. I delivered two packets to the address indicated on Sheremteivskiy Alley. The first time was several days ago and the second time at the Sheremetievskiy address was during my arrest. I also delivered these same envelopes to another address. I saw the gentleman, Smit, at his apartment on Vagan'kov Alley, in Znamenka [district - skoblin], a corner building, top floor. A second address, where I delivered packets, was to the American Consulate at No. 4 or No. 6 Chernysh. [Chernyshevskogo - skoblin] Alley. I handed them to Mr. Pull personally.

There was one occasion in which I went to the French Gymnasium on Maliy Lubyanka with a packet. I gave the packet to the head mistress. I do not know her name. Pozdnyak and Zagryazhskiy would drop by to see us and my older brother. I have known them for two years. During my trip, I was supposed to deliver a packet to Vladikavkaz, addressed to the American Consul. Since I was unable to get through, however, I gave the packet to the Vice-Consul, Mr. Bari [Burri – skoblin], on Petrovskaya Street in Tsaritsyn. I carried a packet [text is ambiguous whether this was the same packet destined for Vladikavkaz or a different packet – skoblin] from the Vice-Consul and gave it to the Americ[an] Cons[ul], Smith, in Moscow. Payment for the delivery amounted to a free trip with a detachment of the Armen[ian] Nation[al] Committee and 600 roub. which I received from Mr. Smith at the beginning of August upon delivery of the packet.

M. Fride

2/IX – [19]18.

Copy verified (signed)”

The testimony provided by M. and A. Fride led to the arrest of Solyus Pavel Maksimovich and Aleksandr Andreevich Zagryazhskiy, a former major-general and landowner, who was employed at the Tsentroplenbezh [Central Committee for POWs and Refugees – skoblin].

Aleksandr Klavdievich Khvalynskiy and Aleksandr Vasilievich Potyomkin were also detained as a result of an ambush set at the Fride apartment. Measures were also taken to search for Kalamatiano-Serpovskiy and a search was conducted at the residence of the head mistress of the French Gymnasium, Zh. Morenz, which was located in the Gymnasium on Milyutinskiy Alley. During the search of this apartment, a cipher code and coded letters were discovered sewn into the fabric of the chairs and the couches as well as in the suits belonging Lorenz's husband – the French citizen, Henrik Vertamont. Thirty nine dynamite percussion caps were also discovered as well as 28,000 roubles, of which 16 thousand were discovered in Vertamont's walking stick along with a large number of general staff maps (Murmansk, Odessa, Kiev and areas occupied by the Czechoslovaks).Vertamont himself had time to escape and was not detained.

Affidavit from Commissar Val'ter

“On 1 September 1918, I – as a commissar of the VChK - conducted a search of the apartment of the French citizen Henrik Vertamont at No. 18 Milyutinskiy Alley, according to order No. 6371.

During the search, I discovered various sorts of papers, a cipher, coded letters and telegrams (in French) – almost all of them sewn into the fabric of the chairs and couches and also in suits. Gun-cotton was also discovered in 3 jars located under some coffee with a weight of 4 pounds 25 zolotniks each [1 Russian pound = 409.5 grams, 1 zolotnik = 4.26 grams – skoblin]. One tin container weighing 5 pounds 73 zolotniks also had 39 dynamite percussion caps.

Citizen Vertamont himself was not arrested, in view of the fact that he was not at home nor did he appear.

Commissar Val'ter”

On 18 September 1918, Ksenophont [sic – Xenophon] Dmitrievich Kalamatiano was arrested during an ambush at the former American General Consulate. He had been residing at apartment No. 5, belonging to Ekaterina Sergeevna Kozhina at 8 Tolstovskiy Alley, under the passport of Sergei Nikolaevich Serpovskiy. In Kalamatiano's walking stick were found receipts and a cipher code, which served as a basis for uncovering the entire counter-revolutionary espionage organization of the Anglo-French-American imperialists, which was created with the goal of destroying Workers-Peasants' power in Russia. Many receipts concerning the payments given to his spies were found in the walking stick. Two of these receipts are printed below:

Examples of the receipts concerning the payment of Kalamatiano's spies.

“Received payment of a thousand roubles from No. 15 for up to and including August 23. No. 5, 20/VIII”.

“Received 1500 roub. (one thousand five hundred) from No. 15 on August 20. No. 31”.

The receipts do not indicate the either the first or last name of the persons receiving payment, nor do they mention from whom it was received. Numbers appeared instead of names.

Kalamatiano, at first, attempted to justify himself by every means possible, but eventually – under the weight of the evidence – he was forced to decipher the coded letters found in his walking cane. After this, it became clear that a counter-revolutionary organization of the Anglo-French imperialists was enveloping the whole of Russia, including those areas under German occupation.

Record of the Testimony provided by Ksenofont [sic] Kalamatiano, aka Serpovskiy

“Regarding the receipt notes and reports found in my walking cane, I may testify as follows:

The receipts, in which numbers sign as having received money from a number 15, these are receipts from informants, who have provided me with information of an economic and political nature.

Number 15 – this is I

Number 8 concealed Ivanov Leonid Alekseevich in Minsk

Number 9 – Nikibroraki, 26 Tyomniy Alley, apt. 16 or 14

Number 10 – Potyomkin Al. Vas. (Smolensk)

Number 11 – Khvalynskiy – 600 r. a month

Numbers 12, 13, and 14 all ceased operations

Number 16 – Kazakov – Crimea

Number 18 – Skvortsov – Khar'kov

Number 20 – Angin – Vinnitsa (Moscow, 28 Tyopliy Alley, apt. 16 or 18)

Number 21 – Moller – Odessa

Number 22 – Florinskiy

Number 24 – Zagryazhskiy

Number 26 – Solyus – 600 r. a month

Number 5 – Fride Aleksandr Vladimirovich

Number 4 – Zbatskiy Boris Somolonovich

Fride was recently receiving a thousand roubles a month. I gave him a reserve of 50,000 for payments. I gave Zagryazhskiy 20,000 for safekeeping. Solyus made one trip to Bryansk and was supposed to go to Petrozavodsk.

Number 17 – Gashtenberg – Rostov

Number 1 – Karpov – Kiev

All of these persons were to furnish information concerning the state of affairs in the region to which they were assigned, such as: the political mood of the population, which parties are conducting agitation against Soviet power, the state of transport, attitude of the population towards the Allies and the Germans, the general economic situation and so on. A sample list of questions regarding the Ukraine were found upon my person and are available in this case.

18-19/IX – [19]18.

I have provided the foregoing testimony in order to establish the fact that the individuals, whom I have indicated, carried out no active operations or agitation on my instructions against the local Soviet authorities in Russia.

K. D. Kalamatiano”

In addition to deciphering the documents and names of the spies, which were concealed by numbers, Kalamatiano also deciphered coded words, which served for the transmission of espionage telegrams.

Code words which were used by Kalamatiano's agents

Austro-Hungarians – Metallurgical industry

Austro-Slavs – Food situation

Germans – Sugar industry

German forces – Sugar factories

Numerical identification of forces – Number of pounds of sugar, syrup, candy and their prices (for example, No. 331 and 71 – 331 p. [pood] at 71 r.[roubles])

Mobilization of Russians for the Germans – Bank operation

Enlisting – deposits

quantity – sum of deposits

Percent of foreign-born in German forces – Falsification of sugar

Morale of forces – Situation and condition of sugar industry

Transfer from the front – Emigration of foreigners to the Ukraine

Desertion – Emigration from Ukraine

Officers – NCOs – 1. engineers 2. workers

Opinion of officers and German soldiers – Attitude of engineers and workers to the situation of industry (metallurgical or sugar)

Artillery units of the slavs, their number – Manufactured goods and their prices

The testimony provided by Kalamatiano and the documents found on his person gave the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission the opportunity to arrest Leonid Aleksandrovich Ivanov, Evgenii Mikhailovich Golitsyn, Dmitrii Aleksandrovich Ishevskiy and Pyotr Dmitrevich Politkovskiy. The former American Consul, William Kemberg-Higgs [Camber-Higgs – skoblin] was also arrested.

Kalamatiano's testimony forced Zagryazhskiy, who had been arrested in an ambush at Fride's apartment on September 2, to confess that he had been in contact with Kalamatiano and Fride and had received payment of 750 roubles for his services as well as 20,000 roubles for the paying intelligence agents, which had been denoted by numbers. During a subsequent search conducted at Zagryazhskiy's apartment at 6 Bol'shaya Usmenskaya on September 20, 20,000 roubles were in fact discovered. Before this, Zaryazhskiy, of course, had claimed that Fride had never spoken to him about his activities with the Americans.

Kalamatiano's testimony also led to the confession of the retired Moscow customs official, Pavel Maksimovich Solyus, who had been arrested in an ambush at A. V. Fride's apartment on September 5. Prior this, Solyus had completely denied any involvement with the counter-revolutionary organization of Kalamatiano-Lockhart & Co. After he was presented with the intelligence report he had compiled concerning the state of affairs in Sestroretsk, Petrograd and Petrozavodsk, which E. Fride had tried to destroy in the lavatory during a search, Solyus changed his initial testimony. Solyus started to claim that the “note” found at the Fride apartment was the only one and that he had compiled it from the comments made by various persons, as he had not been to those places himself for which he was providing information. It was only during questioning on September 19, when Solyus' identification number was already known (26 – from Kalamatiano's agent numbering system), that he confessed that he had traveled to Petrograd on Fride's instructions, for which he received an advance of 500 roubles.

Further testimony, established connections, and materials found with Kalamatiano opened up the counter-revolutionary organization more and more. It turns out that many of those who had been arrested during the first days of September were to be found among Kalamatiano's list of agents and among the receipts found on Kalamatiano concerning payments were their receipts as well. Thus, those persons whom Fride and Zagryazhskiy had carefully concealed, being experienced counter-revolutionaries, were given up by Kalamatiano.

Kalamatiano's arrest significantly advanced the the investigation and further unraveling of the Lockhart case.

In addition to the disclosure of all of his agents, an ambushed conducted at Kalamatiano's conspiratorial apartment at 8 Tolstovskiy Alley, where he lived under the name Serpovskiy, netted an individual, who presented papers in the name of a Czech citizen, Aleksei Aloisivich Lingart. It subsequently turned out that this individual was not whom he claimed to be. Under questioning, he stated that he was not Lingart, but Josef Josefovich Pshenichko – a Czech. The investigation was unable to establish whether he was indeed Pshenichko, or whether he was concealing his identity under this name as well. In presenting documents identifying himself as Lingart, Pshenichko explained that he had had all his documents proving his identity stolen while on a tram and that consequently, he – Pshenichko – asked one of his close acquaintances to lend him his identification card on a temporary basis. He explained his appearance at Kalamatiano's (Serpovskiy's) apartment by stating he had sought shelter. A search of Pshenichko's suitcase subsequently turned up notes indicating he was a member of the counter-revolutionary organization, and had been in contact with Kalamatiano in the latter's capacity as the chief agent of the American-Anglo-French imperialists, who had supported the Czechoslovak uprising. As a result of an investigation, it was established Pshenichko had hidden himself at the apartment of the Czechs, Yaroslav Vyacheslavovich Shmenets and Stanislav Fomich Jellinek, at 30 Novoslobodskaya Street.

The retired major-general, Politkovskiy Pyotr Dmitrievich, who was employed at the Consumers' Association of Sergeevsk district in Kursk, was also arrested, thanks to a letter discovered during a search of Kalamatiano's residence. The letter, which led to his arrest, contained the following:

“Dear Konstantin Dmitrievich.

I send you my sincere thanks for your kind memory and attention and that you allowed me the possibility to become acquainted with the agreeable Aleksandr Vasilievich, who it also turns out was a comrade of mine from school. Unfortunately, I was unable to render much assistance for him, although I have sent him to two or three persons, who – in my opinion – may be useful. I ask once more today, what information you require, and – if successful – I will gather it and write you. I wish you all the best, respectfully yours

P. Politkovskiy

Kursk, 18 Pochtovaya St.

12 May 1918.”

As a result of Kalamatiano's testimony, it was discerned that the “agreeable Aleksandr Vasilievich”, about whom Politkovskiy wrote, was the brother of Aleksei Vasilievich Potyomkin, who was under arrest, and that he was employed by Kalamatiano as an intelligence agent.

Politkovskiy confessed during questioning, that he had in fact sent Aleksandr Vasilievich Potyomkin to several persons in order to obtain information concerning exports and imports, but he denied any knowledge of counter-revolutionary espionage activity.

On September 7, Kemberg-Khiggs [hereafter, Camber-Higgs – skoblin], a British national, was arrested. His office at 2 Teatral'niy Thoroughfare constituted a rendezvous point for Kalamatiano's counter-revolutionary espionage organization. From the testimony provided by Potyomkin and Golitsyn, it was obvious that Camber-Higgs office had been specifically indicated to them as a place of meeting and receiving duties.

Ol'ga Dmitrievna Starzhevskaya and Maksim Vasileivich Trester were also discovered to be persons, who had assisted Reilly in his espionage activities.

Starzhevskaya worked at the Organization Department of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] as a typist. Arrested on September 12, she testified that she knew Reilly as Konstantin Pavlovich Massino and discovered his real name only recently.

While being questioned on September 14, Starzhevskaya testified that she would see Reilly at her apartment, or meet with him somewhere in a public garden or at the restaurant Praga. Reilly suggested she rent an apartment on Malaya Bronaya and he arrived at this apartment for the first time on September 3. Before renting this apartment, Reilly looked it over and left his passport for the registration. He took his passport with him upon departing on 3-4 September. Starzhevskaya also admitted that Reilly gave her 20,000 roub. for furnishing the apartment.

Another one of Reilly's officials was Maksim Vasilievich Trester – the director of a motor unit of the Moscow Military District. Trester drove Reilly in automobile No. 1199 of the Moscow Military District motor depot and lent him 15,000 roubles on receipt.

The receipt, according to which Reilly had received the 15,000 roubles from Tester, stated:

“Copy in translation:

Moscow, 6 July 1918.

Sidney G. Reilly 120, Broadway

New York, Nor. Amer. Unit. St.

Received from M. V. Trester 15,000 roub. (fifteen thousand roub.), for which I request that either he or his representative be paid 1500 dollars (fifteen....dollars).

Sidney G. Reilly”

As is obvious from the receipt, Trester was one of those “wealthy people”, whom Reilly spoke about to Berzin, who would lend him money for subverting unit commanders and for assisting counter-revolutionary activities in general .This money was to be returned to them abroad.

One must also add a few remarks concerning the arrest of Lockhart himself, the ambush at the former American Consulate (Chernyshevskiy Alley), where the American Consul General, Pull, the French General Consul, Grenard and many others (French, British and American officers) hid out, as well as the discovery of a letter written by the French citizen Rene Marchand to the President of the French Republic.

During the night of August 31 – September 1, Cheka officials showed up at apartment No. 24, 19 Khlebniy Alley.

This apartment had already been placed under strict observation from the beginning of the Lockhart case as suspicious persons and persons already established as being active members of the counter-revolutionary espionage organization of Lockhart, Pull, Grenard and Co. would constantly visit this apartment. There was no doubt that Lockhart's apartment was the headquarters of this espionage organization. At Lockhart's apartment were found several British persons and the Russian national, Baroness Benkendorff. Lockhart did not give his name to the Cheka officials and did not protest his arrest as a British diplomatic representative.

Thus, all persons found in his apartment, including Lockhart himself, were conveyed to the Cheka.

When it became clear during questioning, that one of the arrested persons was the British diplomatic representative Lockhart, the latter was told, that he may not be questioned. But in view of the fact that there was serious evidence against him regarding his participation in counter-revolutionary activity against Soviet Russia, he was told that he could hear the charges against him and provide explanations if he wished. Lockhart agreed.

After hearing the account of his conversation with comrade Berzin and the other facts of the plot and being presented with the authorization he had given to the captain of the Lettish Rifles, Krish Kronkal, Lockhart finally admitted that everything was true, but that he had not acted on his own initiative but on a suggestion made by his own government.

The suggestion was made that Lockhart make a declaration on paper, but he declined, averring that he was a diplomatic official of the government of Great Britain and that he did not possess the official right to make a declaration. He stated, therefore, that first of all he had to speak with his counsel, the Dutch Consul, and that all future discussion with the Cheka would go through him. After making this statement, Lockhart was released.

Several days later, Lockhart approached the Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs, comrade Karakhan, requesting a meeting with me, and inquired whether I would agree to talk with him on a non-official basis, simply man to man. Agreement was given and a time was set for the meeting. Before conversing, however, Lockhart demanded a gentleman's agreement that the conversation that would take place between us would remain secret.

I gave him my word, that our conversation would remain secret, unless he were to engage in a slanderous campaign against Soviet Russia, as was being done by all the other agents of international capital through the aegis of the yellow press of their countries.

During those days, which followed upon the elimination of the Lockhart plot, news was received that the representative of Soviet power in Great Britain, comrade Litvinov, had been arrested in London. Litivinov had been arrested without the presentation of any charges. He had not been engaged in military conspiracies. He had not arranged for the murder of leaders of the British bourgeois state and had not planned to arrest the British parliament, as Lockhart's agents had done in Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, he was arrested.

It became necessary to respond to such a move on the part of the British imperialists by a similar action. Lockhart was arrested once more and steps were taken to arrest the other diplomatic conspirators against Soviet power, such as the French Consul General Grenard and the American Consul, Pull.

I repeat, that, in addition to that already known from comrade Berzin, that provided by external observation, and those materials which had been seized in this case, it had also become known to Cheka that a meeting had taken place at the residence of the American Consul General, Pull, on August 25. It was also known that this meeting discussed the issue of how to maintain espionage activity after the diplomatic representatives of the imperialist Entente had departed. However, the arrest of Grenard, Pull, Lavergne and the many other French and British officers guilty in this plot was no easy matter. After Litvinov had been arrested in London, the American diplomats contrived to hide themselves in the American Consulate located on Chernyshevskiy Alley. In order to prevent themselves being taken from there, the Norwegian flag was raised over the building. The representatives of neutral Norway took it upon themselves to defend those who were conspiring against Soviet Russia. Negotiations commenced for the extradition of Grenard, Lavergne, Pull and others from the protection of extraterritoriality, but the Norwegian Consulate flatly refused. The building was then surrounded on all side by Cheka agents and no one was allowed out without a careful scrutiny of documents, while entry into the Consulate was categorically forbidden. The cordon around the Consulate continued for around two weeks, until an offer arrived from the Entente to exchange the convicted conspirators, including Lockhart himself and several other citizens of the Entente, for Bolsheviks located in Britain, France and America. The offer was accepted by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and those Entente officials, who had been placed under a cordon and subject to extradition, were sent to the train station for Petrograd, Finland and beyond.

Both the former chief of the British Mission, P. B. Lockhart, and the former French Consul General, Grenard, were among those manifest conspirators connected to the case who were released.

A search conducted at the Arbat, where Grenard, Lavergne and several other officials from the French Mission and some well-known French citizens lived, yielded an unexpected discovery in the form of a letter from Rene Marchand to the French President. (This letter will be presented in its entirety below).

Despite all the measures taken regarding the arrest of all persons connected to the Lockhart plot, many of them nevertheless succeeded in escaping. This included Sidney Reilly, as the chief representative of British imperialism – the “troika”, which was supposed to continue the subversive counter-revolutionary affair of the Entente consulates after the latter's departure. Vertamont, the representative of the French Consulate and member of the mentioned “troika” also fled. These Entente spies managed to flee primarily due to the energetic assistance rendered by the representatives of other capitalist countries, which had officially declared themselves neutral.

A Tale of Political-Economic Intrigue

The conspirators of international capitalism, who had been caught at the scene of the crime, were quite dismayed, but not one of the criminals, who passed through the Cheka, presented a more pitiable spectacle of cowardice than that of Lockhart, the representative of Great Britain – the sovereign of half the world. Prior to his arrest, Lockhart would proclaim from every housetop that he was conducting a campaign for the recognition of Soviet power. Many liberal and radical-minded foreigners, such as Raymond Robins, trusted Lockhart to be sincere, and cloaked by this trust, Lockhart conducted his secret activities. But then, suddenly, he was caught and caught red-handed, and there was no possibility of extricating himself, even if he had all the power in the world. And like a wretched coward, Lockhart protested, that he had not acted on his own volition, but on suggestions made to him from his government, and besides, a number of British missions – military, transport and so on – had been active. He, of course, was merely the the representative of the political mission.

In private conversations with myself and the Deputy Peoples' Commissar of Foreign Affairs, comrade Karakhan, Lockhart did not hide or deny that he had met with comrade Berzin, and did not deny that he had met with Grenard and had a meeting with the American Consul, Pull. In private conversations, Lockhart was a wretched individual, several times even taking up a pen in order to write down everything that had transpired, to write the whole truth about Berzin, and about his government. But being the pathetic careerist that he was, he stood like a mule caught between two bales of hay, drawn to the one side by British and world imperialism, and to the other by new burgeoning world. And each time he spoke about this new burgeoning world, about its victories, and about his – Lockhart's – abnormal situation – even in that world in which he served, that is, the capitalist world, Lockhart would seize a pen in order to set down the whole truth. Then, after a few minutes had passed, the wretched donkey would be drawn once more to other bale of hay, and toss the pen away.

Once, after visiting Lockhart in the Kremlin, Karakhan told me that Lockhart had already begun to write his testimony. Several days passed by, however and Lockhart, still not finished, had torn up what he had written: he remained mired in his old world. He tossed out the idea, that if he were to disclose the whole truth concerning his government, about that shameful role, which his government had played in Soviet Russia while waving the banner of saving Russia, then – after the victory of the proletariat – his career path would be open in his own country.

Soon, however, his government made attempts to free him and have him returned to England in exchange for supporters and officials of Soviet Russia, whom England would return to Russia.

But here, in Soviet Russia, there remained the evidence against the British imperialists and their agents. This evidence was supported by the wealth of material which was found on Kalamatiano, Fride and the other arrested plotters. This evidence was of such weight that it was impossible to deny the existence of an illegal organization on the part of the Entente – even in the absence of comrade Berzin's testimony.

Kalamatiano could not conceal the fact that the codes and letters of a conspiratorial nature, found in his walking stick, were connected with the known organization. Receipts concerning the payment of monies, cited above, as well as the papers, on which Kalamatiano recorded 32 agents by number, attest to the fact that Kalamatiano's organization had an entire complement of collaborators and – I repeat – it was impossible to deny the existence of this illegal organization. While being questioned a second time, Kalamatiano suddenly regained his memory and began to develop a new idea – that while his organization did indeed exist, it was of a purely political and economic nature. We present below Kalamatiano's own testimony concerning his activities in Soviet Russia and about the origins of his political-economic organization.

The Lockhart Case (1918) - Part I

2009-05-29T10:53:00.000-07:00

The Lockhart Case

Report by Comrade Peters on the Origins of the Lockhart Case

The Origins of the Case

The Lockhart Case arose in the same fortuitous manner as that of the counter-revolutionary organization Union of the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom. In the latter case, a nurse - an ordinary non-communist citizen of the Soviet Republic, having discovered the untoward plans being prepared by British and French capital against the motherland, came forward and reported about this to the organs engaged in the struggle against counter-revolution. In the Lockhart case, it was a honest non-communist commander of one of the units of the fledgling Red Army – comrade Berzin, having indignantly rebuffed an offer made by Shmitkhen – an agent of the British Ambassador Lockhart – to betray his duties as a Red commander, came forward to report about this to me as Deputy Chairman of the Cheka.
Here is my official deposition regarding the origins of the Lockhart case as contained in the file:

“On 8 September 1918, I – V. Kingisepp, member of the VTsIK, was directed to the Cheka to carry out investigations. In pursuit of this, I questioned the Deputy Chairman of the Cheka, Yakov Peters, about the Lockhart Case. Peters testified as follows:

During the last ten days of August of this year, the commander of the First Heavy Latvian Artillery Division, Berzin, arrived at my apartment and stated that agents of the British Mission had approached him with the proposal that he use his present position in service of the British. They presented him the the task of assisting British forces in overthrowing Soviet power and occupying Moscow as well as setting up a military dictatorship.
After discussing the matter with comrade Dzerzhinsky, I suggested to Berzin that he not decline the offer made by the British agents, that he stay in contact with them and keep the Cheka informed about everything. I also notified comrade Peterson, commissar of the Latvian riflemen, who told me in turn that information had already reached him more than once concerning alleged attempts on the part of British agents to enter into contact with the riflemen and their command staff. Soon after this, Berzin reported to me that he had met with Lockhart.
All of Berzin's communications and reports were of a reliable character and were verified by us through materials which were at at our disposal. Berzin handed over to the Cheka a sum total of 1 200 000 roubles, which he had received from the British agent – Lieutenant Reilly.
Berzin's integrity in this matter does not elicit the slightest doubt.

Ya. Peters.”

Thus began the Lockhart Case. However, the Commissar of the Latvian Rifles, comrade Peterson, was not the only person who was aware of the fact that agents of British, French and American capital were lurking about and attempting to buy off the command staff of the Red Army, regardless of the cost.
In 1918, the Red Army command echelon had still not been thoroughly investigated. The Red Army had not tossed out that rubbish which had crossed over to it as an inheritance from the old army in the form of former Tsarist officers, among whom were many who were better prepared to serve the Entente than the Workers-Peasants' State and who could not reconcile themselves to the conditions of service prevailing within the Red Army. This, however, was rather shaky ground for the agents of the British military clique and therefore we in the Cheka were also made aware of the efforts on the part of the Entente agents. The exposure of earlier counter-revolutionary cases provided us with materials through which it became obvious that Allied circles were awarding with largess all those who would assist them in their struggle against the Soviet state.
We were also made aware of the fact that the Allied embassies in Soviet Russia constituted the headquarters for the counter-revolutionary organizations. Numerous times, while trailing agents of counter-revolutionary organizations, their trail would disappear behind the walls of the British or French embassies, where the provisions of extraterritoriality prevailed. Relying upon these provisions, the representatives of international capital, residing in the heart of Soviet Russia, prepared new fetters with which to enslave the workers and peasants of Russia.
When the Salvation of the Motherland and Freedom plot was uncovered, it was discovered that the French mission had been generous is providing resources for this organization. Agents of the above mentioned organization, being followed by Cheka officials, disappeared into the British embassy. The counter-revolutionary organization Salvation of the Motherland and Freedom in fact comprised the command staff of the Czechoslovak uprising. In other words, the representatives of international capital, in assisting the above mentioned organization, were at the same time helping to organize the Czechoslovak uprising. All of this was known to the Cheka long ago, but the evidence for all of the espionage activities engaged in by Lockhart and his associates was vouchsafed in strict secrecy by the provisions of extraterritoriality. With the offer made to Berzin, however, it became possible to breach these provisions while preserving legal hospitality, based as it is upon bourgeois lies and deceptions, and thus we decided to take advantage of the circumstances and to cross the threshold of extraterritoriality.
In carrying out his orders, comrade Berzin informed Shmitkhen that he had decided to accept the latter's proposals. Shmitchen was overjoyed as a result and on August 14 informed Berzin that “the British Ambassador himself, Lockhart, wanted to have a meeting with him (Berzin) to discuss political matters”. This meeting took place on August 14 in Lockhart's private apartment at House No. 10 on Khlebniy Alley. During this meeting, Lockhart queried Berzin concerning the mood of the Latvian units and whether they could be relied upon during a coup. He then indicated that it was necessary to make efforts in this direction so that the Latvian riflemen would rise up against the Soviet state and overthrow it. In pursuing this, Lockhart stressed vigorously more than once that money would be no cost. Among the measures suggested by Lockhart for setting the Latvian Riflemen against the Soviet authorities was the idea of withholding the dispatch of provisions which were badly needed. Upon parting, Lockhart requested that Berzin drop by his apartment the following evening so that he, Lockhart, could introduce him to his French colleague and his agent.
On the evening of August 15, Berzin appeared once more at Lockhart's residence. At this meeting, Lockhart introduced Berzin to the French Consul-General in Moscow, Grenard, and to his agent Konstantin, who was in fact the British intelligence agent, Lieutenant Sidney Georgevich Reilly. The French Consul addressed Berzin through Lockhart with the following words: “Judging by the conversation you had yesterday with the esteemed Ambassador, the fate of Latvia interests you greatly. If we, the Allies, succeed in prying it away from the Germans, we, although we lack special dispensation from our governments, nevertheless can promise you a reward for your assistance – self-determination in the full meaning of this word”.
Lockhart and Grenard inquired further about the number of Latvian units in Moscow and suggested that matters be arranged so that no more Latvian rifles be sent from Moscow to the front. The conversation concluded on the question of money. Grenard and Lockhart asked: “How much money would be needed to subvert the commanders of the Latvian units”. Berzin feigned little interest in the matter of money, alluding that “some 4 or 5 million may needed in the future”. Grenard and Lockhart accepted this sum without a murmur and announced that Konstantin would soon bring Berzin 2 000 000 roubles with the remainder being delivered in about three weeks – and if needed, they would provide even more. With this, the meeting ended. In the future, all conversations and communications would be conducted through the agents of British Mission – Shmitkhen and Reilly.
At this time, Shmitkhen suggested to Berzin that he find his own man who would deliver a coded message to Murmansk. The message, printed on white calico, would be entrusted to Berzin by Lockhart though the intercession of Shmitkhen. Together with the coded message, Shmitkhen delivered an authorization signed by Lockhart for Berzin's man who would be going to Murmansk. This authorization, printed in English, stated the following:

"Copy in translation:
British Mission
Moscow 17 August 1918.
To all British military authorities in Russia

The bearer of this, Captain of the Lettish Rifles, Krish Krankal, has an important errand for the British General Staff in Russia. I request that he be granted free passage and assistance in all matters.

R. B. Lockhart"

With this authorization, the man whom Berzin was supposed to find was to set out for the Chief Residence of the British Command in Murmansk taking along with him the coded letter from Lockhart. Naturally, both the letter and the authorization were handed over to the Cheka and no one ended up being sent by Berzin to Murmansk.
On the evening of August 17, Berzin had his first working meeting with Konstantin (Reilly) at the Cafe Trembley on Tsvetniy Boulevard. During this meeting, Reilly informed Berzin about a plan for the destruction of the Workers-Peasants' government, which had been worked out – according to Reilly – by a French general.
According to this plan, two Lettish regiments were to be sent to the town of Vologda, where – having crossed over to the Allies – they were to assist the advance from Arkhangel'sk and the capture of the northern region. Simultaneous with the capture of Vologda, the Lettish units remaining behind in Moscow were to arrest the session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee together with the Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars, comrade Lenin, and the Chairman of the Military Council, L. Trotsky. Both Lenin and Trotsky were to be subsequently executed. The State Bank and Central Telegraphic office were to be seized at the same time.
This was to be followed by the summoning together of all former officers in order to form detachments for establishing and maintaining order in Moscow and for escorting Bolshevik prisoners to Archangel'sk. With this, Reilly let Berzin in on a big secret that the Allied organization had entered into contact with the Patriarch Tikhon, who had promised that the day following the coup, he would organize services in all the churches in which the clergy were to explain to the people the significance of the coup and justify the actions of the Allies and the White Guards. At the end of the conversation, Reilly suggested that Berzin rent a conspiratorial apartment and handed him a packet containing 700 000 roubles.
The next meeting between Reilly and Berzin took place at on August 19 at Berzin's now rented conspiratorial apartment at House No. 4 on Griboyedovsky Alley. During this meeting, Reilly gave Berzin several tasks of a plainly conspiratorial nature: a) to find out whether it was true that between the stations of Cherkizovo and Rogozhino there were located 9 batteries of 5-inch guns and two batteries of 8-inch guns of British manufacture and what were the condition of these batteries; b) to find out whether it was true that at that the station of Mikino there were several wagons of gold and bills of credit guarded by 700 Latvians, and in case of a coup to ensure that these wagons did not leave; c) to set out to Petrograd and enter into contact with the Petrograd group of Latvians and; d) find among the Latvians individuals who would be willing to draw up, print and distribute proclamations among the Lettish units.
On August 21, Reilly visited Berzin again at his conspiratorial apartment and started asking him how work was going. Berzin replied that the work was proceeding successfully and that he had already met with an official from the First Latvian Rifle Regiment, who had arrived from the front, and had given him 400 000 roubles to carry out agitation within this regiment. Further, he stated that he expected the commander of the 5th Rifle Regiment to arrive any day now and that he, Berzin, wanted to give him a large sum of money as well. With this, Berzin reminded Reilly that he needed money.
Reilly promised to bring Berzin 400 000 roubles the very next day and told him that the British agents were procuring their funds from wealthy Russians, from whom they were receiving money in exchange for cheques which were to be paid out in England. On August 22, however, Reilly brought Berzin only 200 000 roubles instead of the intended 400 000, promising that he would obtain an additional one million roubles in a few days.
On August 27, Reilly brought Berzin 300 000 roubles and urgently requested that he depart for Petrograd and establish contact with local organizations there. Berzin was given the following address in Petrograd: Torgovaya Street, House 10, second entrance, Apt. 10 and told to ask Elena Mikhailovna for a Mr. Massino, by which name Reilly was known there. Having arrived in Petrograd, Berzin headed to the address indicated to him by Reilly. The door man reported that Elen Mikhailovna had already left for work and would be home around 4pm. With this, the door man handed Berzin the key to the apartment and requested that he wait for her. Berzin entered the apartment, where he discovered an envelope inscribed to Citizeness Elena Mikhailovna Boyuzhavskaya. The envelope contained a visiting card from Sidney Georgievich Reilly on the back of which was written an address: Sheremetievskiy Alley, No. 3, Apt .85 from (2) 33 – 99 – second 39 – 99, Petersburg 8 – 20.
Having waited until noon, Berzin left Elena Mikhailovna's apartment and headed off to the city, where he had a chance encounter with Reilly near the Bol'shoi Theater. Reilly, who had been traveling in a cab, was dressed in a khaki-coloured cloak and was wearing glasses, which he usually did not wear. Reilly inquired whether Berzin had established contact with the Latvian organization in Petrograd, to which Berzin responded that he had still not done so. In turn, Berzin asked Reilly to introduce him to the representative of the White Guards in Petrograd. Reilly promised Berzin that he would do so and requested that he drop by the Torgovaya Street around 6 or 7 in the evening. After this, they went their separate ways. Reilly, however, did not fulfill the promise he made to Berzin and avoided introducing him to the representative of the Petrograd White Guards.
At the same time that information was being received from Berzin, the Cheka found out about a meeting that took place at the American Consul General on 25 August 1918, which was attended by the French Consul General Grenard, the representative of the British Mission Lockhart, the American Consul General Pull and several British, French and American officers. At this meeting, they discussed the matter of leaving three agents behind in Russia to direct espionage and counter-revolutionary organizations after the departure of the Entente representatives. At this same meeting, the French officers presented the plans for the Volkhov bridge and reported that they were preparing to blow up this bridge. They also discussed blowing up the bridge over the river Zvanka.
Thus, receiving information from two sources, the Cheka perceived the entire intrigue being carried out by the representatives of the Entente. But the matter of secret activities had still not been concluded. Ever new proposals were made to Berzin by the agents of Lockhart and Grenard, with each proposal being more impertinent than the last. Some of these were of an espionage nature, while others simply involved the performance of services for the British imperialists, such as the matter mentioned previously involving Berzin's search for a man to deliver a coded letter to the main British residence in Murmansk. There were even proposals for the building of a radio station, in order to send telegrams to the command of the British interventionist forces in the north.
Significant work still remained in uncovering this vast espionage organization which had deep roots among both officers and Soviet officials who were disposed against Soviet power. This work, however, was impeded by the White Terror.
On the morning of August 30, comrade Uritsky was murdered in Petrograd, while that same evening an attempt was made on the life of comrade Lenin. Mass arrests commenced in Petrograd, as did the Red Terror, which led to the arrest of White Guards among Lockhart's agents. It was necessary to set about eliminating the plot in Moscow as well. I repeat in saying that the preliminary work involved in uncovering the plot was still far from finished.
With work continuing in the original direction, ever new information would be revealed regarding the counter-revolutionary activities of the representatives of international imperialism in Soviet Russia. The international proletariat would see how Lockhart, Pull and Grenard, taking advantage of the right of extra-territoriality, organized the burning of food stores in a starving country, prepared the blowing up of bridges which would condemn the million inhabitants of Petrograd to a hungry death, and threw money left and right in order to disorganize the Soviet structure. And what is more, in pursuing this they did not shy away from any methods, neither bribery, calumny nor intrigue.

Arrests concerning the Lockhart Case

The first task was to conduct a search at Reilly's address: Sheremetievskiy Alley, No. 3, apt. 85, which had been discovered by Berzin in the apartment of Elena Mikhailovna Boyuzhavskaya (in Petrograd).
In connection with this search, the Arts Theater performer Elizaveta Emelyanovna Otten, who had rented the apartment, was arrested. In the same apartment was also arrested the former supervisor of the Women's Gymnasium, Maria Vladimirovna Fride, who had arrived there with a packet, which contained a detailed report entitled No. 12, written by an agent during a trip from Moscow to Tula, Oryol, Kursk, Voronezh, Gryazi, Kozolov and back to Moscow between the 18th and the 30th of August.

Contents of the report:
"Report No. 12 from the trip Moscow – Tula – Oryol – Kursk – Voronezh – Gryazi – Kozlov – Moscow from 18 – 30 August.
In Tula, the mood of the inhabitants appears outwardly calm, even lively in the evenings. Every day the Tula factory orchestra performs on the boulevard. The food situation is poor, although it is possible now to obtain flour at the relatively inexpensive price of 130-150 roubles a pood. The armaments factory continues to operate, although with only one shift, producing machine guns for the most part as the production of rifles has been curtailed by 80 per cent. The cartridge factory ceased production one and a half weeks ago due to a lack of cotton. The staff of the Tula detachment is stationed in the city and is engaged in organizing a division. The organizing process is being carried out on a regimental basis with a regiment being sent to the front as a battalion after a thousand men have been received. The forces are stationed at a camp outside of town and are not visible. According to conversations with the instructors, almost all the officers were formerly attached to the 75th Tula Reserve Regiment. They also indicated that the organizing process was proceeding successfully regarding both discipline and training. Conversations with the local inhabitants, even among the poor, reveals dissatisfaction with the existing order. Commercial activity within the city is anemic and the stores are empty, with a complete lack of manufactured goods. In the local newspapers Tul'skiy Soviet and Tul'skaya Pravda I have read a number of telegrams from Borovitsk and Yepifanovsk districts concerning peasant disturbances and robberies.
In Oryol, the mood of the city has become sharply divided after a visit by Podvoisky, a member of the Supreme Military Inspectorate: the bourgeoisie is depressed, while the remainder of the population holds their heads high and consider themselves masters of the situation. Two divisions are being formed and an infantry and artillery instructors' school is being organized. The military regime is engaged in enterprises everywhere. Although the city is not under martial law, there is an unusually strict evening curfew. The city is almost lifeless and there is almost no noticeable activity on the streets. Regarding the food situation, there is a lack of meat and butter, although it is possible to obtain flour at 90 – 120 roubles per pood. From conversations along the rail lines, it is clear that there is almost no movement of goods, with the only goods trains consisting of military freight being shipped to the front – but even these are few in number. Within the city, there are 18 tanker trucks of oil destined for Moscow situated on the tracks. The station tracks are choked with empty trains driven from Kursk, on which it is possible to discern wrecked carriages and carts. The mood in the city is depressed, with all sorts of rumours concerning the capture of Kursk and general panic. The general impression is one of fatigue and indifference, albeit quiet and peaceful.
In Kursk, life has the characteristics of a front line city. Many soldiers of all types are to be seen on the streets. Numerous trains are being sent from the station to Oryol and Voronezh, but it is almost impossible to find a passenger train without having to fill out a whole series of formalities. Railroad security plays a central role at the station, acknowledging no authority, orders or instructions. Trains pass through filled with small groups of Red Army men with machine guns, and sometimes with field artillery. When questioned where they are going and for what purpose, answers are not forthcoming: either they themselves do not know or they pass by in silence. The impression is made that small forces are being transferred for the sake of simulating strength. Stories concerning the R[ed] A[rmy] are varied, but coalesce into one – that the Red Army troops are thieves and brigands capable only of fighting peaceful citizens. The city is filthy and is a scene of dissolution and dissipation. The food situation is now being set right. The local newspaper, Izvestiya Kurskogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta, levels the most sordid insinuations against the bourgeoisie, Krasnov and the Allies. Getting to town involved the greatest difficulties, requiring one to obtain a pass at the station and the Sovdep [Council of Deputies].
In Voronezh, there is nothing of interest. There is a great bustle of people coming and going at the station. Conversations revolve around the same topics: food difficulties, the hardships of life and the expectation when this will end. The local Sovdep does not openly acknowledge instructions from the central authorities and has refused one order coming from Moscow. Departing the city, where I had stayed only a few hours, I caught word that Tsaritsyn had been recaptured by the Bolsheviks, and that the British had occupied Baku and Krasnovodsk.
From Voronezh, I had wanted to travel on to Gryazi, considering then to proceed to Bryansk through Yelets and Oryol. At the station, however, I discovered that although it was possible to travel by this route, it was fraught with great difficulties and require at least a week. I decided to head back to Moscow.
The general impression created by everything seen and heard in one of fatigue and passivity on the part of the middle class and an agonizing wait for salvation, regardless from whom or from where, if only to live in peace without fear or oppression."

According to the report by this same individual, the following information concerning German and Austrian forces on the Russian front and in the Ukraine in general was gathered from the staff of one of the Soviet armies:

“German landwehr infantry division No. 3 – in Gomyol, 4 in Bakhmach, 7 in Taganrog, 11 in Rylsk, Korenev, and Sudzh, 15 in Melitopol', 16 in Khar'kov, 17 in Polotsk, 18 in Shklov, Mogilyov and Rogachyov, 19 in Pernov and Valk, 20 in Zhitomir and Berdichev, 22 in Zhitomir, 23 in Polotsk, 24 in Ostrov and Krasniy, 29 in Revel, 35 reserve in Romodan, 45 landwehr in Khar'kov, 47 in Starodub and Klintsy, 85 in Polotsk, 91 in Khar'kov, 92 and 93 in Kiev, 94 in Yur'eve, 95 in Mikhailovskiy khutor (Bryansk front), 2nd Bavarian in Vandeka, 54 and 152 Austrian in Mogilyov, 5th, 11th, 31st and 59th Austrian in Yekaterinoslav, 3rd German landwehr in Rezhits, 212 in Kherson, 221 in Belgorod, 12th Bavarian in Rostov-na-Donu, 127 Austrian in Taganrog, 30, 34 and 151 Austrian in Odessa.

Cavalry: 9th Austrian cavalry division in Khar'kov, 7 Austrian cavalry in Odessa, German guards cavalry regiment in Orsha, 2 German cav. div. in Lugansk, 8th Ger. cav. Finlandia, 9th Germ. cav. in Mogilyov, 2nd Bavarian cav. in Khar'kov, 16 Germ. cav. in Polotsk.
VIII Army staff at Yur'ev, front from the sea (from the Baltic to Yur'ev), 11th Army front from Yur'ev to Orsha, Xth Army from Orsha to Novoselok.
In Finland are the following armies: Western – staff at Tammersfors with a force of 8-10 thousand. Eastern at Vyborg with 20-25 thous, Cavalry detachment – staff at Serdobol', 10-12 thous. In Helsingfors is 3 division and infantry as well as one cavalry division. In total, there are 40-50 thous. infantry, 1500 machine guns, 3600 cavalry and 55 batteries in Finland.”

Being questioned regarding the delivery of the letter to Otto's [sic - Otten] apartment, Maria Fride at first asserted that she had left in the morning for milk and was approached on Vozdvizhenka [street] by a man of average height dressed in a military uniform. The man stated he was in a hurry to leave and asked her, Fride, to deliver a packet to apartment No. 85, house No. 3 on Sheremetievskiy Alley, which request Fride carried out. Fride had never been to this apartment before.
A search conducted at Fride's residence at house No. 12, apt. 2 on Durasovskiy Alley provided unexpected results. Having arrived to conduct the search, Polikevich – an official from the Extraordinary Commission [Cheka], noticed that Elizaveta Sergeevna Fride (mother of M. Fride) ran to the lavatory and threw away some papers. The papers indicated were retained and among them was found a detailed report by a military spy, who had visited Petrograd and Tikhoretsk on 18 August, Zvanka on the 19th, Petrozavodsk on the 22nd and 23rd and Sestoretsk once more on the 27th.

Affadavit from comrade Ponarovich, Cheka - 4th Section, Counter-revolutionary Affairs

"Arriving with comrade Polikevich to conduct a search at the Fride residence at house no. 12, apartment 2 on Durasovskiy Alley, the following events occurred. At the residence were citizens Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride and Elizaveta Sergeevna Fride. Entering the residence, I detained Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride, when Elizaveta Sergeevna Fride ran to the lavatory and threw out some papers, which we retained. I have included these papers with this statement. Upon questioning, when I asked her why she had tossed the papers out in the lavatory, Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride stated that he had ordered her to throw them out. Present at this time were the building doorman Safronov, soldiers from the cyclist detachment Sergei Volkov and Ivan Larin, and the policeman commissar Kokurin from 1 Arbatskiy detachment.

Assistant for the Section regarding the Struggle against K-R, Ponarovich
Commissar V. Polikevich"

The report, thrown out in the lavatory by E. Fride

“The Sestroretskiy factory has been removed entirely to Petrograd. Sestroretsk is completely empty. On around 18 August according to the new style, the order was received to evacuate the entire non-indigenous population, with boarding houses vacated even earlier. At least three-quarters of the dachas stand empty. The remainder are occupied by permanent residents and even they live in expectation of an order to evacuate. As for Soviet forces in Sestroretsk, there is one 6-gun battery with 75 men. The condition of the horses attached to this battery are beyond any criticism, and the soldiers are not much better. The Germans have still not reached Sestroretsk and there is no word yet on when they will arrive, although the inhabitants of both Sestroretsk, and even Petrograd, expect them any day now.
Judging by conversations with the inhabitants, no one doubts that the Germans will occupy Petrograd by winter. This opinion is based primarily upon the notion that the Finnish ports are frozen during winter and therefore the Germans will be forced against their will to search for land-based communications with Finland, in order not to abandon their forces stationed there to the exigencies of fate – which they are obviously not wont to do. On the other hand, the port of Abo freezes over so little that mail steamships maintain a regular schedule during the entire winter, without the assistance of ice-breakers. Thus, it is quite possible to maintain maritime communications via Libau-Abo and the consequent need to occupy Petrograd is diminished. If a German offensive against Petrograd does arise, no one expects serious resistance on the part of the Soviet forces: first, because there are no forces there and; second, because everyone in Petrograd is convinced that the Northern Commune [of Soviets] is not only operating in full contact with the Germans, but even in close alliance with them.
On the streets of Petrograd, it is possible to see quite a few individual German soldiers walking about in full uniform, but without weapons.
A passive and dispirited mood holds sway among the more or less intelligent population of the given region and among those close-lying localities currently under occupation. The peasantry, however, is beginning to regard the German occupation in a far from positive light. Thus, quite recently, around the beginning of August, some settlements have banded together and organized an insurrection in the neighborhood of Yamburg [Kingisepp], on the border of Pskov province. Having risen up against the Germans and scoring a number of local successes, the Germans have been required to send out special forces in order to suppress this revolt. As for Soviet power, a negative attitude exists towards it among the vast majority of the peasantry. Although this rather rarely assumes a sharpened form, it does blaze forth in local areas for a variety of individual causes. Around August 18-20, a disturbance arose not far from Zvanka station on the Northern Railway and throughout the entire Novo-Ladoga district of Petrograd province, provoked by an order issued by the commissars of the Northern Commune concerning the requisition of horses. Several troops of Latvians (who appeared very exhausted) were sent to quell the disturbance. Matters, however, did not reach the point of having blood spilled, as the local commissars managed to placate the agitated peasants almost everywhere, partly, by means of persuasion, and partly by changing the length and terms of the requisition.
The purely working population of the Petrograd region remains firmly on the side of the Soviet authorities through artificial means, a clear example of which may serve the following fact: On August 2, the National Economic Council introduced a resolution concerning the issue of paper money up to the end of 1918 to the amount of 180,985,000 roubles against the value of the Putilov factory for the maintenance and payment of workers' salaries, despite the fact that 30,000,000 roubles were already issued against the factory last July. It is clear, that by paying full compensation for shut down time, the Soviets are thinking of keeping for themselves the vote and opinion of the Putilov factory, especially as its vote always holds sway over the whole of the Petrograd worker region and by its decision drags along behind itself one way or the other almost all other factories in the area, which always sign on to its resolutions.
In Olonets province, the peasantry, if I may boldly say so, is entirely hostile towards Soviet power, and if this mood does not express itself in a more pointed character, then it is possible to explain this by the fact that even “Soviet power”, obviously taking the mood and situation under consideration, does not allow itself to interfere too strongly in the internal affairs of the peasantry.
As an example, one may cite Kupets municipality, Pudozh district, Olonets province, which utterly refuses to recognize Soviet power and is managing to run its own internal affairs as formerly, albeit somewhat rejuvenated. To attempts to introduce the Soviet order into the life of the municipality, the peasants responded by saying they had no need for it and to threats to introduce this order by force they answered as one: “try”. The situation remains confined to these terms to the present time.
The mobilization, announced by the Soviet Commune on a level equal with that announced in those same years by the Council of Peoples' Commissars, failed completely in Olonets province, since the peasantry in all districts and municipalities declared that they would agree to be subject to the mobilization on condition that guns be handed out in the province, as they knew perfectly well against whom and for what they needed to fight.
Food supplies for the indigenous population of Olonets province, except for the largest cities, was rather favourable up until now. The peasantry almost everywhere received from their own food agencies and cooperative stores 37 pounds of rye flour per family per month at a price of 6 roubles per pood, as well as 3 pounds of peas and 5 pounds of groats. There is little meat or fat. For the non-indigenous population, in other words, those newly arriving to the area and not registered, matters stand desperate. Other than herring, there is absolutely nothing to buy. At the wharf at Voznesenie, a large village at the source of the Svir river on the shores of Lake Onega, I sought a pound of bread for myself and was utterly unable to find it for money, and only succeeded in obtaining it by bartering 1/8 of a pound of makhorko which I happened to have with me. The current harvest is expected to be very poor across the entire province of Olonets, due to a severe night frost during the first half of June, which killed both the winter crop and the spring crops. There are absolutely no vegetables to be had. In Petrograd, cucumbers cost 1 - 1.50 roubles each, while potatoes cost 3.30 – 3.50 roubles per pound.
The movement of freight along all water routes has been reduced to minimum, due to a continually on-going strike of both ship hands in general and steamship crews in particular.
Even such high priority cargoes such as firewood for heating Petrograd, according to orders from the various official enterprises, such as Tsentrotop [Central Fuel], the Commissariat of Food, and so on, barley achieve 30% of the amount supplied during the grand events of 1917, already severely reduced against the norm.
In view of the advancing British forces, which have already reached the double-tracked Sebezh-Murmansk railway, and whose forward detachments have already moved up as far as Medvezh'ya Gora station on the same rail line, the city of Petrozavodsk is being evacuated, although neither a definite plan nor procedure is evident and the removal of property is proceeding with a sufficient degree of disorder. The Soviet forces are dispersed in insignificant detachments across the entire breadth of Olonets province. Thus, for example, the staff of the 3rd Olonets infantry regiment is located in the town of Lodeinoye Polye, while the remainder of its units are spread out across every district. This is explained by the fact, that all the forces which Soviet power could deploy, have been moved north against the British advance.”

This report, discovered along with other papers and 50,000 roubles found concealed in the cover of a shaving kit, hidden behind a mirror, show that the Fride apartment was one of the most significant centers for the plot involving the counter-revolutionary organization of the Anglo-French imperialists.
Arrested after the search, the former colonel, Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride, confessed that the papers, thrown out by Elizaveta Sergeevna Fride, belonged to him. During questioning, however, Fride concealed the origin of these papers, referring to a certain fictitious Johnston, who allegedly met with him, Fride, on the street and handed him some packets inscribed with addresses, which were delivered by his sister, Maria Fride. Aleksandr Vladimirovich Fride, himself, turned out to be an official employed at the Administration of the Chief of Military Communications.

Polish Prisoners of War - Documents (V)

2009-05-01T22:49:00.000-07:00

Regulations concerning Prisoner of War Camps

Approved
Deputy People's Commissar
Internal Affairs Union SSR
Komdiv (Chernyshov)
23 September 1939

Top secret

Regulations concerning Prisoner of War Camps

I. General Part

1. Special prisoner of war camps shall be organized for the maintenance of prisoners of war received from units of the RKKA
2. The basic tasks of the prisoner of war camps shall consist of:
a) the maintenance of prisoners of war in conditions of isolation from the surrounding population;
b) the creation of a regimen excluding any possibility of flight on the part of the prisoners of war from the area of the camp;
c) agitation, propaganda and mass educational activity among prisoners of war.

II. Structure, Staff and Functions of Camp Administration

3. The administration of a camp shall consist of the following:
a) a chancellery
b) a special section
c) a political section
d) a records and registration section
e) an economic section
f) a financial section
g) a sanitation section
h) an internal security detachment
i) a fire brigade
The administrative staff of the prisoner of war camp shall be approved by the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Union SSR.
Changes in camp structure are to be effected only on orders from the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Union SSR.
4. Functions of the Camp Administration
A. Management of the Camp
The camp commander and camp commissar, as well as the assistant commander of the camp, shall be responsible for management of the camp administration excluding the special section.
The deputy commander of the camp, being at the same time the commander of military and security forces, shall be responsible for camp security.
The chief duty officer [dezhurniy komendant] shall be responsible for receiving and arranging accommodation for newly arrived prisoners, maintaining order within the confines of the camp, and managing the the work of the pass and permit bureau.
B. Camp chancellery
a) the arrangement and organization of office duties in all sections of the camp, excluding the special section and the infirmary;
b) the recording of incoming and outgoing correspondence, including secret and top secret dispatches, excluding the correspondence of the special section;
c) the storage and filing of correspondence concerning the activity of the camp in general;
d) the maintenance of personnel records;
e) the issuing of travel documents to officials of the camp and the registration of individuals arriving in the camp on official business.
C. Special section
Shall carry out of intelligence and investigative work among prisoners of war.
D. Political section
Shall carry out agitation and propaganda work among prisoners of war, oversee activities involving the camp club and library, and conduct political work among camp personnel.
E. Records and registration section
Shall maintain personal and statistical records concerning the prisoners of war and special records concerning officers and other equivalent categories of persons.
Shall register all arriving prisoners of war, prepare the dispatch of prisoners of war and draw up their convoys, and announce the search for escaped prisoners.
F. Economic section
a) shall ensure the provisioning of the camp in all manner of supplies (food supplies and fodder, arming of camp officials, clothing for camp officials and prisoners of war, camp fuel supply, transport [written in hand], fuel [for vehicles - skoblin], provisioning of equipment and stores and so on.);
b) shall conduct the orderly maintenance and improvement of the territory and premises of the camp and carry out the repair and re-equipping of camp structures;
c) shall organize and oversee the bath and laundry facilities;
d) shall organize the safe keeping of items belonging to prisoners of war
e) shall maintain communications facilities, electrical equipment and electrical lighting systems in good working order
f) shall organize and oversee the activity of all camp transport and maintain said transport in working order
g) shall carry out the storage and stock taking of all food supplies as well as keep stock of all property of the camp and its workshops.
G. Financial section
a) shall carry out financial support for the camp and as well as organize and ensure financial accountability of the camp;
b) statements and salaries regarding camp personnel;
c) issue of monetary allowances for prisoners of war;
d) shall maintain personal accounts for prisoners of war [this would involve monies possessed by prisoners of war held in the State Labour Savings Bank and monies transferred to prisoners of war from outside the camp - skoblin]
H. Sanitation section
a) shall organize medical assistance for prisoners of war;
b) shall oversee medical and disinfectory treatment [sanobrabotka] of arriving prisoners of war and carry out the disinfection of living accommodations and clothing, including undergarments;
c) shall monitor the sanitary condition of living accommodations, bakeries and kitchens;
d) shall carry out preventative measures against epidemics including vaccinations and inoculations;
e) shall ensure medical and sanitary administration for the camp through the requisite medical and sanitary equipment and medication;
f) shall maintain accountability regarding receipts and expenses for medical and sanitary equipment and medication, as well as the record and registration of military prisoners seeking medical assistance in the dispensary;
g) shall maintain statistical health records regarding illnesses and deaths.
I. Internal security detachment
a) shall carry out internal security of the camp according to a devised plan;
b) shall maintain order within the confines of the camp and monitor the compliance of internal camp rules of conduct on the part of prisoners of war;
c) shall take part in the search of barracks as well as the persons of prisoners of war;
d) shall assist the security forces in the prevention and elimination of escapes on the part of prisoners of war.
J. Fire brigade
a) shall ensure the reliable condition and readiness of fire fighting equipment within the entire confines of the camp;
b) shall carry out preventative measures regarding fires within the confines of the camp and carry out fire fighting.

Chief of the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War NKVD USSR
Major P. N. Soprunenko
Commissar of the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War NKVD USSR
Regimental Commissar Nekhoroshev

Polish Prisoners of War - Documents (IV)

2009-05-01T11:40:00.000-07:00

Assumption of Duties by Major P. F. Borisovets as Commander of Ostashkov Prisoner of War Camp - 21 September 1939.

Order
Ostashkov Prisoner of War Camp NKVD USSR

No. 01
from 21/IX.1939
Stolbnoe Is.

1. On this day Commissar Yurasov and myself have arrived and assumed the responsibilities for the command of the prisoner of war camp.

Premise: By order of the People's Commissar Internal Affairs No. 038

2. I present a list of personnel who have arrived under my command and who have been granted staff responsibilities for the administration of the camp.
Attachment: List

3. I grant my deputy com. Fadeev Kondratii Yakovlevich, branch officer com. Ivanov Pavel Petrovich and accountant Tarachkov Nikolai Aleksandrovich the right to arrange financial operations at the Ostashkov branch of Gosbank.

Camp Commander Major (Borisovets)
Camp Commissar Senior Political Instructor (Yurasov)
Secretary - Technical Quartermaster I Rank Mali[nin]

Copy to Deputy People's Commissar NKVD Komdiv com. Chernyshov

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Transfer of Property and Premises of Ostashkov and Yuzha Children's Labour Colonies to the Administration of Prisoners of War NKVD USSR - 22 September 1939.

Secret

Order
People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Union SSR for 1939

Contents:
Concerning the transfer of Ostashkov and Yuzha Labour Colonies to the Administration NKVD USSR of Prisoners of War

No. 0309
22 September 1939
Moscow

In accordance with the order No. 0308 of the NKVD USSR from 19/IX - this year, the labour colonies for children:
1. Ostashkov - UNKVD Kalinin district
2. Yuzha - UNKVD Ivanovsk district are to be eliminated, having been excluded from the complement of active labour colonies of the OTK [Department of Correctional Labour Colonies] NKVD USSR.
All buildings, property and material goods of value are to be transferred to the commanders of the Ostashkov and Yuzha prisoner of war camps by decree.
Commander OTK NKVD USSR Senior Lieutenant of State Security Yatskevich shall ensure the immediate removal of the current underaged subjects together with all items of personal use (cultural1 and personal objects2) to other labour colonies.
The Heads of the Kalinin and Ivanovsk district UNKVD are to appoint a commission of reception and transfer of the stated labour colonies.

Dep. People's Commissar
Internal Affairs Union SSR
Komdiv Chenyshov

1. Kul'tinventar' - a problematic term to translate. Normally, this would refer to religious articles, including icons and the like. Under the present circumstances, this would be unlikely. A broader translation would render this as cultural and possibly educational materials.
2. Veshchdovol'stvie - an allowance for objects, most probably involving personal items, such as clothing, photographs, books, etc.

Polish Prisoners of War - Documents (III)

2009-04-30T12:59:00.000-07:00

Draft Regulations concerning Prisoners of War - 19 September 1939

Secret
Draft

Regulations concerning Prisoners of War

I. General Regulations
1. Prisoners of war shall be recognized as individuals belonging to the armed forces of states, found in a condition of war with the USSR, and captured in the course of military operations, as well as citizens of these states, who have been interned in the territory of the USSR.
By order of the Main Military Command, the following may also be recognized as prisoners of war:
a) individuals captured during military operations who have entered into armed detachments not belonging to the armed forces of the enemy, if these detachments have been raised on enemy territory not captured by units of the RKKA, show indications of a military organization, are openly armed and observe the statutes of customary international law and the rules of warfare;
b) civilian persons accompanying the army and fleet of the enemy with permission, for instance: correspondents, suppliers and other individuals captured during military operations.
2. It is prohibited:
a) to allow cruel treatment against prisoners of war, to subject them to abuse, threats and other acts.
b) to apply coercive measures against prisoners of war with the objective of obtaining from them information concerning the situation of their country in respect to military affairs and other matters;
c) to deprive prisoners of war of their uniforms, linen, shoes and other items of personal use, personal documents and signs of distinction.
Monies and valuables may be taken from prisoners of war for safekeeping with official receipt provided by authorized persons.
3. Instructions and rules issued by the NKVD USSR in development of the present "Regulations" shall be posted in places where they may be read by all prisoners of war. These instructions and rules, as well as orders and directives relating to prisoners of war, shall be provided to them in Russian and other languages known to them.

II. Evacuation of Prisoners of War
4. Upon their capture, prisoners of war shall be immediately directed to a camp for prisoners of war.
5. Upon their capture, prisoners of war shall be registered according to orders of the military unit or formation command.
Upon registration each prisoner of war shall be obliged to give his actual last name, given name, patronymic, age, place of birth and identification number.
This information shall be handed over simultaneously with the said prisoners of war to those centers responsible for their further movement.
6. Wounded or sick prisoners of war requiring medical assistance or hospitalization should be immediately directed by the military unit commander to the nearest hospitals
Following convalescence, prisoners of war are to be transferred by the hospital administration to a camp for prisoners of war.
7. Care and maintenance of prisoners of war (provisions, security, sanitation, medical and political services) shall take place:
a) under military authority up to the moment prisoners of war are received at collection centers;
b) under authority of the NKVD USSR after being received at collection centers.
8. Prisoners of war shall fall under the jurisdiction of the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Union SSR upon being handed over to collection centers for the prisoner of war camps or upon their being received by these centers (or camps) following convalescence.

III. Terms of Maintenance of Prisoners of War and their Legal Rights
9. Collection centers for prisoners of war shall be deployed in the army rear according to the instructions of army command, while the camps shall be organized outside the zone of military operations by order of the NKVD in agreement with the People's Commissariat of Defense.
10. All prisoners of war shall be prescribed the same conditions of maintenance.
Prisoners of war who are officers and other individuals of an equivalent standing shall be accommodated separately from other prisoners of war.
11. Prisoners of war shall be provided with living quarters, linen, clothing, footwear, provisions and other items of primary necessity as well as a monetary allowance according to the standards set by the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Union of the SSR.
A list of items and food supplies for prisoners of war with an indication of their standards are to be posted in a visible place in barracks, hospitals and other locations where prisoners of war are accommodated.
Prisoners of war in receipt of provisions and other assistance from outside sources shall not have their supplies provided by the organs of the Union SSR diminished.
12. Prisoners of war shall be permitted to wear their uniforms, but without insignia, decorations, awarded ranks or appointments. The wearing and keeping of side arms shall be prohibited.
13. Prisoners under medical and related treatment shall be attended to on the same basis as service personnel of the rearward units of the Workers-Peasants Red Army.
Medical staff of a hostile army temporarily detained by the armed forces of the USSR may be recruited to provide medical and related services for prisoners of war in addition to the civilian staff of the camps.
14. Prisoners of war shall be granted the right:
a) to report to their home country their situation of confinement upon the first opportunity;
b) to acquire for themselves food, clothing, linen, footwear and other items of personal use and primary necessity;
c) to receive parcels containing foodstuffs, clothing and other items of primary necessity from their home country or from neutral countries without payment of duties or taxes.
d) to receive monetary transfers from their home country or from neutral countries.
15. In order to maintain internal order and contact with prisoners of war, the administration shall appoint representatives or senior members among the prisoners of war or establish rooms or barracks and so on (depending upon the nature of the accommodations provided for the prisoners of war) through which prisoners of war may address complaints, claims announcements and so on to the administration of the camps or to other organs, either verbally or in writing.
16. Postal correspondence (sealed or unsealed letters, monetary transfers and letters with declared valuables), sent and received by prisoners of war, shall remitted without payment in amounts determined by the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs USSR.
17. Monies remitted to prisoners of war in foreign currency shall be converted into Soviet currency at the current exchange rate.
Prisoners of war shall be permitted to carry monies on their person in defined amounts, as established by the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs USSR. Monies in excess of the stated amount shall be turned over to the administration of the camps to be placed in the State Labour Savings Bank. The issue of monies in excess of the stated amount shall take place upon permission of the administration of the camps.
The stated amount shall not extend to wages of prisoners of war, who are employed in industrial or agricultural enterprises and establishments.
18. Testaments and wills of prisoners of war shall be composed in the same manner as testaments and wills of service personnel during wartime. The same relates also to the procedure for certifying the death of prisoners of war.
19. The burial of deceased prisoners of war shall occur in the same manner as the burial of service personnel. The place of burial shall be devised in an appropriate manner.
Monies and documents of deceased prisoners of war shall be transferred to the Central Information Bureau of the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in order to be forwarded to their inheritors.
Parcels of foodstuffs, addressed to deceased prisoners of war, shall be turned over to the representatives or senior prisoners of war for distribution among the prisoners.
20. Prisoners of war shall be obligated to submit to the administration and obey all rules, indicated in the present Regulations, as well as rules pertaining to internal order, issued by the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs USSR in conformity with the Service Regulations of the Interior Service of the Workers and Peasants' Red Army.

IV. Labour Employment of Prisoners of War
21. Rank and file prisoners of war as well as non-commissioned officers may be recruited for work outside the camp in industry and agriculture of the Union SSR on the basis of special rules to be determined by the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs USSR.
Officers and individuals on an equivalent footing shall be recruited for work outside the camp according to special instructions of the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs USSR.
22. Prisoners of war from the moment of their arrival at work outside of camp are excluded from all allowances received at the expense of the State.
23. Prisoners of war, recruited for work outside of camp shall be provided with living quarters and communal services of those enterprises and organizations in which they are employed.
24. Prisoners of war recruited for work outside of camp shall be covered by the same Resolutions concerning the protection of labour and working hours as applied to citizens of the Union SSR in the given locality and employed in the same branch of labour.
25. Prisoners of war recruited for work in various branches of the national economy shall receive wages at a scale determined by the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
Deductions shall be made against the wages of prisoners of war as compensation for maintenance expenses (payment for living quarters, communal services, food, if there is a general cooking allowance).
26. The use of prisoner of war labour is forbidden:
a) for work in an area of military operations;
b) for personal services for the administration of an enterprise as well as for personal services of other prisoners of war (monetary servitude).

V. Criminal and Disciplinary Responsibility of Prisoners of War
27. Prisoners of war who have committed crimes shall be subject to criminal responsibility in accordance with the laws of the Union SSR and the union republics.
Moreover, non-performance of commands given by persons of authority, resistance to these individuals or insults conducted against them during the performance of their service duties shall be treated as equivalent to corresponding military infractions. Having committed an infraction of this sort, a prisoner of war shall be subject to a Military Tribunal court.
28. For misdemeanors not entailing criminal responsibility according to judicial procedure, prisoners of war shall be subject to disciplinary punishments.
The nature of these punishments, their methods of imposition and appeal, as well as the procedure involved in serving disciplinary punishments shall be determined by the rules, issued by the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War NKVD USSR in accordance with the disciplinary statutes of the RKKA.
29. Prisoners of war, finding themselves under investigation or being sentenced by a court to any sort of punishment, and also subject to disciplinary punishment, shall not be subject to additional restrictions above those which are connected with their condition of being under investigation or on trial, and also with their serving of disciplinary measures or sentences imposed by a court.
30. If a prisoner of war is facing an indictable offense, the appropriate court shall notify the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies no later than 20 days after pronouncement of the verdict. If a guilty verdict is pronounced, a copy of the sentence shall be attached to this report.
A sentence, condemning a prisoner of war to capital punishment, shall be reported to the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies immediately upon pronouncement and said punishment may be carried out no earlier than one month after the stated report.

VI. Concerning the Organization of Information and Assistance for Prisoners of War
31. The exchange of prisoner of war lists and communications with foreign and international Red Cross organizations and information bureaus involving the matter of prisoners of war shall be conducted through the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
Pursuant to this, a Central Information Bureau concerning Prisoners of War shall be attached to the Executive Committee of the Union of the Red Cross and Red Cresent Societies and shall operate according to special regulations established by a committee, appointed in agreement between the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Union SSR and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs.

32. Representatives of foreign and international Red Cross and other organizations shall be allowed on the territory of the Union of the SSR in order to render assistance to prisoners of war and to familiarize themselves with the conditions of their cofinement upon special permission from the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.
33. The Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the Union of the SSR shall be organized upon the announcemnt of a state of war, the functions of the Administration, the structure and staff establishment shall be determined according to the Regulations concerning the Administration, approved by the Concil of Preople's Commissars USSR.

Faithfully:
Note on the last page of this document: Article 33 of these regulations is rejected. The regulations concerning the Administration will be reviewed by the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] at the same time as these regulations, but in the capacity of a separate set of regulations. Com. Vyshinsky should review this. Chernishov. 20.9.

Polish Prisoners of War - Documents (II)

2009-04-29T16:14:00.000-07:00

Instructions for the Organization of an Administration of Prisoners of War under the NKVD and establishment of Prisoner of War camps.

Secret

Order of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs Union SSR

19 September 1939
No. 0308
Moscow

1. To organize an Administration of Prisoners of War NKVD based upon the Regulations concerning Prisoners of War.

2. To approve the attached staff establishment of the Administration of Prisoners of War.

3. To appoint as Chief of the Administration of Prisoners of War Major com[rade]. Soprunenko P. K. and as Commissar of the Administration - Regimental Commissar com. Nekhoroshev.
To appoint as deputies to the Chief of Administration:
1) Lieutenant of State Security com. Khokhlov I. I.
2) For security - Major com. Polukhin I. M.

4. To organize the following 8 camps for the confinement of prisoners of war:
1) Ostashkov - on the premises of the former NKVD children's colony on the island of Stolobnoe [Stol'bny] (on lake Seliger), Kalinin oblast, for 7 thous. persons with an increase to 10 thous. persons by 1 October.
2) Yukhnov - on the premises of the "Pavlishchev Bor" sanatorium at Babynino, Western railway, for 5 thous. persons with an increase to 10 thous. by 1. X [October].
3) Kozel'sk - on the premises of the Gorky rest home at Kozel'sk station, Dzerzhinsky railway, for 7 thous. persons with an increase to 10 thous. persons by 1. X.
4) Putivl - on the premises of the former Sofronievskii monastery and peatbog at Tetkino station, Moscow-Kiev railway, for 7 thous. persons with an increase to 10 thous. persons by 25. X.
5) Kozel'shchansk - on the premises of the former Kozel'shchanskii monastery near Kozel'shchina station, Southern railway, for 5 thous. persons with with an increase to 10 thous. persons by 1. X.
6) Starobel'sk - on the premises of the former Starobel'skii monastery near Starobel'sk station, Moscow-Donbass railway, for 5 thous. persons with an increase to 8 thous. persons by 1. X.
7) Yuzha - on the premises of the NKVD children's labour camp at Vyaz'niki station, Northern railway, for 3 thous. persons with an increase to 6 thous. persons by 5. X.
8. Oransk - on the premises of the former Oranskii monastery at Znamenka station, Moscow-Kazan railway, for 2 thous. persons with an increase to 4 thous. persons by 1. X.

5. To approve the attached model for the staff establishment of the camps for prisoners of war, instructions concerning work activity of the camps and the daily routine for the camps for prisoners of war.

6. To approve as commanders and commissars of the camps:
1) Ostashkov -
Major com. Borisovets P. F. - as commander
Senior politruk [political instructor] Yaroslav I. V. - as commissar
2) Yukhnov -
Major com. Kadyshev F. I. - as commander
Battalion Commissar Gil'chonok Ye. Sh. - as commissar
3) Kozel'sk -
Major com. Korolev V. N. - as commander
Senior Politruk Alekseev M. M. - as commissar
4) Putivl -
Major com. Smirnov N. N. - as commander
Battalion Commissar Vasyagin S. P. - as commissar
5) Kozel'shchansk -
Senior Lieutenant s/s com. Sokolov V. L. - as commander
Captain com. Akulenko F. S. - as commissar
6) Starobel'sk -
Captain s/s [state security] com. Berezhkov - as commander
Battalion Commissar com. Kirshin M. M. - as commissar
7) Yuzha -
Junior Lieutenant s/s com. Kiy A. F. - as commander
Senior Lieutenant s/s com. Korotkov G. V. - as commissar
8) Oransk -
Senior Lieutenant s/s Sorokin - as commander
Lieutenant s/s Kuznetsov V. D. - as commissar

7. Operational security and maintenance of prisoners of war in the camps to be placed upon the Special Section of the NKVD USSR and its local organs. Com. com. [Comrades] Kobulov (convening), Belyanov, Soprunenko and Kornienko are to work out the necessary instructions for the district Special Sections over a two day period and present them to me for approval.

8. To approve the pay scale for commanders and commissars of the camps: Ostashkov, Yukhnov, Kozel'sk, Putivl, Kozel'shchansk and Starobel'sk at a rate of 2400 rub.; Yuzha and Oransk - at a rate of 2000 rub.
To approve the pay scale for officials in the Administration and in the camps for prisoners of war at the level currently in effect in GULAG and in the camps of GULAG.

9. To entrust to GULAG NKVD the determination of necessities and the timely delivery of stocks of food, clothing and sanitary supplies.
Personal responsibility for the provisioning of supplies for the prisoner of war camps is to be placed upon my deputy, Komdiv [Divisional Commander] com. Chernyshov.

10. Financial administration regarding the affairs of the prisoners of war as well as the prisoner of war camps is to be placed on the Central Financial Planning Department NKVD.
Personal responsibility for the financial administration of the camps is to be placed upon the Chief TsFPO [Central Financial Planning Department] NKVD USSR, Divisional Quartermaster com. Berenzon.

11. My deputy, Komdiv com. Maslennikov, is to ensure the security arrangements for the collection points, the prisoner of war convoys upon transfer from the collection points to the camps - in accordance with the orders of the Chief of the Administration for Prisoners of War, and the sucurity arrangements in the prisoner of war camps - for which the necessary number of cavalry detachments are to be assigned according to the attached list of stationed troops.

12. Assigned: Head UNKVD Kalinin region - Colonel com. Tokarev, Head UNKVD Smolensk region - Captain of State Security com. Kuprianov, Head UNKVD Chernigov district - Captain of State Security com. Dmitriev, Head UNKVD Pol'tava district - Captain of State Security com. Bukhtiarov, Head UNKVD Voroshilograd district - Captain of State Security com. Cherevatenko, Head UNKVD Ivanovsk district - Captain of State Security com. Blinov and Head UNKVD Gor'kov distrcit - Major of State Security com. Fedyukov together with the camp commanders and commissars:
1) To ensure, in accordance with the deployment plan of the Department of Correctional Labour Colonies, the development of the prisoner of war camps organized according to point 7 of the attached order;
2) To bring the staff establishments of the camps up to full strength according to the approved standard in the attached order and in accordance with the present deployment plan of the OITK [Department of Correctional Labour Colonies] NKVD;
3) To dispatch the following for a period of 10 days in order to assist in the development of the prisoner of war camps:
To Kalinin district Dep. Chief department GULAG - com. Polyakov.
To Smolensk district Dep. Chief GULAG - Brigade Commissar com. Vasil'evna.
To Ivanovsk District Chief of OTK NKVD USSR - senior lieutenant s/s com. Yatskevich.
To Gor'kov District Dep. Chief of Inspection GULAG - Lieutenant s/s com. Lobudev.
My Deputy Commissar of State Security III Rank com. Kruglov assigned for a 2 day period to bring the staff establishment of the Administration of Prisoners of War NKVD USSR up to full strength.

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs USSR
Commissar of State Security I Rank
L. Beria

Original.

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Regulations concerning the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War NKVD USSR.

Approved.
People's Commissar Internal Affairs
Commissar State Security I rank
(L. Beria)
XX September 1939.

Regulations concerning the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War NKVD Union SSR

I. General Regulations
1. The Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War forms part of the structure of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs USSR with the rights of self-management.
The Chief of Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War is subordinate to the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs.
Direct management of the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War is exercised by the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Komdiv com. Chernyshov.

2. The Chief of the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War exercises management over the Administration and directs its activities in accordance with the decisions of the Government USSR regarding war prisoners, present instructions by the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs Union SSR and in accordance with the present regulations.

3. The Administration of the Affairs of Prisoners of War NKVD USSR directly supervises the organization of camps, accommodation, reception, recording, maintenance, and the labour employment prisoners of war. It devises the regulations concerning the collection centers and prisoner of war camps, and issues instructions and orders regarding the maintenance and internal order of the camps.

4. The Chief of Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War NKVD USSR is responsible for the condition of the collection centers and the camps. It supervises all work of the Administration and its peripheral organs on a daily basis.

II. Administrative tasks
The following tasks are assigned to the Administration of Affairs of Prisoners of War:
1) The organization of collection centers for war prisoners, transits camps and permanent camps for war prisoners in agreement with the General Staff of the RKKA;
2) Receiving prisoners of war from the field command of the RKKA;
3) The timely evacuation of prisoners of war from the collection centers to the camps;
4) Establishing internal order in the collection centers and in the camps, rules and regulations concerning prisoners of war;
5) Developing standards for the provisioning of prisoners of war: living accommodations, clothing allowance, rations and other items of primary necessity and the organization of the sequence of supplies according to fixed conditions;
6) Determining the monetary allowance for prisoners of war during their time in the camps;
7) Establishing rules concerning monetary sums prisoners are allowed to hold while in the camps;
8) Establishing rules concerning the rate and range of foodstuffs allowed in parcels to prisoners of war;

9) Organizing the labour use of prisoners of war in industrial and agricultural endeavours of the Union SSR, according to the "Regulations on Prisoners of War";

10) Supervising political and cultural education activities among prisoners of war and developing corresponding instructions;
11) Issuing rules concerning the imposition of order and the serving of disciplinary punishment in accordance with the disciplinary and guard regulations of the RKKA..

Chief of Administration of Affairs
of Prisoners of War NKVD USSR
(Soprunenko)

Polish Prisoners of War - Documents (I)

2009-04-29T13:40:00.000-07:00

Message from the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, L. Beria to the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Molotov, concerning the collection of Polish Prisoners of War.

Top Secret
No. 4271/B

To Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars
Union SSR
comrade Molotov

The General Staff of the RKKA requests that eight collection points be established in the Belorussia and Kiev Military Districts for receiving war prisoners and that two transit camps be set up for prisoners of war at Kozel'sk (BSSR) and Putivl (USSR).
Security for the collection points, the transit camps and the escorting of prisoners of war is to be assigned to the cavalry forces of the NKVD.
In order to maintain security and escort the prisoners of war, the NKVD requests approval of the attached draft resolution of the Committee of Defense of the SNK [Council of People's Commissars] USSR concerning the transfer over to a wartime footing and the complete mobilization of all NKVD cavalry forces located in the Belorussian and Kiev Special Military Districts and the Leningrad Military District, in accordance with the current mobilization plan.

Enclosed: Draft resolution of the KO [Committe of Defense], SNK USSR

People's Commissar of Internal Affairs
Union SSR
L. Beria
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Excerpt from the Minutes of the Politburo, 19 September 1939, Approving the Mobilization and Use of NKVD Cavalry Forces for Maintaining Security involving Prisoners of War.

Decision from 18.IX.39
150. - Question from the KO [Committee of Defense]
Concerning the transfer over to wartime footing of the cavalry forces of the NKVD USSR.
Approve the following decision of the KO:
1. To transfer over to wartime footing from 20 September 1939, the cavalry forces of the NKVD in the Belorussian and Kiev Special and Leningrad Military Districts.
2. To place under the security of the cavalry forces of the NKVD all collection points for receiving military prisoners, located in the Belorussian and Kiev special military districts and the transit camps for prisoners of war located at Kozel'sk (BSSR) and Putivl (USSR).

Secretary TsK [Central Committee].
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Instructions to the Belorussian and Kiev Special Military Districts concerning the transfer of war prisoners to the organs of the NKVD.

Top Secret
For immediate direct delivery through the operational duty room

No. 574970
To the Military Councils BOVO [Belorussian Special Military District], KOVO [Kiev Special Military District]
Copy: To the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, com. Beria

The People's Commissar of Defense USSR orders the the transport of prisoners of war to be carried out as follows:
1. Prisoners of war are to be under the command of the front line Military Councils until reaching the border.
2. Prisoners of war are to moved along specially determined routes. The movement of prisoners of war is not to interfere with the regular movement of our forces.
3. Refreshment points are to be organized along the routes assigned for the prisoners of war. Cooking pots are to be used at the refreshment points instead of field kitchens.
4. Special detachments are to be organized for escorting prisoners of war and are to be drawn from rifle companies, and from cavalry squadrons attached to rifle and cavalry divisions.
5. Prisoners of war are to be handed over to the organs of the NKVD at transfer points.
6. Transfer points for handing over prisoners of war to the NKVD are to be established:
a) for BOVO - Orekhovno, Radoshkovichi, Stolbtsy, Timkovichi, Zhitkovichi;
b) for KOVO - Olevsk, Shepetovka (border), Volochisk, Yarmolitsy, Kamenets-Podol'sk.
7. Further evacuation from the NKVD transfer points are to be carried out to Kozel'sk and Putivl through the use of empty rail wagons upon their return, according to the instructions of the Head of VOSO [Central Military Transportation Administration] and according to the demands of the NKVD. Dispatch of the first echelon is to take place on the evening of 20.9. [20 September 1939]
9. Information concerning acceptable measures and instructions to be given out will be announced.

Shaposhnikov
Gusev

Fathfully
Chief of the 12th Section
General Staff RKKA
Utkin.

Shvernik Report on the trial against Tukhachevsky and other members of the RKKA (II)

2009-04-28T19:39:00.001-07:00

II. The arrest of Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uberovich. Investigation and trial.

As mentioned above, notebooks have been found in Yezhov's archive in the TsK [Central Committee], in which Yezhov recorded various instructions regarding work in the NKVD. In one such notebook, the following entry is found: "1. Tukhachevsky, 2. Yefimov1, 3. Eideman, 4. Appoga2." The mark "(a)" was placed to the right of each of these names, which - in all probability - signified the order for their arrest. A check mark was also set against each name, signifying that this order had been carried out. Marshal Tukhachevsky and Corps Commanders Yefimov, Eideman and Appoga were all arrested on the same day - 22 May 1937. Tukhachevsky, in particular, was arrested in Kuibyshev, where he had already arrived to take up his new responsibilities. He was subsequently transferred to the inner prison of the NKVD in Moscow, where he was incarcerated in cell No. 94.
On 24 May 1937, two days after Tukhachevsky's arrest, the Politburo TsK VKP(b) passed the following resolution:
"The following motion is placed before the members of the TsK VKP(b) and before the candidate members of the TsK for a vote: The TsK VKP has received information exposing Rudzutak, member of the TsK VKP, and Tukhachevsky, candidate member of the TsK VKP, as participants in an anti-Soviet Trotskyist-Rightist conspiratorial bloc and of having engaged in espionage activity against the USSR on behalf of Fascist Germany. In connection with this, the Politburo of the TsK VKP calls on the members and candidate members of the TsK VKP to vote on the motion to expel Rudzutak and Tukhachevsky from the party and to transfer their cases to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs."
On 25-26 May 1937, the following resolution was written up by members of the TsK VKP(b) and candidate members of the TsK and signed by Stalin:
"On the basis of the information which has been received exposing member of the TsK VKP(b), Rudzutak, and candidate member of the TsK VKP(b), Tukhachevsky, as participants in an anti-Soviet Trotskyist-Rightist conspiratorial bloc and of having engaged in espionage activity against the USSR on behalf of Fascist Germany, that Rudzutak3 and Tukhachevsky be expelled from the party and their cases be transferred to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs."
There is insufficient information concerning how Tukhachevsky may have comported himself while being questioned during his first days in the hands of the NKVD. The minutes of Tukhachevsky's preliminary interrogations were either destroyed by the investigators or were never recorded in the first place. However, other documentation which has been preserved attests that Tukhachevsky denied participation in a conspiracy during the initial stages of the investigation.
This claim regarding Tukhachevsky's conduct is corroborated by a statement made by Fel'dman:
"I suspected that Tukhachevsky had no doubt been arrested, but I thought, that after falling into the hands of the investigation, he would divulge everything and thus try to atone somewhat for the heavy burden of guilt he bore before the State. However, in being confronted by Tukhachevsky during questioning, he denied everything and stated that I had made everything up..."
A statement made by Tukhachevsky from 26 May 1937, regarding his confrontations with Primakov, Putna and Fel'dman during the interrogation process, is also available:
"Confrontations with Primakov, Putna and Fel'dman, who accuse me of being the leader of an anti-Soviet Trotskyist military conspiracy, have already taken place. I hereby request that I be provided with the testimony of the other participants of this conspiracy who are making accusations against me. I pledge that I will provide frank and sincere testimony."
The minutes relating to these confrontations arranged by investigators between Tukhachevsky and Primakov, Putna and Fel'dman have not been located, either in Tukhachevsky's archival file pertaining to the investigation or in any other file.
In describing his conduct at the beginning of the investigation, Tukhachevsky stated in both hand-written testimony as well as in interrogation minutes recorded on 1 June 1937, that:
"I repeatedly and persistently attempted to deny my participation in the conspiracy as well as denying individual facts involving my my anti-Soviet activity."
Archival materials pertaining to the investigation reveal that such conduct on Tukhachevsky's part was extremely short-lived. All measures were taken in order to break his resistance, with Yezhov himself directly leading the investigation. As investigators for the case, Yezhov appointed the schooled and studious falsifiers Leplevsky, Ushakov and others. These individuals had long ago lost all semblance and understanding of being human, and reckoning upon the choice of methods for achieving their goals, applied various sorts of moral and physical torments in order to break the will of the prisoners and obtain false testimony. Having found himself in such circumstances, being placed under guard for several days and grasping the hopelessness of his position, Tukhachevsky wrote the following statement on 26 May 1937:
"I hereby acknowledge the existence of an anti-Soviet Trotskyist military conspiracy and that I was leading it... The founding of this conspiracy dates back to 1932."
On 29 May 1937, Yezhov interrogated Tukhachevsky, which led to the following testimony being provided:
"I was drawn into the Rightist organization by Yenukidze4 as early as 1928. In 1934, I personally got into contact with Bukharin. I established espionage contacts with the Germans in 1925, after having traveled to Germany for training exercises and maneuvers... During a trip to London in 1936, Putna arranged a meeting for me with Sedov5... I had conspiratorial contacts with Fel'dman, Kamenev S. S.6, Yakir, Eideman, Yenukidze, Bukharin, Karakhan7, Pyatakov8, Smirnov I. N.9, Yagoda10, Osepian11 and a number of others."
Between 1 and 10 June 1937, Tukhachevsky was compelled to elaborate further, describing the conspiratorial organization and plans for defeating the Red Army. This testimony was forwarded to Stalin and was attached to the file only after the trial had taken place.
Here is some information, which reveals the means by which Tukhachevsky was forced to provide false testimony. Bul, a former NKVD USSR official and member of the KPSS, reported in 1956:
"I personally witnessed Tukhachevsky being led through the corridors of Building 2 to be interrogated by Leplevsky. He was dressed in a splendid gray civilian suit with a peasant's greatcoat made of cloth tossed over it and bast shoes on his feet. I deduced that Tukhachevsky was forced to wear such an outfit in order to humiliate him. The entire case conducted against Tukhachevsky and the others was concluded very quickly... The investigators employed persuasion in addition to physical coercion in order to obtain testimony."
While examining the Tukhachevsky case, several pages of his testimony were found to have brownish-coloured spots and stains and a judicial-medical analysis was conducted as a result. The Main Judicial-Medical Laboratory of the Military Medical Administration attached to the Ministry of Defense concluded on 28 June 1956, that:
"The stains and smears found on pages 165 and 166 of File No. 967581 were determined to be blood... Several of the blood stains have the shape of exclamation marks. Such a shape is usually observed only in the case of blood emanating from a subject which is in movement or with blood falling onto a surface at an angle..."
The investigator-falsifier Ushakov, who was mentioned previously, was himself arrested in September 1938. In an effort to justify the use of his "services," he boasted: "I dug information out of Tukhachevsky, Yakir and the others." In his testimony written on 23 September 1938, Ushakov stated:
"I was transferred to Moscow along with Leplevsky in December 1936... From literally my first days there I had determined the existence of a military Trotskyist organization in the RKKA and the Fleet and had worked out a specific plan for uncovering it. The first such evidence I obtained came from Zakupnev, the former commander of the Caspian military flotilla... I... then proceeded confidently towards exposing the anti-Soviet military conspiracy. At the same time, I moved forward with confidence in another department, and with Eideman I turned out not to be mistaken. As for Fel'dman, he confessed in my presence that he was a participant in an anti-Soviet military conspiracy (as recorded in the minutes of his interrogation of 19 May 1937), which formed the basis for the arrest of Yefimov and others which commenced on May 22. On May 25 I was given free rein to interrogate Tukhachevsky, who confessed on the 26th , and on the 30th I was given Yakir as well. Working alone and without assistants (or "partners") and with the three of us having received instructions that the case must be ready for a hearing within just a few days, I laboured unceasingly, dragging out of them a few more facts, a few more conspirators. Even early in the morning on the day of the trial, I succeeded in obtaining supplementary evidence from Tukhachevsky concerning Apanasenko12 and a few others."
Among these "others," for instance, was even mentioned Timoshenko.
Komkor [Corps Commander] Eideman, arrested on May 22 at the same time as Tukhachevsky, was conveyed first to the inner prison of the NKVD USSR and then transferred to Lefortovo prison the following day. On 25 May, Eideman presented a statement addressed to Yezhov, in which he agreed "to assist the investigation" in uncovering criminal activity. Judging by its external characteristics (irregular handwriting and the absence of certain letters in some words), it is evident that this letter was written in a state of nervous shock, and exhibited the results of physical coercion.
On 28 May 1937, the results of Eideman's interrogation were forwarded by Yezhov to Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov and Kaganovich with the following cover letter: "I am relaying the interrogation records of Eideman P. R., former Chairman of the Central Council of the OSOAVIAKHIM13 USSR, which took place on 27 May of this year. Eideman has testified that he was drawn into an anti-Soviet Trotskyist military conspiracy by Tukhachesky and has been active in carrying out sabotage efforts. Eideman has named Fel'dman, Yefimov, Peterson, Kork, Gorbachev, Fishman14, Osepian and Vol'pe15 as participants of this Trotskyist military conspiracy. Eideman states that he recruited Belitsky16, Voskanov17... into the Trotskyist military conspiracy. I request permission to arrest all the participants of the conspiracy, named by Eideman, who are working in the administration of the OSOAVIAKHIM."
Permission was granted to carry out the arrests and Yezhov wrote on his copy of this document: "All individuals named by Eideman employed with the OSOAVIAKHIM (center and periphery) are to be arrested immediately. Yezhov. "
The former NKVD official, Karpeisky, commenting on the illegal methods which had been used to render Eideman compliant, has testified:
"Eideman denied any involvement in a conspiracy, stating that he had no idea of its existence and that the charges did not correspond to how he had conducted himself throughout his life nor to his views.
"Threatening Eideman with physical coercion if he continued to remain stubborn and conceal his conspiratorial activities from the investigation... Agas declared, if Eideman did not being providing evidence immediately, then he - Agas - would continue the questioning in another place and in another fashion. Eideman fell silent and Agas interrupted the questioning with the remark that Eideman would have only himself to blame; that he would be sent to prison where his stubbornness would soon be broken... Some three days later, I was notified during the day that I was urgently required at Lefortovo prison where Agas was expecting me. This was my first time to be at this prison... and what I saw and heard that day at Lefortovo prison surpassed all my expectations. An unimaginable din carried on continuously throughout the prison and from the offices of the investigators could be heard the shouting of officials and - as was easily deduced - the groans and moans of those being beaten... I located Agas' office and found Eideman sitting across the table from him. Next to Agas sat Leplevsky... Dergachev. On the table, in front of Eideman, lay a statement written by him and addressed to the People's Commissar, Yezhov, in which he confessed his participation in the conspiracy and that he was prepared to provide frank testimony.
"A day or two later, I summoned Eideman again for questioning at Lefortovo prison. During this interrogation, however, Eideman conducted himself rather strangely, responding to questions in a rather sluggish if not disconnected fashion, apparently distracted by extraneous thoughts. Hearing the sound of an engine he declaimed, "Aircraft, aircraft." I did not write up the minutes of the interrogation and reported to Agas afterward that Eideman was in a rather strange state and that it was necessary to verify his testimony... After this, Eideman was essentially removed from me and was subsequently interrogated by Agas." On 28 May 1937, the NKVD USSR arrested [Army] Commander 1st Grade, Yakir. In Yezhov's notebook, the following entry is found: "Yakir, upon arriving in Moscow." Next to this phrase stands the word "check," signifying that the assignment had been carried out. On the following day, that is, 29 May 1937, Komandarm [Army Commander] 1st Grade, Uberovich, was arrested at Vyazma station on his way to Moscow. Sent to the internal prison of the NKVD USSR, both Yakir and Uberovich were placed in solitary confinement under secret designation.
After the arrest of Yakir and Uberovich, Stalin signed the following resolution, which was drawn up according to a decision of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b) on 30 May 1937, and a vote conducted among members and candidate members of the TsK VKP(b) between 30 May - 1 June 1937:
"Confirmed, the following resolution of the Politburo TsK: In view of information which has been received which indicates that member of the TsK VKP, Yakir, and candidate member of the TsK VKP, Uberovich, have participated in a Fascist-Rightist Trotskyist military conspiracy and have engaged in espionage activity on behalf Germany, Japan and Poland, that they be expelled from the ranks of the VKP and their cases be transferred to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs."

Neither Yakir nor Uberovich confessed their guilt in the course of their preliminary interrogations. However, a record of these interrogations was never drawn up.

The former NKVD USSR official, Soloviev A. F., member of the KPSS since 1918, providing details of the case to the TsK KPSS on 29 November 1962, wrote:

"I personally witnessed the Commander of the UVO [Ukrainian Military District], Yakir, being led to Leplevsky's office. Yakir entered the office dressed in uniform, without shoulder tabs or belt, and with his tunic unbuttoned. He was in a visibly deplorable state and it was obvious that he had been beaten by Leplevsky and his assisstants. Yakir was interrogated some 2-3 hours in Leplevsky's office on this occasion."

In an effort to coerce Yakir into providing false testimony, he was confronted with Kork during interrogation. During this confrontation, which took place on 30 May 1937, Kork maintained that he and Yakir had joined the leadership group of the military conspiracy in 1931. To this, Yakir responded:
"I deny this categorically. I always knew that Kork was a worthless individual, avoiding a more strongly-worded description, but I never thought he would be a simple provocatuer... We did indeed meet once in April of this year at Tukhachevsky's apartment, but nothing was said."

In "working over" Yakir and obtaining false evidence from him, Yezhov played an immediate and direct role. In an incomplete and unsigned statement addressed to Yezhov, found in the case file, Yakir wrote: "On the thirtieth of May, You personally demonstrated with conclusive clarity by means of investigative materials that further denial on my part was completely hopeless... In my testimony, I will relate everything I know regarding the Rightist-Trotskyist conspiracy and individuals connected with it, in order to help smash this despicable organization."

In a signed statement from 31 May 1937, Yakir reported:

"I wish... to assist in hastening the investigation, to relate everything I know about the conspiracy, and to earn myself the right to have the Soviet government believe in my complete disarmament."
Over the next seven days, Ushakov obtained six hand-written letters of testimony from Yakir and drew up two records of interrogation.
On 30 May 1937, a confrontation was carried out between Kork and Uberovich, during which Kork confirmed that Uberovich had joined the Rightist Trotskyist conspiracy in 1931. Objecting to Kork, Uberovich stated flatly:

"I categorically deny this. These are all lies from start to finish... I have never engaged in any conversations with Kork regarding counter-revolutionary organizations..."
It was extremely necessary, however, to obtain false evidence from Uberovich and this evidence was acquired by force. Avseevich, a former official of the Special Section of the NKVD USSR, testified:

"In May 1937, during one of our meetings, the assistant section chief Ushakov reported to Leplevsky that Uberovich did not wish to provide any testimony. Leplevsky ordered Ushakov to use physical coercion against comrade Uberovich."
Soon after, Uberovich signed two statements addressed to Yezhov, in which he confessed his participation in the military conspiracy. He also signed the record of his interrogation acknowledging his guilt.

Stalin was personally occupied with questions concerning the investigation of the military conspiracy on a daily basis, receiving the interrogation records of those who had been arrested, while also meeting Yezhov almost every day. During the period 21 to 28 May, however, he also met with the Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, Frinovsky, who also played a direct role in the falsification of the charges.
On 30 May 1937, the Politburo TsK VKP(b) reached the following decision:
"Comrades Gamarnik and Aronshtam are hereby removed from their duties in the People's Commissariat of Defense and expelled from the ranks of the Military Council for having been found in close contact with Yakir, who as of today has been from the party his participation in the Fascist military conspiracy."
Gamarnik was at home confined to his bed due to illness at this time. On 31 May 1937, Deputy Chairman of the PU [Political Administration] of the RKKA, Bulin, and the Chief of Administration of the NKO [People;s Commissariat of Defense], Smorodinov, were instructed by Voroshilov to go to Gamarnik's apartment and notify him of his dismissal from the RKKA. After they departed, Gamarnik immediately shot himself. The next day, Pravda and other newspapers published the following announcement:
"On 31 May, fomer member of the TsK VKP(b) Ya. B. Gamarnik, having become entangled with anti-Soviet elements and fearing possible exposure, committed suicide."
Between 1 and 4 June 1937, a report by Voroshilov titled "Concerning the Exposure by the Organs of the NKVD of a Counter-Revolutionary Conspiracy within the RKKA" was discussed in the Kremlin at an enlarged meeting of the Military Council, People's Commissariat of Defense, with the participation of the Politburo of the TsK VKP(b). In addition to the standing members of the Council, some 116 military officials had been invited from the provinces and from the central administration of the NKO. It should also be mentioned that by 1 June 1937, twenty members of the Military Council, that is, one quarter of its membership, had been arrested as "conspirators".
Those participating in the Military Council were only apprised of the testimony of Tukhachevsky, Yakir and other "conspirators" just before the meeting convened. This created a tense atmosphere within the Council from the very first day.
Voroshilov's report, which was heavily dependent upon the false and fabricated testimony provided by those who had been arrested, alleged:
"The People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs has uncovered within the military a long-standing and illegally operating strictly conspiratorial counter-revolutionary fascist organization, which has been led by persons who stood at the top ranks of the army." ...
"That these individuals - Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uberovich and a number of others - maintained close relations was no secret. We knew this. Still, it is a long path from close relations - even close relations such as this - to that of counter-revolution.... Last year, in May, at my apartment and in the presence of Stalin, Molotov and many others, Tukhachevsky accused Budyonny and I of allegedly forming a small group around myself, of directing an entire set policy, and so on...The next day, Tukhachevsky withdrew everything he had said... Comrade Stalin then stated that this private squabbling must cease and that it was necessary to arrange a meeting of the PB [Politburo] in order determine what is going on. And now, at this meeting, we have sorted out all the issues and have arrived at the aforementioned result."
Stalin: He recanted the charges.
Voroshilov: Yes, he recanted, although Yakir and Uberovich were rather aggressive towards me at the meeting. Uberovich remained quiet, but Gamarnik and Yakir were quite rude to me."
In his report, Voroshilov ordered, that "the army be investigated inside and out, right down to the last tack....," while warning beforehand that this purge "may result in a significantly large number of casualties."
Voroshilov continued further:
"I, as People's Commissar... must be frank in saying that not only had I failed to notice these despicable traitors, but even when some of them (Gorbachev, Fel'dman and others) had already begun to be exposed, I did not wish to believe that these people, who seemed above reproach in their duties, were capable of such monstrous crimes. My blame in this is enormous, yet I can not cite a single indication of warning even on your part, comrades... I repeat, no one warned either myself or the TsK of the party even once that counter-revolutionary conspirators were operating in the RKKA... "
On 2 June 1937, Stalin spoke to the Military Council. Alluding to testimony provided by the accused themselves, he drew the conclusion that "a military conspiracy directed against Soviet power, incited and financed by the German Fascists," was operating within the country. He alleged that Trotsky, Rykov, Bukharin, Rudzutak, Karakhan, Yenukidze and Yagoda were the leaders of the political wing, while the military line was led by Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uberovich, Kirk, Eideman and Gamarnik.
"These men comprised the core of the military political conspiracy," stated Stalin, "a central body which had systematic relations with the German Fascists, especially with the German Reichswehr, and which coordinated its activities to the views and orders of the German Fascists."
Stalin was convinced, that of the thirteen leaders of the conspiracy he had named, ten of these individuals - that is, all of them except for Rykov, Bukharin, and Gamarnik - were German spies and that some were also working for Japanese intelligence. Thus, speaking about Tukhachevsky and the other arrested military officials, Stalin declared:
"He handed over our operational plan, our operational plan - our holy of holies - to the German Reichswehr. He met with representatives of the German Reichswehr. A spy? A spy... Yakir systematically informed the German General Staff... Uberovich informed them as well, both along with his friends and comrades, but also individually, on his own. Karakhan was a German spy. Eideman was a German spy. Karakhan started informing the German General Staff from the time he was stationed there as Military Attache."
According to Stalin, Rudzutak, Karakhan and Yenukidze had been recruited by the German-Danish agent Josefina Gensi (Yensen), who was in the employ of the German Reichswehr, and that she also "assisted in recruiting Tukhachevsky." It is obvious now, having examined the materials, that these allegations on the part of Stalin were based on false testimony, which lacked any veracity, and regarding Tukhachevksy in particular, was entirely non-existent.
Making use of the false investigative materials, Stalin spent his speech slandering many Soviet officials, naming them as participants of the military conspiracy, allegedly created by the Reichswehr. Accusing these individuals of sabotage, Stalin declared to the Military Council:
"This is a military-political conspiracy. The German Reichswehr has had its hands in it from the very beginning. I think these people are puppets and marionettes in the hands of the Reichswehr. The Reichswehr wanted an conspiracy in our country and these gentlemen undertook this conspiracy. The Reichswehr wanted these gentlemen to systematically provide them military secrets and these gentlemen reported these military secrets to them. The Reichswehr wanted the existing government to be removed, to be destroyed, and they undertook this business, but they did not succeed. The Reichswehr wanted everything prepared in case of war, that the army would cross over to performing sabotage, so that the army would be unprepared for defense. This is what the Reichswehr wanted and this was the business they were undertaking. These agents, the leading agents of the military political conspiracy in the USSR, consisted of 10 patented secret agents and 3 patented agents provocateurs. These are agents of the German Reichswehr. This is a fundamental fact. This conspiracy, thus, has not so much an internal basis, but rather an external foundation; not so much an internal policy regarding our country, but rather the policy of the German Reichswehr. They wanted to make a second Spain out of Russia and found themselves agents to actively pursue this. These are the circumstances of the case."
Having reported that between 300 and 400 persons had already been arrested on the military front, Stalin made the accusation that the case of military conspiracy "had been bungled," and that "few among the military have been uncovered through our own efforts." He declared, that our intelligence in regards internal matters had been poor and weak, that it was clogged with spies, and that within the Cheka an entire group had been found, which was working for Germany, Japan and Poland.
Having voiced his displeasure over the lack of warning signals from the provinces and demanding such signals, Stalin declared: "Even if only 5% turn out to be true, this is still something to be valued."
Having believed in Stalin and Voroshilov's assertions and accepting the authenticity of the testimony provided by the accused themselves, the participants of the Military Council harshly condemned the "conspirators," while assuring both the party and the government of their unbounded devotion. Still, of the 42 members who had listened to Voroshilov's report, 34 of them were soon arrested as conspirators themselves. These included:

Alksnis Ya. I., Belov I. P., Blyukher V. K., Bokis G. G. , Viktorov M. V., Gailit Ya. P., Grinberg I. M., Griaznov I. K., Dubovoi I. N., Dushenov K. I., Dybenko P. Ye., Yegorov A. I., Zhil'tsov A. I., Kozhanov I. K., Krivoruchko N. N., Kulik G. I., Kuchinsky D. A., Levandovsky M. K., Ludri I. M., Mager M. P., Mezis A. I., Meretskov K. A., Neronov I. G., Okunev G. S., Sedyakin A. I., Sivkov A. K., Slavin I. Ye., Smirnov P. A.. Stepanov M. O., Troianker B. U., Uritsky S. P., Fed'ko I. F., Khripin V. V., Shestakov V. N.
On 5 June 1937, Stalin received Molotov, Kaganovich and People's Commissar of Interanal Affairs USSR, Yezhov. On that same day, those who undergo trial in the case of the "military conspiracy" were chosen from among the large group military officials who had been arrested in May 1937. Those selected included Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Kork, Uberovich, Eideman and Fel'dman. Primakov and Putna would also be chosen in roder to impart a Trotskyist hue on the proceedings, as both these men shared Trotskyist views until 1927. The individual criminal cases of all of these persons were combined into one large case on 5 June 1937.

On 7 June 1937, Yezhov and Vyshinsky met with Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov. and the final text of the statement of indictment was issued. On this same day, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Belov, Kashirin and Dybenko were approved as auxiliary judges of the Supreme Court of ther USSR by a resolution of the Presidium of the TsIK USSR as part of the trial preparations. Following this, the NKVD took measures to immediately conclude the case of the military conspiracy.On 7 June 1937, Primakov was indicted, followed the next day by Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uberovich, Kork, Fel'dman and Putna according to Articles 58-1 "B", 58-3, 58-4, 58-6, 58-8 and 58-9 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (betrayal of the Motherland, espionage, terror, and so on.)

On 9 June 1937, Vyshinsky and Subotsky, assistant to the Chief Military Prosecutor, subjected the accused to a brief round of questioning. Conducted in the presence of the NKVD investigators, the questions were intended to certify the "authenticity" of the various testimony, which had been provided by the accused. Transcripts of these interviews have been found in Stalin's archives. On the record of Tukhachevsky's interrogation is found the inscription: "To com. Stalin. Yezhov. 9. VI. 1937."
On that same day, 9 June 1937, Subotsky announced to the accused that the investigation had been concluded, but in breach of the provisions of Article 206 of the UPK [Criminal Trial Procedures] RSFSR, he did not present them with a copy of the case nor did he explain to them their right to review the proceedings and to supplement the investigation.
Before the trial, the accused were permitted to address Stalin and Yezhov with statements of penance, in order to create the illusion that this could save their lives. Taking advantage of such a possibility, Yakir wrote on 9 June 1937:
"My dearest comrade Stalin. I dare thus to approach You, as I have told everything, divulged everything, and it now appears to me that I have once again become that honest man, devoted to the party, to the state, and to the land of fighters that I had been for so many years. All my conscious political life has been spent in selfless honest work for the sake of the party and its leaders, which then plunged into the irreparable nightmare and horror of betrayal... The investigation has ended. I have been presented with the charge of state treason. I confess my guilt and declare my utter repentance. I have boundless faith in the prudence and correctness of the decision of both the court and the government... Now, I am honoured by each word I say, when I say I love You, the party and country, with unbounded faith in the victory of Coimmunism."
The following remarks are found on Yakir's statement:
"My archive. St [alin]"; "Scoundrel and prostitute. I. St [alin]"; "An absolutely accurate desription. K. Vorishilov."; "Molotov". "Bastard, swine and whore. There is but one punishment - death. L. Kaganovich."
On 9 June 1937, the day that the investigation into the military conspiracy concluded, Vyshinsky was received twice by Stalin. Both Molotov and Voroshilov were present during the second visit, which took place at 10:45 in the evening. On that same day, Vyshinsky signed the statementof indictment regarding the case.
The statement of indictment confirmed that during April and May 1937, the organs of the NKVD had uncovered and eliminated a Trotskyist military conspiracy in Moscow. The central leadership of this conspiracy included Gamarnik, Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uberovich, Kork, Eideman and Fel'dman. The military Trotskyist organization, into which all of the accused in the case had entered, was formed in 1932-1933 under the direct instructions of Trotsky and the German General Staff and was linked with the Trotskyist center and with the Rightist group of Bukharin and Rykov. The organization was engaged in sabotage, wrecking, terrorism and prepared for the overthrow of the government and the seizrue of power with the intention of restoring captialism. The charges were in accordance with Articles 58-16, 58-8 and 58-11 of the UK [Criminal Code] RFSFR. In so doing, State Prosecutor Vyshinsky failed to consider the fact that Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uberovich and the four other detainees had not been presented with this charge.
Following Vyshinsky, Stalin met with Molotov, Yezhov and Mekhlis, the editor of Pravda, at 11:30 in the evening. On 11 June 1937, Pravda published a report announcing the conclusion of the investigation of Tukhachevsky and the others and their impending trial. As stated in the report, they were accused of "breaching their military duty, betrayal of the Motherland, betrayal of the peoples of the USSR, and betrayal of the Workers-Peasants Red Army."
On 10 June 1937, an Extraordinary Plenum of the Supreme Court of the USSR listened to a report by Vyshinsky regarding the charges leveled against Tukhachevsky and the others. The Plenum decreed that the case be heard by a Special Judicial Session of the Supreme Court of the USSR composed of Ulrikh, Alksnis, Bluykher, Budyonny, Shaposhnikov, Belov, Dybenko, Kashirin and Goryachev.
The initiative for convening a special military court to hear the case of Tukhachevsky and the others and the decision to employ well-known military officials as members of the court lay with Stalin himself. The selection of these officials was not accidental. All of them were members of the Military Council of the Commissariat of Defense, and had attended the June meeting of the Council where, in Stalin's presence, they sharply condemned Tukhachevsky, Yakir and Uberovich as "conspirators". Zaryanov, a former member of the Military Collegiate of the Supreme Court of the USSR, who took part in the trial against Tukhachevsky as Secretary of the Court, writes:
"In conversation with Ulrikh, I was led to believe that the Special Session, which was composed entirely of marshals and komandarms [army commanders], had been created solely on Stalin's initiative. In creating this special military court, Stalin had the goal of raising its authority while evincing the correctness of its verdict."
On 10 June 1937, a preparatory meeting of the Special Judicial Session of the Surpeme Court of the USSR took place, which confirmed the statement of indictment compiled by Vyshinsky and handed over Tukhachevsky and the others for trial.
On that same day, all of the accused were presented with copies of the statement of indictment by the Secretary of the Court, while Leplevsky, Chief of the Special Section NKVD, signed the security and order protocals for the judicial session and presented it to Yezhov.
The squeezing of testimony from the accused carried on so far that even after Tukhachevsky and the others had been transferred to the court, investigators still demanded additional evidence from them against various military commanders, especially against the very judges of the Special Judicial Session itself. Thus, on 10 June 1937, testimony was obtained from Primakov, which compromised three members of the court: Komandarms Kashirin, Dybenko and Shaposhnikov. Regarding Kashirin, Primakov testified:
"In the fall of 1934, when in Moscow, Fel'dman got me into touch with Alafuzo, who told me at one and the same time that both Kozitsky and Kashirin were taking part in the conspiracy."
Avseevich, who interrogated Primakov, reported:
"During the last phase of the investigation, Leplevsky summoned Primakov to his office, and presented him with an entire list of prominent Soviet army commanders, none of whom had been mentioned in Primakov's earlier testimony. Primakov now offered to write something regarding each of them on behalf of Yezhov... Thus arose testimony against Kashirin, Dybenko, Gamarnik, Kuibyshev, Gryaznov, Uritsky, Vasil'ev and others... All this slanderous testimony, compiled by Primakov and the others at that time, was utter speculation, which had been brought about by the violation of the most elemental standards of legality - both in regards the conduct of the case and that of the court itself. Within the NKVD at that time, it was known among us officials that Stalin controlled the leadership of the NKVD and that Yezhov would by-bass the TsK VKP(b), reporting only to Stalin and obeying only his orders. This system of personal subordination to Stalin within the NKVD continued under Beria and Abakumov. Everything done within the organs of the NKVD was connected with the name of Stalin."
Not long before the judicial trial began, an operational meeting took place within the Special Section of the NKVD USSR, at which Leplevsky gave instructions to the investigators to prevail upon their charges to maintain their testimony during trial and to convince them that doing so may alleviate their fate. The investigators who had fabricated the case, led their prisoners to the court, sat with them in the waiting rooms and were situated in the hall of the court. Concerning these preparations, Avseevich has testified:
"As for the preparations involving the judicial trial against Tukhachevsky, Primakov and the others, an operational meeting was summoned upon the conclusion of the investigation. This occurred two days before the trial. At the meeting, Leplevsky gave instructions to all those who had taken part in the investigation to speak with their charges once again, and to convince them to maintain their testiony while in court. The day before the trial began, I sat down with Primakov, and he promiseed me that he would maintain his testimony during the trial. Other officials from the Section spoke with other members of the accused. In addition, we were ordered to conduct the accused to court, sit beside them in the waiting hall.... I wish to report further that right prior to the trial session commencing, I was ordered by Leplevsky to acquaint Primakov with the contents of his testimony."
In his subsequent explanations, Avseevich has written:

"On the eve of the trial, the accused were summoned by Leplevsky, who announced that the trial would begin the next day and that their conduct in the court would determine their fate."
"Immediately before the trial began, Primakov was summoned by Yezhov and queried as to how he planned to conduct himself in court. He was then urged to maintain the testimony he had given the investigators beforehand. Primakov promised Yezhov he would expose the conspirators to the very end."
The former NKVD official, Karpeisky, has also provided testimony concerning the trial preparations.
On 11 June 1937, the Special Judicial Session of the Supreme Court of the USSR in Moscow examined the charges against Tukhachevsky and the others in a closed hearing. After reading out the statement of indictment, all the defendants confessed their guilt when queried by the chairman of the court. They would subsequently fulfill the demands placed upon them by their NKVD investigators, essentially maintaining the testimony they had given beforehand.
The following excerpts may give an idea of the trial proceedings.
In his speech to the court, Yakir adhered to the plans of the trial organizers and provided the framework for the other defendants in exposing the intrigues of Trotsky and the Fascist governments against the USSR, while stressing Tukhachevsky's role in the conspiracy whenever possible.
When Bluykher, however, attempted to obtain a concrete accounting of how the Red Air Force was to be sabotaged in a coming war, Yakir responded, "I am unable to tell you anything beyond that provided to the investigation."
When the Chairman of the Court inquired about the specifics involved in his attempt to sabotage military preparedness, Yakir announced evasively, "I have addressed this in a special letter."
Tukhachevsky and Uberovich were examined by the court by means of simple questions and answers. In the process, they were repeatedly interrupted by Ulrikh, who would add his own comments and remarks. Tukhachevsky failed to maintain some of the charges that had been leveled against him. When Uberovich started to deny the charges of sabotage and espionage, the court suspended his examination and called a recess. When the preceedings resumed an hour later, they crossed over to the examination of the other defendants.
The investigators had placed great hopes on Kork's testimony and had painstakingly prepared him for the trial. As a result, he was permitted to deliver a lengthy speech "unmasking" the conspiracy, which filled some 20 pages in the stenographic record. The subsequent examinations of Eideman, Putna and Primakov were alse conducted in question and answer format, with Eideman asked a total of no more than three questions.
As with Kork, the investigators had also placed their "hopes" on Fel'dman. Prior to his examination, Fel'dman appealed to the court with the following request:
"I would request, cit. [izen] Chairman, that I be allowed to give a brief account (I shall not detain your attention for long) regarding those things known to me as a member of the center and those things which I have done. I believe that this will be of assistance to the court as well to those commanders who are in attendance."
Permission was naturally granted and Fel'dman's subsequent speech filled some 12 pages of the stenographic record.
During the trial, the circumstances of the case were subjected to an extremely superficial and incomplete examination, while the questions directed to the defenadants were tendentious and leading in nature. The court not only ignored contradictions present in the defendants' testimony, regarding when the conspiracy was formed, when the defendants had entered it, who comprised the central leadership, and the nature of their conspiratorial activities, but also covered up these contradictions as is clear in the following section.
The court did not demand any objective documentary evidence and testimony, which should have been required in order to assess the veracity of the charges, nor did it summon any expert witnesses to examine the case.
The entire proceedings concerning the trial of Tukhachevsky and the others was recorded by stenograph However, the stenographic record was proof read and corrected by the same NKVD officials who had carried out the investigation, in particular, the fasifier of the case, Ushakov-Ushamirsky. This explains the numerous distortions in testimony that is met with in the stenographic record. One of the court stenographers, Timofeeva, member of the KPSS from 1938, when comparing her authentic stenographic notes with the decoded text, explained to the Party Commission of the TsK KPSS in 1962, that:
"I worked as a stenographer during the trial of Tukhachevsky and the others... In Volume 15, page 154, of the official corrected stenographic record, the word "Japanese" had been added to the phrase "General Staff," resulting in an apparent confession on the part of Tukhachevsky during his final words to court that he had been in contact with the Japanese General Staff. In actual fact, this was a falsification committed by persons unknown, as the stenographic record of the proceedings, which I had written, made no mention such connections on the part of Tukhachevsky, nor did he in fact say them...
On page 144 in the same volume of the stenographic record, it states that Eideman told the court: "Although it is true to say that the information I handed over was not all that valuable in comparison to that which Tukhachevsky and the others had given to the Germans, Japanese and Poles, nevertheless, I must confess that I was engaged in espionage, as this information was secret." This was also a falsification as the stenographic record which I had taken down has Eideman stating on page 133, that "Although it is true to say that if I am asked about this, then yes, these are state crimes...a crime involving trivial information, neverthelss, it is a crime - state betrayal, and should be named as such."
In presenting their final remarks to the court, the defendants continued to slander themselves, while swearing love and devotion to the Motherland, the party and Stalin.
Their fate, of course, had been decided in advance. The former Secretary of the Court, Zaryanov, reports:
"Ulrikh told me that he had kept I. V. Stalin informed about the course of the proceedings. He stated he had received instructions from Stalin that all the defendants were to receive the highest measure of punishment - execution."
Zaryanov's remarks are supported by the visitor registration record [of the Kremlin - skoblin], which shows Stalin receiving Ulrikh on 11 June 1937.From the accompanying notes it is obvious that Molotov, Kaganovich and Yezhov had also been in attendence.
On the same day of the trial, Stalin directed the following instructions to the various republics, territories and regions:
"To the national TsKs, kraikoms [territorial committees - skoblin] and obkoms [regional committees - skoblin]. In connection with the ongoing trial against the spies and saboteurs Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uberovich and the others, the TsK suggests that you organize workers' meetings, and where possible meetings among peasants and red army units as well, and put forward the proposal that the most severe method of punishment is required. The trial is to be concluded this evening. A report of the sentencing is to be published tomorrow, that is the twelfth of June. 11.VI.1937. Secretary TsK. Stalin."
At 11:35 in the evening on 11 June 1937, Chairman Ulrikh announced the verdict, sentencing all eight defendants to be executed, along with the confiscation of all personal possessions and the deprivation of all ranks that had been conferred.
During the night of June 12, Ulrikh signed orders for the Commandant of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, Ignatiev, to conduct the immediate execution of Tukhachevsky and the other condemned as determined by sentencing. The execution order was signed by Vyshinsky, Ulrikh, Tsesarsky, Ignatiev and NKVD Commendant, Blokhin, who had all attended the execution.
After the trial, Budyonny presented Stalin an account of his impressions of the proceedings on 26 June 1937. In it he wrote:
"From the very beginning of the proceedings, while the statement of indictment was being read aloud and during the presentation of testimony by the other defendants, Tukhachevsky would shake his head, as if telling the court, the investigation and everyone else that everything written in the statement of indictment was essentially false and did not correspond to the facts. In other words, he struck the pose of an aggrieved man, neither comprehending nor deserving that which was taking place, although outwardly he gave the impression of being very confused and frightened. It is obvious, that he did not reckon on such a swift unmasking and elimination of the organization nor such a swift investigation and trial... During the proceedings, Yakir dwellt on the essential aspect of the conspiracy, which consisted of restoring capitalism in our country on the basis of a fascist dictatorship...
In subsequent speeches given by the defendants, they all essentially adhered to the basic framework supplied by Yakir in his speech.
In his own speech, Tukhachevsky initially attempted to refute the testimony he had given during the preliminary investigation. Tukhachevsky began by stating that until Hilter's fascist revolution had occured in Germany, the Red Army had been prepared to meet the Poles and was capable of defeating the Polish state. Upon Hitler's rise to power, however, Germany entered into a bloc with Poland and expanded from 32 divisions to 103 divisions. The Red Army, in comparison to the German and Polish armies had some 60 to 62 fewer divisions... Tukhachevsky, as if presenting an official report, attempted to popularise the idea to those in attendance, that he had foreseen everything, and had attempted to demonstrate to the government that this situation would lead the country to defeat, but that no one had allegedly listened to him. Com. Ulrikh, however, on the advice of several members of the Special Session, interrupted Tukhachevsky and asked him to reconcile this explanation with the testimony he had given to the preliminary investigation, and specifically, with his testimony that he had been in contact with the German General Staff and had been working as a German agent since 1925. Tukhachevsky declared that, although he could be considered a spy, in actual fact he had given German intelligence no information whatsoever...
Uberovich's speech conformed to that given by Yakir...
Kork testified that he was apprised of everything, and that the leadership of the Fascist counter-revolutionary military organization viewed its connections with Trostsky and the Rightists as a temporary phenomenon. Eideman was unable to tell the court anything... Putna, this patented secret agent and confirmed Trotskyist, testified that, while being a member of this organization and always adhering to the principle of working honestly for the conspirators, nevertheless alleged that he did not believe in the correctness of their actions... Primakov maintained a courageous demeanour during the trial more than the rest... He persistently denied that he had led a terrorist group consisting of Shmidt, Kuz'michev and others directed against the person of com. Voroshilov.... Fel'dman testified in the same fashion, as did Kork."
In describing the last words of the defendants, Budyonny remarked that Yakir, Uberovich, Putna, and Fel'dman stated that they had confessed and repented "within the walls of the NKVD."
Upon the conclusion of his report to Stalin, Budyonny remarked:
"1. ... in an attempt to conceal their espionage and counter-revolutionary activities prior to 1934, the defendants, who had been exposed by Kork in this regard, tried to make Kork out as a liar and a confused individual. 2. All the defendants attempted to conceal Gamarnik's participation in the conspiracy in no uncertain terms... 3. ...Although the defendants stated that they did not succeed in handing over their defeatist plan to the German General Staff, I believe that their plan to defeat the red armies, while not necessarily detailed, was neverthless turned over to German intelligence."
Belov, another member of the military court, wrote to Voroshilov on 14 July 1937:
"Bourgeois morality, interpreting everything in its own fashion, states "the eyes are the windows of the soul." After witnessing the proceedings of this trial, I was able to satisfy myself of the falsity of this expression more than any other time during my entire life. Nothing in the eyes of this entire gang could convey anything which would allow one to discern the boundless villainy of those defendants who sat in the dock. They shared a common countenance... something unnatural. The stamp of death already lay on all their faces. On the whole, they had a sallow look about them... Tukhachevsky attempted to maintain his "aristocratic bearing" and his superiority over the others... He tried to show off his broad operational and tactical insight. He attempted to prevail upon the feelings of the judges, by recalling past comradely endeavours and the good relations he had held with the majority of the members of the court. He also tried to steer the court towards considering his positive qualities, while reducing his traitorous activity to trivialities...
Uberovich was more unnerved than the first two. He appeared in a civilian suit, without tie or collar, a tramp...
Kork, although also dressed in a civilian suit, always maintained a soldier's demeanour... Fel'dman strove for complete sincerity. Rebuking his defendants -in-arms in the trial for lacking the courage to call things by their proper name, he stated that they had been engaged in the most common form of espionage yet they wished to interpret this as legal relations with foreign officers. Eideman. This man was the most pitiable of them all. Weakened by defeat, he walked with an unsteady gait. He did not speak, but prattled on incessantly in a confused and halting voice. Primakov seemed to have become seriously thin, and displayed a deafness which he had not had earlier. He carried himself with confidence... Putna had not lost nearly as much weight, but the usual confidence in his voice was missing...
All their final words were spoken in brief, except for Kork and Fel'dman, both of whom pleaded for mercy. Fel'dman even went so far to state, "Where indeed lay concern for the living, if pardon and forgiveness are not given." The rest all stated that death was little for such serious crimes... They swore their love for the Motherland, for the party, and for the leader of peoples, com. Stalin...
General impression regarding the condemned: 1. None of them were entirely truthful and they have taken much with them to the grave. 2. All of them nursed the hope that they would be forgiven; hence their verbal declarations of love for the Motherland, the party and com. Stalin."
As for the conduct of Tukhachevsky, Yakir and the others upon their execution, Todorsky, member of the KPSS since 1918, reported:
"Several days after the execution, the People's Commissar of Defense, K. Ye. Voroshilov, told us...that during the execution the doomed comrades cried out" "Long live Stalin!", "Long live Communism!". Now that these inccoruptible men have been fully rehabilitated within both the ranks of the party and that of the government, we take cognizance of the fact that these men, while staring an underserved death square in the face, found in themselves the strength of spirit to declare that they were dying as communists."
After the execution of Tukhachevsky and the others, Stalin ordered that assemblies and meetings be conducted everywhere in order to set public opinion against these men. Reports of the verdict and the executions were published in the newspapers and broadcast in the army on Voroshilov's orders. All of this resulted in disinformation of the facts among the party organs, military organizations and the soviet public concerning the case, while the role of the NKVD in the country was extolled and praised. Soon after the Tukhachevsky trial concluded, a large number of NKVD officials, led by Yezhov, were awarded with medals.

1. N. I. Yefimov, Corps Commander and former Head of the Artillery Administration of the RKKA. Executed in 1937.
2. E. F. Appoga, Corps Commander, Department Head of the RKKA General Staff. Executed in 1937.
3. Ya. E. Rudzutak, Member of the Central Committee. Executed in 1938.
4. A. S. Yenukidze, Member of the Central Committee. Executed in 1938.
5. L. L. Sedov. Son of Leon Trotsky. Murder in Paris by Stalinist agents in 1938.
6. S. S. Kamenev. Soviet military leader. Died in 1936.
7. L. M. Karakhan. Soviet diplomat. Executed in 1937.
8. G. L. Pyatakov. Member of the Central Committee. Executed in 1937.
9. I. N. Smirnov. Former Trotskyist. Executed in 1936.
10. G. G. Yagoda. Former head of the NKVD. Executed in 1938.
11. G. A. Osepian. Army Commissar, 2nd Rank. Executed in 1937.
12. I. R. Apansenko. RKKA Commander. Killed in action in 1943.
13. OSOAVIAKHIM. Soviet paramilitary organization: Voluntary Society of Assistance to the Army, Air Force and the Navy..
14. M. Fishman. Head of the RKKA Chemical Administration..
15. A. M. Vol'pe. Red Army instructor. Executed in 1937.
16. Belitsky. Former NKVD official.
17. G. K. Voskanov, Corps Commander. Executed in 1937.

Next section: III. Analysis of the materials involved in the investigation and the trial.

The Trust - Part VI: The Trust and the MOTsR

2009-04-11T15:02:00.000-07:00

Over the years, some writers have questioned whether the MOTsR ever existed as an independent monarchist organization. The former Polish intelligence official mentioned previously, for instance, claims that from the very beginning the organization was a legend designed to entrap foreign and domestic monarchists. Although this lay well within the realm of the possible, considering the conspiratorial ability of the Cheka-OGPU, there appears to be sufficient indirect evidence to negate this thesis. As it is, the evidence supplied by the Polish official is scant, and consists merely of an unsubstantiated presentation of alleged OGPU communications and by the fact that Yakushev was employed by a Soviet economic department, which was under the control of OGPU Chief Dzerzhinsky.
The latter point is of only minor significance, since in 1921 Dzerzhinsky had been appointed head of the VSNKh - the All-Russian National Economic Council - and in this capacity was the de facto head of the entire Soviet economic apparatus. As for the alleged OGPU communications, it must be admitted that almost the entire history of what would be the Trust consists of allegations, with no one set commanding greater claim to the truth than any other. For the most part, the only real deciding point is through the use of textual analysis and deference given to what constitutes the most logical sequence of events, given the available information and considering the opposing interests involved. In this case, however, we have recourse to an interesting set of articles, which directly impacts upon the problem in question. In the 1950s, an anonymous contributor to one of the emigre journals published a number of documents pertaining to the MOTsR, many of them corresponding to early 1922, the same period of time in which the OGPU was interrogating Yakushev and coming to grips with the nature and extent of the monarchist organization of which he was a member. Most of these documents apparently passed through the hands of Artomonov in Reval, who was operating under the codename Lipsky.
The first of these cited documents - a letter sent by the chief liaison of the MOTsR, who went by the codename Polyak - was received in May 1922 and covers the period of time roughly corresponding to that of Yakushev's detention. In this letter, Polyak reported that the MOTsR still lacked any significant organizational structure and had only recently begun establishing contact with monarchist groups outside of Moscow. He described the Moscow organization as having roughly 280 members, with the toal strength of the movement being roughly 400. Polyak also related that the MOTsR had had its founding congress on March 1st in Moscow, with some 21 delegates in attendance, and that the congress had been employed to determine the structure and tactics of the organization.
Another letter, received in June and written by the head of the MOTsR - Boyarin Vassily, outlined the financial condition of the organization. According to Vassily, the MOTsR, relying upon the meager resources of its own membership, was experiencing monthly deficits since at least April and required immediate assistance from the emigres in the West if they were to continue their attempts at expansion. Vassily's letter ended on a pathetic note, with the observation that "thousands of persons devoted to Russia and the Throne find themselves hourly under the threat of death and are waiting for only a paltry degree of financial support. Is it true that the emigres will refuse this?"
In addition to financial and organizational difficulties, these documents also have the MOTsR putting a damper on the previous rosy prognostications made by Yakushev in November. Captain Uznik, a member of the ruling Political Council of the MOTsR, in a letter received September 12, related that the Moscow monarchists had originally believed that the Soviet regime would soon collapse as a result of its economic policies. As a result, they had hastily expanded the scope of their organizational work to take advantage of this possibility. In the following months, however, the Soviet regime was able to strengthen its position due to the stabilization of the economy. As a result, Uznik continued, "the hope has disappeared from us regarding the possibility of overthrowing the Soviet government in the near future." Instead, the MOTsR was now re-evaluating the program and tactics it had adopted at its founding congress.
The above-mentioned communications could hardly have designed to impress the monarchist emigres operating abroad. Overall, they present the MOTsR as a cash-starved, fledgling organization operating under conditions that were becoming progressively more disadvantageous - a far cry from an organization, which was supposed to have penetrated almost every major Soviet institution as claimed by Stetskevich. The most likely case is that the actual Monarchist Association of Central Russia was merely that - an association: a loose gathering of like-minded officials and specialists. One imagines those traditional liberal opposition groups from before the Revolution - clusters of well-meaning intelligentsia who would engage in literary circles and subscription dinners, in which active conspiracy against the government was usually not on the menu. Indeed, the "conspiratorial" aspect of the actual MOTsR seems merely to have been one of waiting for the Bolshevik regime to collapse on its own accord.
In order to serve the purposes of the OGPU, however, this vague and nebulous association would have to be tempered into a solid - at least on paper - counter-revolutionary organization; an extensive government in waiting which would command the respect of both emigre organizations and foreign governments. Stetskevich's report about the MOTsR having now penetrated the OGPU et al was likely the first attempt on the part of Dzerzhinsky's lieutenants to effect this transformation4. A more substantial effort would be undertaken by Yakushev himself. Given the codename Fedorov by his handlers, he would be entrusted with the task of impressing upon both the MOTsR Political Council and the foreign monarchist organizations the need to change their program and tactics in favour of ones which ultimately originated behind the ornate walls of the Lubyanka.

4. Evidence of the correctness of this claim may be found in the OGPU's national intelligence assessments for 1922. These assessments corroborate the information provided to the foreign monarchists by Yakushev, Captain Uznik, Boyar Vassily, and Polyak. While the situation in Russia was indeed favourable to the goals of the monarchists at the time Yakushev was meeting Artomonov in Reval, in late 1921, the situation changed significantly duing 1922, improving in the Soviet's favour. By September 1922, during the time of Captain Uznik's last cited letter, the combination of a good harvest and restored economic connections between the industrial and agricultural sectors had brought about a significant drop in worker and peasant discontent, thus corroborating the information provided by Uznik, regarding the declining possibilities for the monarchists. The claims made by Stetskevich to Artomonov in the spring of 1922, however, lay in start contrast, suggesting internal conditions so at variance with actual improving situation that Stetskevich's comments can only be considered as a willful attempt at disinformation and provocation.

The Trust - Part V: Stetskevich and the creation of "the Trust"

2009-04-11T13:12:00.000-07:00

In early 1922, while Yakushev was very likely still in the hands of the OGPU, the Soviet secret police sent one of their operatives - Victor Stetskevich - to Reval to meet with Artomonov under the guise of being a member of the MOTsR. Stetskevich - originally a Polish intelligence official by the name of Stezkiewicz - was another in a long list of former Bolshevik enemies who had been broken by the Cheka interrogators and turned into a willing agent of their designs. According to another former Polish intelligence official, Stetskevich had betrayed the entire Polish underground in the Soviet Union when he changed sides in 1920, during the Soviet-Polish war. Following the war, he worked as a Soviet intelligence officer in Finland and Latvia under the name Kosinsky and became acquainted with the monarchist underground in the Baltic countries. After this stint, Stetskevich emerged at the headquarters of the KRO OGPU under the name Kiakovsky and - according to the same former Polish intelligence official - also participated in Yakushev's interrogation.
To Artomonov and the ever present Shchelgachev, Stetskevich - now going by the name Kolesnikov - produced the pawn shop receipt number that Yakushev had instructed Artomonov to write down as a codeword for future communications. The two White Russians had spent the last several months engaged in fruitless informal inquiries as to the whereabouts and status of Yakushev, who had apparently pledged to send some form of communication upon his return to the Soviet Union. In response to their anxious questions, Stetskevich provided them with the cover story of Yakushev's alleged typhus attack in Irkutsk. He then proceeded to propound upon the MOTsR in terms significantly at variance with that they had received in November during their fateful meeting with Yakushev.
According to Stetskevich, during Yakushev's absence the MOTsR had expanded both geographically and numerically. Contact had been made with monarchist elements in most of the major centers of European Russia. At the same time, the organization had penetrated almost every major Soviet institution - including the army and the secret police. Referring to the latter, Stetskevich now boasted that the MOTsR was able "to elude or frustrate the inevitable reprisals of the OGPU." Echoing Yakushev, the OGPU operative stressed the need for the Moscow activists to take the lead, adding the important proviso that all future monarchist efforts relating to Russia be communicated to and coordinated with the MOTsR. The conversation was continued the next day in Stetskevich's hotel room, where arrangements were made to establish secure communication links between the foreign and internal monarchist organizations through the aegis of the Estonian mission in Moscow. With this, their talks concluded, and Stetskevich headed home to report back to his superiors, while the White guardists reported back to their contacts at the Supreme Monarchist Council in Berlin on the sudden turn of events.
It now appears obvious that Stetskevich's visit to Estonia was undertaken to verify the results of Yakushev's interrogation. When the OGPU operative returned to Moscow with positive confirmation, Dzerzhinsky's lieutenants brought Yakushev in from his cell in order to present to him the structure and character of his assignment within the MOTsR. This assignment consisted of three main tasks: first, to take over liaison work between the MOTsR and foreign monarchist groups, utilizing his ability to travel abroad for the Soviet government; second, to remove 'adventurists and rogues' from among the ranks of the MOTsR and to report to the OGPU planned acts of terrorism and sabotage, and; third, to counter attempts on the part of foreign monarchists to pursue actions deemed detrimental to Soviet interests, including the lobbying of foreign governments for intervention and the pursuit of destabilization policies. Finally, it was announced that from this moment onwards, the compromised MOTsR organization would be supplied with a cover name to be utilized both abroad and within the halls of the OGPU - this name was the Trust. With this, Yakushev was finally released from prison.
As for the period of Yakushev's confinement, no one source provides an explicit accounting of its duration, but through a comparison of the various sources we can arrive at a rough approximation. All sources agree that the monarchist was arrested some time shortly after his return to Moscow - approximately late November 1921. According to a Soviet source, Yakushev had already been in prison at least two months before making his confession - which would have been in late January or early February 1922. Although this same source asserts that he was released shortly afterward - before Stetskevich's trip to Reval - we must agree with above-mentioned former Polish intelligence official that Yakushev's release came after Stetskevich had returned from an obvious mission of verification. Finally, according to a document published in one of the White Russian emigre journals and dated from September 1922, it is reported that Yakushev had been released from prison "in the second month of the [formal] existence of the MOTsR.3" Since the founding congress of the MOTsR - according to this same document - had taken place on 1 March 1922, this implies that the imprisoned bureaucrat was not released until late April or early May 1922. Thus, Yakushev spent approximately five months in the hands of the OGPU.

3. Two important points are to be derived from this document. First, the anonymous contributor of this document makes a formal distinction between the MOTsR as a loosely organized underground movement and that which arose after its formal establishment after its founding congress. Second, this document, provided by a White emigre, states that it was known by at least September 1922, that Yakushev had in fact been imprisoned. There is an obvious contradiction here between those accounts of the Trust, which report that the emigres had received information purporting that Yakushev had been struck with typhus in Irkutsk and this document, which implies that the MOTsR knew that he had been arrested and had in turn notified the emigres. But there is a possible solution to this discrepancy. In another document supplied by the same anonymous emigre contributor, it is reported that Yakushev had been arrested again in late 1922, after his second trip abroad (as described later). This document, however, does not say so explicitly. Instead, it reports that Yakushev "had been ill for three days" following his return. From the tenor of the document, it is clear that 'illness' was a covert euphemism for police confinement. Thus, it is possible that when Stetskevich reported that Yakushev had been ill with typhus, according to the OGPU cover story, the monarchists in Reval interpreted this as meaning he had been arrested. Thus, despite their best efforts to conceal Yakushev's incarceration, the OGPU may have inadvertently employed a monarchist underground code to alert the monarchists that Yakushev had been arrested.

The Trust - Part IV: Arrest

2009-04-11T11:31:00.000-07:00

History abounds with examples in which pressing intelligence or espionage concerns were solved or unraveled through the expediency of the unexpected or the fortuitous. In the case of Trust, the concern of the OGPU was underground monarchist organizations operating within the USSR and the fortuitous was Artomonov's letter. Even before Yakushev's trip to Estonia, the OGPU had already uncovered the existence of the MOTsR. According to one source, OGPU chief Feliks Dzerzhinsky was already pursuing the possible option of breaking into this organization with the aim of utilizing it as a means of penetrating foreign monarchist organizations.

In addition, it is suggested that the Moscow monarchists already had some contact with those monarchist groups operating abroad - again, prior to Yakushev's meeting Artomonov. One possible support for this claim is a reference made about an informal communications existing between Shchelgachev and Aleksandr N. Rtyshchev, a supposed top ranking leader leader of the MOTsR. If this is the case, then the significance of Yakushev's conversation with Artomonov may have been due to the fact that this was the first occurrence of face to face talks between the MOTsR and the emigre monarchists - not that this was the first time the emigres had been apprised of the underground movement's existence.

As it was, a copy of the Artomonov letter arrived on the desk of the Chief of the Counter-Intelligence Section (KRO) of the OGPU, Artur Kh. Artuzov, some time in mid-November 1921. Artuzov had already been entrusted with the task of penetrating the MOTsR by this time. The method chosen fell on procuring an inside man of sorts who would work as a double agent: "a man, whom these gentlemen will believe, whom they know to be a committed monarchist and who could become one of the leaders of the MOTsR, while operating in the interests of Soviet power." Yakushev, with his prominent standing in the former Tsarist bureaucracy and his known monarchist leanings, became the prime candidate for the task.

Artur Kh. Artuzov

On 22 November 1921, the hapless Yakushev returned to Moscow, unaware of the impending catastrophe. Within a few short days, the bureaucrat found himself staring at the blank walls of a prison cell at OGPU headquarters at the Lubyanka. No explanation was given for his arrest, but he suspected it involved his previous counter-revolutionary activities in Petrograd. Little did he know that his arrest concerned his present activities, not his past ones - which, indeed, the OGPU knew about as well.

Instead of confronting the agitated monarchist, his OGPU interrogators - Artuzov and Roman A. Pilyar - broke him down by degrees, reserving their knowledge of the letter and the true nature of Yakushev's visit in Estonia. Their prime task was to compromise Yakushev's sense of moral superiority in relation to the Bolsheviks. They accomplished this through a combination of methods ranging from a list of his marital infidelities to questioning his devotion to the Motherland, laying particular emphasis upon his support of monarchist groups who had been willing to compromise Russian sovereignty in exchange for foreign support. Finally, they broached the topic of his trip through Estonia. After catching their victim in a succession of lies, they produced the letter and a stunned Yakushev finally admitted everything.

Roman A. Pilyar

In his handwritten confession, Yakushev acknowledged, "I was one of the leaders of the MOTsR - the Monarchist Organization of Central Russia, which had as its goal the overturning of the Soviet regime and the establishment of monarchy. I confess that the purpose of my meeting in Reval was to establish contact between the MOTsR and the Supreme Monarchist Council abroad...." Confession, however, was merely the first step in the process of 'turning' the civil servant into a Soviet agent. After securing his guilt, Artuzov and Pilyar stressed the incompetence of the White conspirators whose amateurishness had landed Yakushev in prison and placed his family in danger. They focused upon the joint desires they had with him to rebuild the economy and strengthen the Russian state. Finally, they emphasized the fact that Yakushev could have been executed before, but they had relented and instead had given him a responsible position in the state as a sign of good faith. And then, in full expectation of being assigned a death cell, they suddenly forgave him for his actions and his lies and pronounced that he would be freed to return to his family and his post.
A grateful Yakushev promised to cease all political activities and to fully live up to the expectations placed upon him by the Soviet authorities. For his OGPU handlers, such effusions were indeed appreciated, but they made it known that only positive, constructive political activity on his part could fully expiate his crimes: "You have made one step, it is necessary to make another... It is impossible to stay neutral between the two camps. You must stand up for the defense of the Motherland, actively guard against evil enemies, interventionists, counter-revolutionaries, terrorists and spies..." For this, they demanded that he return to his previous role in the MOTsR and to report back to them for instructions. Before releasing him, they established a convenient cover story to account for the several months in which he had been incarcerated - he had come down with typhus while on an unscheduled business trip to Irkutsk2.

2. The next section will explain some possible interpretations of the phrase 'being ill' in the language of the White monarchist underground.

The Trust - Part III: A Meeting in Reval

2009-04-11T02:10:00.000-07:00

In early November 1921, Yakushev was sent abroad by the Bolshevik government to attend a conference in Scandinavia. On his way, he made a fateful visit in the Estonian capital of Reval (Talinn) to one Yuri A. Artomonov1. Like Yakushev, Artomonov had graduated from the Alexandrovsky Lycee. Unlike Yakushev, however, the young Artomonov joined the army and eventually entered the ranks of the White forces operating in the Ukraine during the Civil War. He subsequently made his way to Estonia, where, according to some sources, he worked the British passport bureau as a translator. He also had close links with monarchists groups among the emigres.
Writers disagree as to the purpose of Yakushev's visit to Artamonov. According to Wraga, it was to inveigle upon Artomonov to divorce his wife, whom he had left behind and with whom Yakushev had become romantically involved. According to the emigre writer Boris Prianishnikov, Artomonov had been a former classmate of Yakushev's at the Alexandrovsky Lycee in St. Petersburg before the war. He asserts that the overt reason for Yakushev's visit was to deliver a letter addressed to Artomonov from the latter's aunt, Varvara Strashkevich. Finally, Nikulin cliams that Artomonov had been a pupil of Yakushev's at the Alexandrovsky Lycee and that Yakushev was carrying on a romance of sorts with Ms. Strashkevich.
Regardless of the actual pretext for the visit and the exact nature of the relations between Artomonov and Yakushev, it is clear that the two men were on familiar terms. This conclusion naturally follows from the nature of the subsequent conversation between them. Once their preliminary discussion had been concluded, Yakushev began to relate to the former White officer a tale likely to enthuse even the most jaded anti-Bolshevik. The essence of the tale centered upon the supposed existence of a powerful underground counter-revolutionary organization, which embraced all parts of organized life under the Bolshevik regime.
Yakushev's account followed three main themes. First, that the Soviet regime was stumbling towards internal collapse, and that in the resulting maelstrom the technical and bureaucratic state apparatus, consisting of former Tsarist specialists and civil servants, would step into the breach and seize power. Yakushev reckoned on a period of no more than three or four months before this would ensue. Second, that an underground monarchist organization had already formed to take advantage of this situation. Third, that this process of state change would be an entirely internal affair. There was no role to be played for either foreign emigres or for foreign interventionists.
Throughout, Yakushev stressed that the lead role was to be played by those monarchists who had remained in Russia and who knew modern Russian conditions, adding that "the monarchist organization in Moscow will give directions to the organizations located abroad and not the other way around." Not surprisingly, if foreign emigres were to be marginalized, the role of foreign powers would be even more curtailed. The inference was that intervention would merely inflame nationalist sentiment and elicit support for the Bolshevik regime.
Their conversation, which also apparently included a close monarchist friend of Artomonov's - Vsevolod I. Shchelgachev, a representative of one of the main monarchist emigre organizations - concluded with mutual affirmation on the need to improve contact between the monarchists in Moscow and those abroad. With this, and the promise of future contact, Yakushev departed for Scandinavia - but not without first arranging a secret code in the form of a pawnshop receipt number.
It remains a source of contention whether Yakushev expected Artomonov and Shchelgachev to pass on his information to responsible emigre figures in the West. Undoubtedly, this must have been implied, since the tenor of the conversation, Yakushev's position within the MOTsR, and the arrangement for future communications all would seem to lead to the idea that the MOTsR wished to impress upon the monarchist emigres the need to limit their subversive activities in Russia and their lobbying of foreign governments for intervention, since these efforts would have impeded the 'natural' collapse of the Bolshevik government and its replacement by the monarchist-inclined bureaucratic and technical elements.
That being said, it must also be asserted that Yakushev probably did not expect the amateurish manner in which Artomonov conveyed this information to his contacts in the monarchist movement. Rather than using the secure route of presenting this information in person, the former White guardist penned a letter to a leading member of the Supreme Monarchist Council (VMS) in Berlin, Prince Kirill A. Shirinsky-Shikhmatov. Within short order, a copy of the letter had found its way to the counter-intelligence department of the Cheka, and from their to Dzerzhinsky and his lieutenants. Although Artomonov had apparently taken the precaution of not mentioning Yakushev by name, his reference to a 'high Soviet official' passing through Estonia limited the potential list of culprits to an exceedingly small number.

1. Also known as "Captain X" in some accounts.

The Trust - Part II: Yakushev

2009-04-11T01:47:00.000-07:00

Aleksandr A. Yakushev was born on 7 August 1876 in the town of Tver, a sleepy provincial capital north of Moscow. A graduate of the Imperial Alexandrovsky Lycee in St. Petersburg, the young Yakushev forewent an early foray into government service in favour of remaining at the Lycee in the capacity of a tutor for the younger class of students. Utilizing the connections he made as counsellor to the offspring of the governing class, Yakushev was able to eventually procure a post in the Ministry of Waterways. By the time of the Bolshevik revolution, the rising bureaucrat had reached the position of actual state councillor in the old Tsarist table of ranks - the same position reached by Lenin's father, Alexander Ulyanov.
The Revolution, however, shattered the orderly and privileged existence of Yakushev and countless thousands of other Tsarist officials. It represented both a political event of profound historical significance as well as the end of a way of life. The Soviet author, Lev Nikulin, describes Yakushev's response to this new reality thus: "Revolution! What right did they have to take away from him his place in the world, a brilliant future, a general's rank, a comfortable state apartment, to smash his career, which he created for decades, and to destroy the state with which he had been connected his whole life?" This view was undoubtedly shared by thousands of other civil servants. Many of them fled to the West to eke out a furtive existence among the ranks of the other emigres. Others chose to remain in Russia, electing to either serve their new Bolshevik master or to pursue the life of an underground opponent of the regime. Other, such as Yakushev, would choose both.
Accounts differ as to the nature and timing of Yakushev's conspiratorial work in the monarchist underground. A former Polish intelligence official claims that Yakushev was approached by Trotsky personally to take up responsibilities in the new Commissariat of Communications as the head of the Department of Waterway, where he subsequently became involved in the MOTsR. A Soviet source, however, presents a more roundabout route. After a futile attempt in organizing underground counter-revolutionary cells in Petrograd, Yakushev fled in late 1919 to Moscow, where he lived on his own meager savings and what money he could acquire throught the sale of silverware and china in the black markets of the capital. Instead of Trotsky, it was a former associate who finally convinced Yakushev that his talents were better served in taking up a position in the new administration. Despite being accepted for a high ranking post in the aforesaid commissariat, Yakushev remained an inveterate monarchist and Russian nationalist. At about this same time he also entered into the clandestine MOTsR, becoming one of its key members.

The Trust - Part I: The Emigre Tangle

2009-04-11T00:46:00.000-07:00

The anti-Bolshevik forces which fled Russia following the Bolshevik victory in the Civil War, constituted a confused knot of mutually antagonist elements. Some of these antagonisms were based upon profound ideological differences, while others were the result of personality conflicts among the various factional groupings. Overall, the main ideological difference consisted of those emigres who supported the February revolution and those who were opposed to any of the revolutions which had occurred in Russia. In the ranks of the former were to be found diverse Social-Revolutionary factions, liberals of various hues, populists and even anarchists. Among the latter were the monarchists, White officers, and conservatives.
Despite their common opposition to social revolution, mutual antagonisms had led to a schism between the White generals on one side and the conservative monarchists on the other. In the former camp, pride of place was afforded to Baron Petr Wrangel - the last Supreme Commander of the United Russian Army (ORA) during the Civil War. After the destruction of the last White redoubt in the Crimea in 1921, Wrangel's forces fled first to Gallipoli and then to the Balkans. But throughout the retreat, evacuation and exile, Wrangel kept his army together through either force of will of threat of penalty. His efforts and his character endeared him to his troops and he remained the single most popular leader among the White emigres.
Ensconced in Serbia, Wrangel desperately tried to preserve the nucleus of the ORA, preparing it for the day, when, in combination with a renewed Western military intervention, it could march once again into battle with the Bolsheviks and take part in the liberation of Russia. Nor was he alone in this view. Over one million Russians had fled to the West and most of them believed their sojourn would be temporary: either the Bolsheviks would collapse from within or they would be overthrown from without. In either case, their hold on Russia would not be permanent. Eventually, the rightful rulers of Russia would return.
But where Wrangel would differ with many of the other White leaders was in how he envisioned the new Russia, which would replace the Bolshevik republic. Alone among the White generals, Wrangel had realized very early on that the old Russia was dead. Desperately, he had tried to impress upon Denikin - the former head of the White forces in Southern Russia during the Civil War - that unless the Whites recognized the great changes that had taken place since the Revolution, they were bound to lose the war. Instead, Denikin and his officers pursued the conflict with the intention of impressing the old structure of the Russian state upon its now shattered foundations. The results were predictable. The peasants, who only recently seized control of the land, took up arms against their returning landlords. The Cossacks and Ukrainians refused their support in the pervasive rhetoric of Great Russian chauvinism. The workers and the Jews...well...they were simply the minions of "the Forces of Darkness" - in the opinion of the Whites - and thus were deserving of repression.
Because of the above mentioned policies, when the decisive battle of Orel was fought in October 1919, the entire rear of the White army was ablaze in discontent. Thousands of troops had to be removed from the front in order to protect the supply lines and to serve garrison duty. The remaining front line troops, now outnumbered two-to-one, quickly broke under the hammer blows of the Red cavalry and Lenin's Lettish brigade, and soon the entire edifice of White power collapsed - and with it the last hope to win the Civil War. For Wrangel, the lesson was simple: "it was impossible to win over Russia. The population has come to hate us." He thereupon championed a new White policy, which recognized the peasant land expropriations, workers' rights and autonomy for Russia's minorities. But this 'leftist policy with rightist hands,' on the part of Wrangel's ORA, was opposed by the other major right-wing organization among the White emigres - the Supreme Monarchist Council (Vysshe monarkhicheskii soviet - VMS).
The VMS, which had its headquarters in Berlin, was lead by Nikolai Ye. Markov, the former head of the Monarchist party in the State Duma. Despite its lofty name, the Council was a fractious association. Younger monarchists, for instance, resented the control their elders had over the council. More serious, however, was a growing split between those monarchists, who supported the claim of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich - the murdered Tsar Nicholas II's uncle - to the now vacant Romanov throne, and those who supported Nicholas' cousin - Grand Duke Kirill Vladimirovich. The latter's support of the February revolution, however, was not forgotten by many monarchists, and it severely weakened his support. Despite these differences, the monarchists of the VMS did share several fundamental values, including the full restoration of the monarchy, the abolition of political parties, the return of expropriated land, and the inviolability of the Empire's borders.
Unable to mount any effective opposition to Lenin's regime with their own meager resources, the various White organizations continually lobbied Western governments for military intervention against the Bolsheviks, for financial support, and for an economic cordon to be placed around the Bolshevik state. In exchange, they often supplied intelligence material to these same governments, utilizing the numerous clandestine contacts they still maintained within the Motherland. They also supported various incursions conducted by guerrilla fighters and partisans, which operated in Western Belorussia and the Western Ukraine, as well as terrorist attacks and assassinations against Soviet officials. In this capacity, they presented a continuous external threat to Lenin and his regime.
But despite these actions on the part of the vanquished and the exiled, most of the monarchists by the fall of 1921 had started to place their greatest hopes upon the idea that somehow the Bolshevik regime would collapse from within, either through its own incompetence or though some sort of national revolt, or both. Although a million or more monarchists and other conservative opponents had fled, even more remained unable to flee for a variety of reasons. Many of these persons had been pressed into service by the Bolshevik state. Lacking trained administrators, the new rulers of Russia had to rely upon the services of their former enemies - under proper supervision of course. Many of these officials, however, remained inveterately hostile to the Bolsheviks and, coupled with the actual day-to-day control they possessed over large parts of the economic and political machinery of state, they constituted a significant internal threat to Lenin's government.
It was not surprising, therefore, that when rumours began to spread in the autumn of 1921, that a new underground monarchist organization had sprung up within the Soviet Union, many emigres sat up and took notice. The organization was known as the Monarchist Association of Central Russia (Monarkhicheskoe ob'yedinenie Tsentral'noi Rossii - MOTsR) and it would monopolize monarchist hopes and dreams for the next five years. And with these hopes would be connected one man - Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Yakovlev - a man whose background and personality made him an unlikely participant of the tragic events which follow.

The Murder of Tukhachevsky - Part 6: The Real Diplomatic Plot

2009-04-10T20:44:00.000-07:00

In the early months of 1936, a number of articles began appearing in the Russian emigre press of Paris and Prague. These articles, published in the Czechoslovak Znamiia Rossiia and Vozrozhdenie in Paris, alluded to a conspiracy headed by Tukhachevsky, which had the aim of toppling Stalin from power. They also claimed that Tukhachevsky had been a German agent since World War I72. The spurious nature of these reports was matched by the equally unctuous character of their writers. Among them were such figures as Kotypin-Liubsky, referred to by at least one French judicial authority as "an agent of the Soviet secret service," and N. N. Alekseev, who was also named as an NKVD agent by the Russian emigre writer Roman Gul'73.
In April of that same year, Czechoslovak officials began receiving information from Russian emigre circles in Prague, which essentially corroborated the above-mentioned press articles. The information claimed that the plotters had the intention of establishing friendly relations with Germany and renouncing the Soviet Union's treaty obligations with the Czechoslovak republic74. In October of that same year, Czechoslovak police managed to arrest some 'suspicious Gestapo agents' in Prague who were preparing to strip the Soviet military attache of his documents. Under interrogation, the agents divulged that the military attache was maintaining contacts with German counter-intelligence75.
That the above-mentioned reports may have come from NKVD sources is supported by Walter Krivitsky, the former rezident of Soviet military intelligence in Western Europe. Krivitsky, writing in 1938, claimed that "the resident agent of the NKVD could publish in the right-wing Vozrozhdenie whatever material he wanted76." The same author goes on to describe one operation in Paris, in which he was ordered to assist, which involved the use of two of his agents who could impersonate German officers, "impressive enough to pass as military attaches 77."
Taking into consideration the possibility that both the writers of the emigre articles and the arrested 'Gestapo' agents may in fact have been NKVD operatives, the question arises for what purpose would the Soviet government have directed such a campaign against its own allied - France and Czechoslovakia. The answer to this question takes us to the very heart of the entire operation which was conducted by foreign agents of the NKVD against the leadership of the RKKA and which accidentally - as it turns out - drew in the German SD as uninvited guests.
Over the years there has arisen a general line of argument that Stalin was counting on receiving information implicating Tukhachevky and other Soviet military officials from a foreign source, and that this source was to have been the German secret service78. The basis of this theory rests upon the fact that General Nikolai Skoblin was a known NKVD agent and that the SD official Jahnke perceived this to be the motive behind Skoblin's intention to meet with SD officials. This view is suspect on several grounds.
First, what many writers seem to forget is that Skoblin was in effect a triple-agent: a member of the White Russian intelligence service since the mid-twenties, of the Soviet OGPU since at least 1930, and of the German SD since around 1935. The idea that he may have been operating independely can not be dismissed. Nor could it be argued that Skoblin would not have risked passing on such information to the Germans without Soviet consent, since the initial rumours of Tukhochevsky's supposed perfidy had already appeared in print almost a year earlier, at the possible behest of the NKVD. Thus, Skoblin's 'disclosures' were already old information. In addition, it appears that Skoblin's prime motivations were ambition and money, and therefore the possibility of receiving German coin may be just as valid an explanation for his actions as an order to do so from his Soviet handlers79.
Second, if the Russians were intent on passing on information implicating Tukhachevsky, one could argue whether they could have chosen a more tainted and suspect agant than Skoblin. That the suspect handler of the incriminating information could not fail to make the said information suspect in turn is amply borne out by the warnings of Jahnke. If the goal of the Soviets was to receive the information back from an external source, the use of Skoblin was very close to employing an automatic brake on the transmission of the material.
Third, in distinction to the allegedly varied and persistant attempts of the NKVD to disnform French and Czechoslovak officials concerning Tukhachevsky's alleged doings, the sole junket of Skoblin to Berlin appears to be the only direct source for German officials regarding the "Tukhachevsky plot." This should make it obvious that Berlin was never considered as the main target of the NKVD effort and that Skoblin's venture may have been an independent effort. If Stalin was indeed hoping to receive information from German hands, the NKVD campaign seems to have been waged under anemic conditions. It is probably for this reason that Skoblin's information seemed so significant for some German intelligence officials.
Finally, the whole idea of requiring a foreign source for materials seems questionable. Considering that the information acquired from Benes never saw the light of day either in the Military Soviet proceedings or in the actual trial, this should already raise doubts as to why such a campaign would have been launched if the proceeds were not to be used80. Additional arguments concerning the necessity of such 'foreign evidence,' in order to persuade some of Stalin's inner circle, also falls on barren ground81. Neither Defense Commissar Voroshilov nor Marshal Budyonny, who both disliked Tukhachevsky for their own personal reasons, had the need for such 'proof.' Nor would figures such as NKVD Chief Yezhov, Politburo member Kaganovich and Stalin's Deputy Molotov, who all owed Stalin their careers, would have made such 'proof' necessary to produce82. As it stands, direct evidence - either factual or falsified - was unnecessary in any of the other cases against leading party, government and military officials83.
The only adequate explanation is taht it was not so much the false information itself that Stalin wanted, but rather the passing on of such information. In other words, the NKVD campaign was conducted not so much to convince domestic consumption - this, indeed, would have been accomplished through the standard tools of a totalitarian state - but foreign observors. Butchery of the Red Army command could not fail to cause concern among the ruling circles of those countries allied to the Soviet Union. In the absence of convincing evidence of a Red Army plot, the leaders of countries such as Czechoslovakia and France would have been forced to conclude that the ruler of Moscow was either a bloodthirsty tyrant or a madman84. The spread of false information in both allied capitals would have given a ready explanation for the Soviet leader's actions. The passing on of the information from either Paris or Prague would have amptly demonstrated that the rumours concerning Tukhachevsky were believed to be true to the point that the USSR's allies had felt it necessary to alert the Soviet government of the danger - which is exactly what Benes did.
There is, however, still one possible explanation for the Soviet disinformation campaign, which has not been adequately developed: that Soviet disinformation would allow Moscow to shift ultimate blame for Tukhachevsky's arrest and execution onto others. Since the implicating documents came from the Czechoslovak government, the Soviet government could always wash its hands of the whole affair by claiming that it was duped by one of its own allies85. Finally, by reacting in such a public and decisive way to information inherently threatening to the existing political and military balance in Europe and, more specifically, to the position of France and Czechoslovakia, Stalin could subsequently assert that his actions in eliminating Tukhachevsky's group were indicative of his strong adherence to the principles of the French-Czechoslovak-Soviet pact86.
As it turned out, however, the Czechoslovak government did not respond to the information provided by the NKVD through the White Russian emigre papers and officials and through the possibly impersonated Gestapo officials. Instead, they chose to accept the information provided by Goering and the German secret service - information which also ultimately originated from the NKVD. Thus, the German secret service was able to inadvertently provide the necessary push on Prague which Stalin's own secret service had been unable to accomplish.
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The Yezhov File (IV)

2009-03-31T23:05:00.000-07:00

Results of the search of former People's Commissar N. I. Yezhov's apartment, 11 April 1939.

Chief, 3rd Special Section NKVD
Colonel, comrade Panyushkin

Report

I am reporting about several items, which were discovered during the search conducted at the Kremlin apartment of Yezhov Nikolai Ivanovich, arrested according to Order 2950 on 10 Arpil 1939.

1. During the search of the desk in Yezhov's office, I discovered in one of the drawers an open package with the letterhead Secretariat NKVD, addressed to TsK VKP(b), comrade Yezhov. In the package was found four bullets (three from the cartridges for a Nagan pistol, and one, apparently, for a Colt revolver).
The bullets were split from being fired. Each bullet was wrapped in paper with the words Zinoviev, Kamenev and Smirnov written on each in pencil, with the paper saying Smirnov wrapped around two bullets. Apparently, these bullets were sent to Yezhov after the executions of Zinoviev, Kamenev and the other. I have taken possession of this package.

2. During the search, I took possession of a Walther pistol, No. 623573, caliber 6.35, and a Browning, caliber 6.35 No. 104799, which were hidden in different places behind books in the book cabinet. In the office desk, I discovered a Walther pistol, caliber 7.65, No. 777615, loaded, with a broken firing pin.

3. While searching the book shelf, behind books in various places were discovered 3 half-bottles (full) of wheat vodka, one half-bottle of vodka, half-emptied, and two empty half-bottles of vodka. They were apparently placed in various locations on purpose.

4. While searching through the books in the library, I discovered 115 books and brochures by counter-revolutionary authors, as well as books by White emigres, in both russian and foreign languages. The books were apparently sent to Yezhov through the NKVD. As the entire apartment has been sealed up by me, the indicated books remain in the office and have been collected in one location.

5. While conducting a search of Yezhov's dacha (sovkhoz Meshcherino) among other books by counter-revolutionary authors, being subject to seizure, were seized two hardbound books titled Concerning the counter-revolutionary Trotskyist-Zinovievite group. The books have a title page and typed text comprising 10-15 pages, with completely blank stitched paper comprising the rest of the volumes.
While conducting the search, various materials, papers, writings, letters and notes of a personal and party character, were discovered and seized according to the search order.

Assistant of the Chief,
3rd Special Section, NKVD
Captain, State Security
Shchepilov
11 April 1939.